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ANNOTATION 
Numerous research and practical publications in business administration, economics, sociology, 
psychology, information sciences, etc. have been dealing with the topic of decision making, 
decision making behavior, decision making outcomes, or emphasizing various aspects of this 
research area, i.e. efficiency criteria, individual and collective decision making approaches, 
human characteristics, degrees of decision making rationality and measuring decision making 
success. But there still seems to be no clear picture if intuitive or rational decision making leads 
to a higher efficiency in business management decision making esp. when problem tasks with 
different structures (e.g. well-, mid- and ill-structured) are involved in the decision making 
process. 
Based on an intensive literature review and on extended theoretical analysis as well as on 
preliminary empirical evidence the author developed a theoretical framework, proposing specific 
cause and effect relationships between personality types as the independent variable and the 
decision making efficiency as the dependent variable, intervened by differently structured 
decision making problems and tasks. 
The present study shows that there are significant results between various degrees of the 
intuition/rationality indicators and the decision making efficiency degrees in well-structured, 
mid-structured and ill-structured decision making tasks. However, there are no overall significant 
correlations, indicating that overall the hypotheses cannot be substantiated, although rational 
types seem to achieve higher decision making efficiency outcomes within well-structured 
problem tasks than intuitive types. In particular, former research findings seem to be 
corroborated in that the highest degrees of decision making efficiency can be achieved by a 
“pertinent blend” of intuitive and rational personality types in general, and especially when it 
comes to complex strategic decision making issues. 
Finally, more research needs to be conducted in the interdependencies of structural elements in 
decision making processes (goals, procedures, sanctions, risks, etc.) and in the 
individual/personal “design” of the decision makers (personality types, motivation, 
psychological predetermination, group dynamics, etc.). 
Keywords: decision making, intuition, rational, personality types, efficiency 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Actuality of topic and novelty 
Faced with today’s ill-structured business environment with fast-paced change and rising 
uncertainty, organizations are searching for application oriented approaches in management 
decision making which will perform satisfactorily under such ambiguous conditions.1 
Managerial decision making behavior has been in focus both from a scientific and a 
professional position whether rational or intuitive decision making leads to better outcomes. 
By now, scholars have agreed that effective organizations do not have the luxury of choosing 
between the “applications” of intuitive or rational decision making.2 Instead, they try to 
understand how different factors like personality types and problem characteristics influence 
the decision-making process.3 Reviewing the literature reveals that personality pre-
determination and the structure of problems (e.g. well-structured problems versus ill-
structured problems) seem to have a significant impact on decision-making efficiency. 
Further, the review also shows that there is a lack of application-oriented empirical studies in 
this area of research. Therefore, the aim of this research is to propose application oriented 
approaches for organizations, on how to use personality type categories in combination with 
different structured problems in the decision-making process. First, hypotheses are derived 
from the literature on how personality pre-determination and behavioral patterns in the 
decision-making process lead to higher socioeconomic efficiency within certain problem 
categories. Second, a causal model and a setup for a laboratory experiment are proposed to 
allow testing the hypotheses. Finally, the conclusion provides an outlook on how this research 
could support organizations in their decision-making processes. 
The following points mark the novelty of this research: 
• A new model was developed to address, from an empirical point of view, with the 
personality types and the ambiguity of the problem more than one behavioral oriented 
decision making factor. 
• Besides the well- and ill-structured problem the present research defines and includes 
with a mid-structured problem for the first time a further scenario to evaluate what is 
“in between” a well- and ill-structured problem. 
                                                 
1  Sinclair, M.; Ashkanasy, N. M. (2005). Intuition: Myth or a Decision-making Tool? In: Management 
Learning 36 (3), p. 353. 
2  Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior. A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organizations. 4. Aufl. New York, USA: Free Press, p. 139. 
3  Sinclair, M.; Ashkanasy, N. M. (2002). Intuitive decision-making amongst leaders: More than just shooting 
from the hip. In: Pre Print Version. Later published in Mt. Eliza Business Review, pp. 7-10. 
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• The author has shown on an empirical base that the highest degrees of decision 
making efficiency can be achieved by individuals with a “pertinent blend” of intuitive 
and rational personality types in general, and especially when it comes to complex 
strategic decision making issues. 
• Based on empirical findings of the present work, a new approach has been developed 
which can be given to organizations to compose and train teams for different structure 
problem solving processes. 
Purpose 
Empirical findings allow for building an application orientated approach for organizations. It 
shows on how to use personality type categories in combination with different structured 
problems, to advice when to use intuitive, rational or complementary approaches in 
management decision making processes. 
Research object  
Business organizations 
Research subject 
Impact of personality on decision making efficiency 
Aim and tasks of the promotional work 
The author’s aim for this research is to empirically examine the impact of personality on the 
decision making efficiency of different structured problem situations. Therefore the following 
tasks were conducted: 
• Based on an intensive literature review and on extended theoretical analysis as well as 
on preliminary empirical evidence, the author develops a theoretical framework 
proposing specific cause and effect relations between personality types as the 
independent variable and decision making efficiency as the dependent variable, 
intervened by differently structured decision making problems and tasks. 
• The findings from the literature review are used to formulate the hypotheses about the 
impact of intuitive behavior in the decision making process on the outcomes of the 
socioeconomic efficiency within certain problem categories. 
• The hypotheses are the basic foundation for building the causal analytical model 
showing the cause-effect relationship between the dependent variable with the 
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personality predetermination and the independent variable with the socioeconomic 
efficiency of the decision making process. 
• Laboratory experiments are conducted to collect empirical data for correlation 
analyses between personality type measures of the experimentees and the decision 
making efficiency measures in the various decision making task structures. 
Furthermore computation of means, means distribution and relative frequencies of the 
overall efficiency measures in the various decision task structures (well-, mid- and ill-
structured tasks) are conducted. 
• Findings from the correlation analyses and mean values are used to falsify or 
tentatively substantiate the hypotheses and draw conclusions on the results. 
Hypotheses 
The basic hypothesis is formulated as: 
HB: Personality predetermination has an impact on decision making efficiency, varying 
along different decision making structures 
Further sub hypotheses are defined as: 
H01: Intuitive behavior in decision making process leads to higher efficiency within ill-
structured problems than rational behavior 
H02: Complimentary intuitive and rational behavior in the decision making process 
leads to a higher efficiency in mid structured problems than sole intuitive or 
rational behavior 
H03: Rational behavior in decision making processes leads to higher efficiency in well-
structured problems than intuitive behavior 
H04: Rational behavior in decision making processes leads to lower efficiency within 
ill-structured problems than intuitive behavior 
H05: Intuitive behavior in decision making processes leads to lower efficiency in well-
structured problems than rational behavior 
Theses for defense as results of the research outcomes 
1. Rational behavior in decision making processes leads to higher efficiency in well-
structured problems than intuitive behavior and vice versa intuitive behavior in 
decision making processes leads to lower efficiency in well-structured problems than 
rational behavior. 
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2. Personality types with a mix of intuition (N) and rationality (T), by the measurement 
of the MBTI, show the highest efficiency outcomes in management decision making 
within well-, mid- and ill-structured problem situations. 
3. The highest degrees of decision making efficiency can be achieved by individuals with 
a “pertinent blend” of intuitive and rational personality types in general, and especially 
when it comes to complex strategic decision making issues. 
4. Management decisions in groups can be best performed by composing decision 
making teams with adequate personality types of rational and intuitive types. 
Used methods 
A laboratory experiment is used to test the hypotheses, as no other method is more 
appropriate for producing data/answers in such a controlled manner. Popper has already 
highlighted the fact that one of the main issues within an experiment is to eliminate all 
disturbing factors.4 This is especially valid for laboratory experiments. The laboratory 
experiment, as already explained, seems to provide, in the author’s case, a good possibility for 
the observer to gain insight into the arrangement and the execution of the experiment. The 
intersubjective checkability and traceability of the laboratory experiment can be rated higher 
than that of a field experiment which may include all kinds of disturbing side effects. A 
further methodical basic requirement for empirical testing, which allows repeating the 
experiment again under reproducible circumstances, is also fulfilled to a greater degree with a 
laboratory experiment than with any other purpose like method because of the controlled 
environment in which the experiment takes place.5 The laboratory experiment is therefore 
characterized by a high degree of reliability. A further aspect of the laboratory experiment is 
that experimental situations can be constructed in a variable way so that cause-effect 
relationships can be clearly isolated and tested. This allows for attributing or denying an effect 
clearly to a cause.6 In the author’s case he can determine if a different kind of personality has 
an impact on the decision making efficiency within different structured tasks. This way it can 
be determined if the decision making efficiency outcomes within different structured problem 
situations change when personality/cognitive styles change.  
  
                                                 
4  Popper, K. R. (2005). Logik der Forschung. 11. Aufl. Hg. v. Herbert Keuth. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, p. 84. 
5  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 157-160. 
6  Bortz, J.; Döring, N. (2006). Forschungsmethoden und Evaluation. Für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler. 4. 
Aufl. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Medizin-Verl., pp. 57-58. 
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Approbation of results of research 
Several steps during the development of the dissertation were presented and discussed within 
the following international business conferences and publications: 
a) Conferences 
1. Hoeckel, Christopher, PERSONALITY TRAITS, BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES 
AND EFFICIENCY MEASURES IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING – A LITERATURE REVIEW, Global Business Management Research 
Conference, University of Applied Science Fulda, Dec. 02-04, 2011, Fulda, Germany. 
2. Hoeckel, Christopher, THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS AND 
BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES ON THE OUTCOMES OF MANAGEMENT 
DECISION MAKING – A FRAMEWORK FOR AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, New 
Challenges of Economic and Business Development Conference, University of Latvia, 
May 10-12, 2012, Riga, Latvia. 
3. Hoeckel, Christopher, THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS AND PROBLEM 
CHARACTERISITCS ON EFFICIENCY OUTCOMES IN MANAGEMENT 
DECISION MAKING – A FRAMEWORK FOR AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 
International Business and Economics Conference, University of Applied Science 
Kufstein, August 03-05, 2012, Kufstein, Austria. 
4. Hoeckel, Christopher, THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS AND PROBLEM 
CHARACTERISITCS ON EFFICIENCY OUTCOMES IN MANAGEMENT 
DECISION MAKING, 71th UL scientific conference session “Economic and Business 
Impact of Globalization” Conference, University of Latvia, January 30, 2013, Riga, 
Latvia. 
5. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher, THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS 
AND PROBLEM CHARACTERISITCS ON MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING OUTCOMES: SOME EXPRIMENTAL FINDINGS AND EMPIRICAL 
CONCLUSIONS, 42 Annual Meeting, Western Decision Sciences Institute, March 
26-29, 2013, Long Beach CA, USA. 
6. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher, THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY TRAITS 
AND PROBLEM CHARACTERISITCS ON MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING OUTCOMES: PRELIMENARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, New 
Challenges of Economic and Business Development Conference, University of Latvia, 
May 09-11, 2013, Riga, Latvia 
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7. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher, MEASURING EFFICIENCY, IN 
MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKNIG – THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND 
STATE OF RESEARCH, International Business and Economics Conference, 
University of Applied Science Kufstein, Nov. 29-30, 2013, Kufstein, Austria. 
b) Publications 
1. Hoeckel, Christopher (2012). The Impact of Personality Traits and Behavioral Patterns 
on the Outcomes of Business Management Decision Making – A Framework for an 
Empirical Study. In: New Challenges of Economic and Business Development 
Conference Proceedings, Riga, Latvia, pp. 259-269. 
 http://www.evf.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/projekti/evf/konferences/maijs_2
012/session8/Hoeckel.pdf 
2. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher A. (2013). The Impact of Personality Traits and 
Problem Structures on Management Decision-Making Outcomes. In: Journal of 
Modern Accounting and Auditing 9 (3), pp. 282-293. 
 http://www.davidpublishing.com/DownLoad/?id=12195 
3. Hoeckel, Christopher (2013). Personality Traits, Behavioral Approaches and 
Efficiency Measures in Business Management Decision Making - A Literature 
Review. In: Business Management Strategies and Research Development - Discussion 
Paper No. 8, Fulda, Germany, pp. 6-16. 
 http://fuldok.hs-fulda.de/volltexte/2013/271/ 
4. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher A. (2013). Measuring Efficiency in Management 
Decision Making - Theoretical Analysis and State of Research. In: Business 
Management Strategies and Research Development – Discussion Paper No. 8, Fulda, 
Germany, pp. 17-29. 
 http://fuldok.hs-fulda.de/volltexte/2013/271/ 
5. Neuert, Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher A. (2014). The Impact of Personality Traits and 
Problem Characteristics on Management Decision Making Outcomes - Some 
Experimental Findings and Empirical Conclusions. In: Journal of Business and 
Management, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 77-94. 
 http://www.chapman.edu/business/faculty-research/journals-and-essays/jbm-
online.aspx 
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6. Neuert Josef, Hoeckel, Christopher A., Woschank, Manuel (2015). Measuring 
Rational Behaviour and Efficiency in Management Decision Making Processes: 
Theoretical Framework, Model Development and Preliminary Experimental 
Foundations. In: British Journal of Economics, Management & Trade, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
pp. 299-318. 
 http://www.sciencedomain.org/abstract.php?iid=701&id=20&aid=6565 
Content of dissertation 
In the first chapter, the literature review on normative and descriptive decision making 
theories and personal disposition and problem characteristics in decision making reveals that 
individuals, as intuitive or rational types, share distinct personality characteristics and 
therefore behave according to their personality in certain problem situations in predictable 
ways. As rational types rely more on their conscious, analytical, effortful and affect free 
“system” they seem to perform well when solving well-structured problem tasks. Well-
structured problem tasks therefore seem to call for rational decision making approaches. In 
turn, intuitive types rely more on their unconscious, automatic, rapid, effort less and holistic 
“system” and therefore seem to perform well when solving ill-structured problems. Ill-
structured problems, therefore, seem to call for intuitive decision making approaches. In the 
second chapter the causal analytical model shows the cause-effect relationship between the 
dependent variable with personality predetermination and the independent variable with 
socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making process intervened by the problem structure. 
The setup of the empirical experiment explains how the data are collected within a laboratory 
experiment allowing to conduct statistical analyses and to measure the impact of personality 
type measures of experimentees and the decisions making efficiency measures in various 
decision making task structures. In the third chapter statistical analyses of the personality 
predeterminations and the overall efficiency measures in the various decision task structures 
(well-, mid- and ill-structured tasks) are conducted to tentatively support or refute the 
hypotheses. Finally the conclusions and suggestions wrap up the dissertation. 
Discussion of research results 
According to the literature review, the personality predetermination and the ambiguity of 
problem structures seem to be two of the larger contributors to the outcomes of decision 
making efficiency. Therefore this empirical study focused on the impact of personality types 
and the ambiguity of problem structures on decision making efficiency by no means denies 
that other factors mentioned in the literature have an impact on decision making efficiency. 
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Narrowing this down to two factors, could result in the fact that remaining factors, which 
might provide significant impact, show lower correlations.  
The problem tasks for the empirical study were selected from typical business management 
tasks. But there is a risk that factors like experience, knowledge, etc. could “play” a more 
significant role beside the personality types or the ambiguity of the problem structure. 
Meaning that independently from the individual personality of the experimentees, the 
experience within specific domains of the problem task has a greater impact on the empirical 
efficiency outcomes. 
Main results of the research 
The outcome of the research can be resumed by the following general experimental findings:  
Contradictive to theory, there seems to be evidence that rational oriented types achieve higher 
efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks than intuitive orientated types. As for the 
significant relationship between personal efficiency and rational orientated Sensing types the 
hypotheses H01 and H04 cannot be substantiated. 
The empirical data provide significant differences in efficiency measurement between 
Sensing and Intuition types but no difference between Thinking and Feeling types. As the 
hypothesis states that “complimentary” intuitive and rational behavior in the decision making 
process leads to a higher efficiency in mid structured problems than sole intuitive or rational 
behavior, the data do not provide enough substantive results to support the hypothesis H02.  
According to the literature, the empirical data support the fact the rational orientated 
personality types (Thinking types) are overall more efficient when solving well-structured 
problem tasks than intuitive orientated types. In this case the empirical data provide 
substantive results to tentatively support the hypotheses H03 and H05. 
Main conclusions and suggestions 
In particular, former research findings seem to be corroborated in that the highest degrees of 
decision making efficiency can be achieved by a “pertinent blend” of intuitive and rational 
personality types in general, and especially when it comes to complex strategic decision 
making issues.7 
                                                 
7  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer. 
9 
Finally, more research needs to be conducted into the interdependencies of structural elements 
in the decision making processes (goals, procedures, sanctions, risks, etc.) and into the 
individual/personal “design” of the decision makers (personality types, motivation, 
psychological predetermination, group dynamics, etc.). 
Used sources 
The model of Sinclair & Ashkanasy provides a vital basic foundation for research in the 
behavior oriented management decision making processes, as the model contains more than 
one influencing factor unlike other theories and models.8 This enables one to better 
understand dependencies between these factors and most likely reflects the reality to a greater 
degree than the one factor models.  
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8  Sinclair, M.; Ashkanasy, N. M. (2002). Intuitive decision-making amongst leaders: More than just shooting 
from the hip. In: Mt Eliza Business Review - Pre Print Version, 5 (2), pp. 7-10. 
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1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT DECISION 
MAKING THEORY AND PERSONALITY TYPES9 
In the past business leaders and top executives used to be in the position to rely predominantly 
on their analytical techniques to chart the future course of their businesses. Today’s business 
environment is more and more characterized by a climate of rapid changes.10 To keep track of 
these dynamic changes organizations face today, the challenge is to move more quickly. Top 
executives today and increasingly in the future will therefore need to make major decisions 
without having the time to gather “all” (enough) information to apply only analytical 
methods.11 Researchers like Schoemaker & Russo argue that the use of rational decision 
making approaches yield the best outcome.12 But especially in complex situations it seems 
that effective managers do not have the “luxury” of choosing between a rather analytic or 
intuitive approach to problems.13 Therefore it seems that for effective organizations it is 
necessary to couple analytical with intuitive judgment.14 Hodgkinson et al. go even a step 
further as they claim that intuitive judgment is an indispensable component of strategic 
competence and is essential for decision makers.15 The exclusivity for the long time 
dominating rational choice model seems to be outdated for two reasons. First, in complex 
decision making situations it is difficult for the human mind to understand the complexity, the 
conditions and the predictability. Second, people differ in real life significantly in their 
decision making process from the so called “rational choice” model because of the lack of 
                                                 
9  Parts of this chapter have been published in: Hoeckel, C. (2012). The Impact of Personality Traits and 
Behavioral Patterns on the Outcomes of Business Management Decision Making – A Framework for an 
Empirical Study. In: New Challenges of Economic and Business Development Conference Proceedings, 
Riga, Latvia, pp. 259–269; Neuert, J.; Hoeckel, C. (2013). The Impact of Personality Traits and Problem 
Structures on Management Decision-Making Outcomes. In: Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing 9 
(3), pp. 382-393. 
10  Cf. Agor, W. H. (1986). How Top Executives Use Their Intuition to Make Important Decisions. In: Business 
Horizons 29, p. 49; Hodgkinson, G. P.; Sadler-Smith, E.; Burke, L. A.; Claxton, G.; Sparrow, P. R. (2009). 
Intuition in Organizations: Implications for Strategic Management. In: Long Range Planning 42 (3), p. 278. 
11  Cf. Agor, W. H. (1986). How Top Executives Use Their Intuition to Make Important Decisions. In: Business 
Horizons 29, p. 49; Patton, J. R. (2003). Intuition in decisions. In: Management Decision 41 (10), p. 989. 
12  Schoemaker, P. J.; Russo, E. J. (1993). A Pyramid of Decision Approaches. In: California Management 
Review 36, p. 29. 
13  Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior. A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organizations. 4. Aufl. New York, USA: Free Press, p. 139. 
14  Cf. Ju, B.; Junwen, F.; Chenglin, M. (2007). Intuitive decision theory analysis and the evaluation model. In: 
Management Science and Engineering 1 (2), p. 67; Kutschera, I.; Ryan, M. H. (2009). Implications of 
Intuition for Strategic Thinking: Practical Recommendations for Gut Thinkers. In: SAM Advanced 
Management Journal, p. 18; Mintzberg, H.; Westley, F. (2001). Decision Making: It’s Not What You Think. 
In: MIT Sloan Management Review, p. 89. 
15  Hodgkinson, G. P.; Sadler-Smith, E.; Burke, L. A.; Claxton, G.; Sparrow, P. R. (2009). Intuition in 
Organizations: Implications for Strategic Management. In: Long Range Planning 42 (3), p. 278. 
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time and resources.16 There are also three reasons why people tend to place less trust in 
analytic methods when situations get complicated: first, analytical methods imply 
simplification but in complex situations they can’t overlook the richness of the problem 
context and may miss details that are important. Second, analytical methods need assumptions 
most of the time which may be perceived as unrealistic. And third, people are aware that 
small mistakes can invalidate the outcome of the analysis.17 Shapiro & Spence conclude from 
the latest research that incorrect specification of underlying causal relationships lead to poor 
decisions even with the help of analytical elements.18 Therefore Shapiro & Spence see the 
intuitive approach in more complex situations as a good possibility to enhance the quality of 
the decision making process. For them most of the decisions have both elements of the 
rational and intuitive decision making process; they see an advantage to combine intuitive 
judgments explicitly with analytical judgments. Contrary to the common believe that 
consciously deliberate decisions are the ideal way to approach complex, multifaceted and 
expensive decisions to make the right choice, the study of Dijksterhuis et al. shows a different 
picture. In their study, participants in a simple decision making situation performed better 
with a conscious deliberate approach whereas in a complex situation participants performed 
better with unconscious thoughts without attention.19 
Whereas discursive versus intuitive thinking in Greek philosophy with Socrates (470-399 BC) 
and Plato (427-348 BC) has a longer history, Chester Barnard was one of the first in 
management literature to distinguish decision making in what he called a “logical” (rational) 
and a “non-logical” (intuitive) process.20 Research since then has studied intuitive decision 
making from various perspectives like neuroscience21, psychology22 and within contextual 
                                                 
16  Roth, G. (2008). Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und andere zu 
ändern. 4. Aufl. Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta, pp. 180-181. 
17  Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating intuition. Chicago, USA: Univ. of Chicago Press, pp. 11-12. 
18  Shapiro, S.; Spence, M. T. (1997). Managerial intuition: A conceptual and operational framework. In: 
Business Horizons 40 (1), p. 65. 
19  Dijksterhuis, A.; Bos, M. W.; Nordgren, L. F.; van Baaren, R. B. (2006). On Making the Right Choice: The 
Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect. In: Science 311, pp. 1005–1007. 
20  Cf. Barnard, C. I. (1938/1968). The functions of the executive. Cambridge MA, USA: Harvard Univ. Press, 
p. 185; Henden, G. (2004). Intuition and its Role in Strategic Thinking. Thesis (PhD). BI Norwegian School 
of Management, Oslo, p. 14. 
21  Cf. Bechara, A.; Damasio, H.; Tranel, D.; Damasio, A. R. (1997). Deciding advantageously before knowing 
the advantageous strategy. In: Science 275, pp. 1293–1295; Damasio, A. R. (2006). Descartes' error. 
Emotion, reason and the human brain. rev. ed. with a new preface. London, Great Britain: Vintage; 
Liebermann, M. D. (2000). Intuition: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach. In: Psychological Bulletin 
126 (1), pp. 109–137; Volz, K. G.; von Cramon, Y. D. (2006). What Neuroscience Can Tell about Intuitive 
Processes in the Context of Perceptual Discovery. In: Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (12), pp. 2077–
2087. 
22  Cf Epstein, S. (1991). Cognitvie-Experiential Self-Theory: An Integrative Theory of Personality. In: Rebecca 
C. Curtis (Ed.): The Relational self. Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology. New 
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background.23 Research shows that there are several factors on how we make intuitive 
decisions. For Isenberg and Burke & Miller one key for the decision maker’s choice between 
the rational and intuitive approach lies in the vagueness of the situation.24 For others the task 
characteristic (problem structure or the ambiguity) is one of the main factors for the use of 
intuition.25 Wossidlo supports this view but for him there is a lack in the empirical theory and 
empirical research that in most cases problem characteristics are not adequately considered in 
the setup. For him a definition like “well- versus ill-structured” does not provide enough 
accuracy. He therefore advocates a more accurate systematic approach in describing the 
problem characteristics.26 Allinson & Hayes and Pretz & Totz see the personal 
predetermination as one of the main factors on how people choose a rather intuitive or rational 
approach in decision making.27 Kirsch supports this view because for him personality is also a 
key factor in the decision making process.28 Decisions seem to be a function of the decision 
maker’s cognitive setup which varies with different psychological types.29 For Appelt the 
decision making process is mostly affected by the decision features, situational factors and 
                                                                                                                                                        
York: Guilford Press, pp. 111–137; Epstein, S. (2003). Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory of Personality. In: 
Irving B. Weiner (Ed.): Handbook of psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pp. 159–184. 
23  Cf. Burke, L. A.; Miller, M. K. (1999). Taking the mystery out of intuitive decision making. In: Academy of 
Management Review 13 (4), pp. 91–99; Dane, E.; Pratt, M. G. (2007). Exploring intuition and its role in 
managerial decision making. In: Academy of Management Review 32 (1), pp. 33–54; Khatri, N.; Alvin Ng, 
H. (2000). The role of intuition in strategic decision making. In: Human Relations 53 (1), pp. 57–86. 
24  Cf. Burke, L. A.; Miller, M. K. (1999). Taking the mystery out of intuitive decision making. In: Academy of 
Management Review 13 (4), p. 94; Isenberg, D. J. (1984). How senior managers think. In: Harvard Business 
Review, p. 87. 
25  Cf. Dane, E.; Pratt, M. G. (2007). Exploring intuition and its role in managerial decision making. In: 
Academy of Management Review 32 (1), p. 45; Fields, A. F. (2001). A Study of Intuition in Decision-
Making using Organizational Engineering Methodology. Thesis (DBA). Nova Southeastern University, 
Florida, pp. 93-94. 
26  Wossidlo, P. R. (1988). Die wissenschaftliche Ausgangslage für das Projekt Columbus. In: Eberhard Witte 
(Hg.): Innovative Entscheidungsprozesse. Die Ergebnisse des Projektes "Columbus". Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 
(Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, 58), p. 17. 
27  Cf. Allinson, C. W.; Hayes, J. (1996). The Cognitive Style Index: A Measure of Intuition-Analysis for 
Organizational Research. In: Journal of Management Studies 33 (1), p. 119; Pretz, J. E.; Totz, K. S. (2007). 
Measuring individual differences in affective, heuristic, and holistic intuition. In: Personality and Individual 
Differences 43, p. 1248. 
28  Cf. Kirsch, W. (1971a). Entscheidungsprozesse II. Informationsverarbeitungstheorie des Entscheidungs-
verhaltens. Wiesbaden, Germany: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler, p. 103; Kirsch, W. 
(1971b). Entscheidungsprozesse III. Entscheidungen in Organisationen. Wiesbaden, Germany: 
Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler, p. 162. 
29  Cf. Feger, H. (1975). Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der psychologischen Entscheidungsforschung. In: Hermann 
Brandstätter (Hg.): Entscheidungsforschung. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, p. 28; Hauschildt, J.; Gmünden, H. G.; 
Grotz-Martin, S.; Haidle, U. (1983). Entscheidungen der Geschäftsführung. Typologie, 
Informationsverhalten, Effizienz. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 216-217; Henderson, J. C.; Nutt, P. C. (1980). 
The influence of decision style on decision making behavior. In: Management Science and Engineering 26 
(4), pp. 371–386. 
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individual differences.30 The empirical studies of Neuert come to the conclusion that 
individual personality has a significant impact on the degree of decision making efficiency.31 
The model (Figure 1) of Sinclair & Ashkanasy assumes that the behavior oriented decision 
making process is affected by four categories: 1. problem characteristics, 2. decision 
characteristics, 3. personal disposition, and 4. decision making context.32 Those four 
categories again include sets of factors which characterize more closely the content of these 
categories. 
 
Figure 1: Categories and factors of the behavior oriented decision making process 
Source: Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2002, pp. 7-10 
                                                 
30  Appelt, K. C.; Milch, K. F.; Handgraaf, M. J. J.; Weber, E. U. (2011). The Decision Making Individual 
Differences Inventory and guidelines for the study of individual differences in judgment and decision making 
research. In: Judgment and Decision Making 6 (3), p. 252. 
31  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 330-331; Neuert, J. O. 
(2010). The Impact of Intuitive and Discursive Behavioral Patterns on Decision Making Outcomes: Some 
Conjectures and Empirical Findings. In: WDSI Annual Conference Readings, Lake Tahoe, USA, p. 4491. 
32  Sinclair, M.; Ashkanasy, N. M. (2002). Intuitive decision-making amongst leaders: More than just shooting 
from the hip. In: Mt Eliza Business Review - Pre Print Version, 5 (2), pp. 7-10. 
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The model of Sinclair & Ashkanasy provides a vital basic foundation for research in the 
behavior oriented decision making processes as the model contains more than one influencing 
factor unlike other theories and models.33 This provides a better understanding of the 
dependencies between these factors and most likely reflects the reality better than the one 
factor models. 
Starting the review with the normative and descriptive decision making theories allows 
building the main foundation for this dissertation. In a next step the development from the 
rational choice theory to the bounded rationality will be laid out and therefore Simon’s theory 
of administrative behavior in decision making in business management will be basically 
addressed. As intuition in decision making is more complex to understand, as it is by nature a 
vaguer subject, the description and definition of intuition is laid out in a more elaborate way. 
Within the section of personal disposition the review explains how individuals process 
information by two independent, interactive conceptual systems and how using these different 
cognitive styles impact the decision making process. The following chapter, problem 
characteristics, is reviewed by focusing mainly on how information complexity and the 
problem structure impacts the decision making process. Further, it explains how different 
structured problems (like ill-defined versus well-defined problems) can be conceptualized and 
how decision makers can approach these problem characteristics according to their cognitive 
structure. 
1.1. Decision making in business management 
A decision is, amongst others, a reaction to a conflict situation. The conflict situation in this 
sense can be seen as a psychological imbalance where individuals are urged by some kind of 
behavior to achieve again a psychological balance.34 The literature also pictures decision 
making as a process which intends to reduce given complexity at the beginning of a problem. 
The decision making process is finished when the complexity is reduced to an acceptable 
point.35 In this case decision making in business management can be characterized by a set of 
minimum criteria: 
                                                 
33  Sinclair, M.; Ashkanasy, N. M. (2002). Intuitive decision-making amongst leaders: More than just shooting 
from the hip. In: Mt Eliza Business Review - Pre Print Version, 5 (2), pp. 7-10. 
34  Thomae, H. (1975). Die Entscheidung als Problem der Interaktion von kognitiven und motivationalen 
Vorgängen. In: Hermann Brandstätter (Hg.): Entscheidungsforschung. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 1–2. 
35  Hauschildt, J.; Gmünden, H. G.; Grotz-Martin, S.; Haidle, U. (1983). Entscheidungen der Geschäftsführung. 
Typologie, Informationsverhalten, Effizienz. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, p. 233. 
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• Having at least two or more alternatives 
• Having at least one existing target which can be a solution to the conflict or problem 
• Disruption of previous behavior 
• Weighing of the alternatives while taking into account the resulting consequences and 
• The evaluation of the result36 
Decision making is not a onetime action of a choice, rather it is a process that lasts over a 
certain period of time. The matter of the choice within the decision making process is an 
action or omission of reaching or maintaining a certain purpose.37 But beside reaching or 
maintaining a certain purpose with the decision making process, a further aim is to do it with 
high quality. The quality within decision making can be described in the sense of how 
thoroughly elaborate and with how much speed it is made. More generally the decision 
making process can be understood as a target orientated process which at the end has an act of 
will to select a choice.38 But before gaining the ultimate result of the decision the selection of 
a choice out of a set of alternatives is necessary and there are cognitive sub processes such as 
the search und evaluation of solutions. Therefore it seems clear that the decision making 
process consisting of various sub processes can be seen as an overall process to solve 
problems.39 A decision making situation can be understood as an episode in an individual’s 
biographical continuum which begins when at least two options of behavior are present and 
which (maybe not fully or definitely) ends when the individual decides to give preference to 
one of the options.40 Kirsch believes from a theoretical background, that decision making and 
problem solution processes by definition are different processes.41 But because they are in his 
sense grounded on the same base and therefore share the same kind of identity he advocates 
using them equally. For him the decision making- and problem solution process in business 
                                                 
36  Cf. Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr 
(Empirische Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), pp. 17-18; Hauschildt, J.; Gmünden, H. G.; Grotz-Martin, S.; 
Haidle, U. (1983). Entscheidungen der Geschäftsführung. Typologie, Informationsverhalten, Effizienz. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, p. 233. 
37  Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr (Empirische 
Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), pp. 17-18. 
38  Cf. Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr 
(Empirische Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), p. 19; Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior. A study of 
decision-making processes in administrative organizations. 4. Aufl. New York, USA: Free Press, pp. 3-4. 
39  Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr (Empirische 
Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), p. 24. 
40  Feger, H. (1975). Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der psychologischen Entscheidungsforschung. In: Hermann 
Brandstätter (Hg.): Entscheidungsforschung. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, p. 16. 
41  Kirsch, W. (1970). Entscheidungsprozesse I. Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Ansätze der Entscheidungstheorie. 
Wiesbaden, Germany: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler, pp. 70-72. 
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management today contains the following phases: identification of the problem, obtainment of 
necessary information, development of possible solutions, evaluation of those solutions, 
selection of a strategy for implementation of the solution and implementation of the action 
with a subsequent learning and revision phase.42 Smith supports this view because for him 
decision making implies that there is a choice between alternatives which exists or will be 
identified.43 The problem solving process in contrast is directed towards the resolution of the 
problem. The problem solving process is laid out to evolve from an existing situation to a 
desired situation but not necessarily by choosing between alternatives. For Simon decisions 
under an administrative or business management background are mostly purposive orientated 
towards goals or objectives.44 The decision can be distinguished in the selection of final goals 
that he calls “value judgment” and the implementation of such goals that he calls “factual 
judgments”. Decision making can be described as a process by which a number of alternatives 
are narrowed down to one alternative.45 All decisions are a matter of compromise. Due to 
environmentally inevitable circumstances the final selected alternative is, in most cases, the 
best solution out of a limited amount of alternatives available in trying to attain the maximum 
level of the purpose.46 A selection or a choice in the decision making process seems not to be 
a matter of a conscious or deliberate process.  
For Barnard the nature of decisions within business management consists of two main parts: 
first, a purpose and second, the physical or social world under which circumstantial decisions 
will be made.47 He refers to this part as the environment of the decision. For Barnard the 
purpose is essential to provide any meaning to the decision making process. But in reverse, 
however, the purpose without any environment itself has no meaning at all. So the purpose 
can only be defined in relation to the environment. As soon as a purpose is placed in a certain 
environment, it becomes clearer and more understandable. Barnard also believes that this is 
not a onetime action.48 When placing a purpose into an environment it enables differentiating 
                                                 
42  Cf. Kirsch, W. (1970). Entscheidungsprozesse I. Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Ansätze der 
Entscheidungstheorie. Wiesbaden, Germany: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler, p. 73. Witte, E. 
(Hg.) (1988). Innovative Entscheidungsprozesse. Die Ergebnisse des Projektes "Columbus". Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr (Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, 58), pp. 202-203. 
43  Smith, G. F. (1988). Towards a Heuristic Theory of Problem Structuring. In: Management Science and 
Engineering 34 (12), pp. 1489-1490. 
44  Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior. A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organizations. 4. Aufl. New York, USA: Free Press, p. 3. 
45  Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior. A study of decision-making processes in administrative 
organizations. 4. Aufl. New York, USA: Free Press, p. 4. 
46  Ibid, p. 5. 
47  Barnard, C. I. (1938/1968). The functions of the executive. Cambridge MA, USA: Harvard Univ. Press,  
p. 194. 
48  Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
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the environment to a greater degree. In reverse a more differentiated environment allows 
again the change from a general purpose to a more specific purpose. This process of 
successive decision making allows step by step differentiation of the facts which are 
immaterial or irrelevant and the facts which apparently support or prevent the 
accomplishment of the purpose. With this differentiation the state of selection between 
alternatives starts.49 The decision making process may differ due to two different 
perspectives. First, because of the complexity of the topic and second, because of conflicts in 
consequence of political imbalance which lead to different characteristics of the decision 
making process.50  
1.1.1. Normative and descriptive decision making theories 
a) Normative models of decision making 
The normative decision making theory is mainly based on rational choice theory and aims to 
give advice on how ideal judgments or decisions should be made.51 In a more general sense 
the normative decision making aims to support decision makers by providing models to 
compare possible results of various decision possibilities. A decision making model is 
normally composed of decision making rules and a decision making field which includes 
alternatives, results and the environment (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Basic elements of a decision making model 
Source: Laux et al., 2012, p. 30 
                                                 
49  Barnard, C. I. (1938/1968). The functions of the executive. Cambridge MA, USA: Harvard Univ. Press,  
p. 197. 
50  Astley, W. G.; Axelsson, R.; Butler, R. J.; Hickson, D. J.; Wilson, D. C. (1982). Complexity and Cleavage: 
Dual Explanations of Strategic Decision-Making. In: Journal of Management Studies 19 (4), p. 360. 
51  Cf. Gintis, H. (2005). Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory. In: Analyse & Kritik 
27, pp. 52–54; Koehler, D. J.; Harvey, N. (2004). Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making. 1. 
Aufl. Oxford, UK, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., pp. 3; Laux, H.; Gillenkirch, R. M.; Schenk-Mathes, H. Y. 
(2012). Entscheidungstheorie. 8. Aufl. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Gabler, p. 3. 
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A rational decision is only possible when there are at least two alternatives and therefore any 
decision making model minimum needs two alternatives. To evaluate the alternative it is 
necessary to also include the consequences resulting from these alternatives. The 
consequences are normally considered as targets within the model. These targets express 
which consequences the decision maker attributes to the alternatives and these targets are also 
a requirement for a rational decision.52 For a rational decision the decision makers also need 
to have preferences about the fulfillment of the results.53 
Some of the main requirements for preferences are: 
• Future-oriented means that choices between alternatives should only be dependent on 
various consequences 
• Transitivity means that when the decision maker prefers version A against version B 
and version B against version C, then version A should also be preferred against  
version C 
• Invariance means that the preference should not be dependent on how the decision 
making problem is presented 
• Independent of irrelevant alternatives means that preferring version A against version 
B should be independent if version C exists54 
The result achieved by making a choice for a certain alternative is also dependent on the 
environment and therefore on things which cannot be influenced by the decision maker. 
Therefore the model also has to account for conditions like security, uncertainty and risk. 
When a decision is made under truly rational aspects the alternative, which provides the 
greatest need for the satisfaction of the decision maker, should be the choice.55 A decision 
under security is normally considered when the decision maker knows all the relevant data 
about the environment for the decision making process in which the decision will be made. In 
turn, for decisions under uncertainty the decision maker does not have all the information 
about the environment and at the time of the decision he does not know the result of the 
decision. For decisions under uncertainty the probabilities are either known or nonexistent.56 
For decision making under risk it is not only important to determine the probability for the 
environmental issues but also to discuss the risk attitude of the decision maker. In general 
                                                 
52  Laux, H.; Gillenkirch, R. M.; Schenk-Mathes, H. Y. (2012). Entscheidungstheorie. 8. Aufl. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Gabler, pp. 30-31. 
53  Ibid., p. 41. 
54  Eisenführ, F.; Langer, T.; Weber, M. (2010). Rationales Entscheiden. 5. Aufl. Berlin, Springer, p. 7. 
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there are three possible attitudes about risk: 1) neutral to risk, 2) risk aversion and 3) willing 
to take a risk. The attitude to risk has a fundamental meaning for the behavioral orientated 
decision making process. 
One of the most popular decision making principles for decisions under risk is the Bernoulli-
principle as it is in accordance with the axioms of rational behavior. As the Bernoulli-
principle is orientated on the expected value of gains, decisions made in accordance with the 
Bernoulli-principle and therefore based on normative decision making theory under risk, are 
also called the “expected utility principle”. The actual concept of the Bernoulli-principle is to 
divide complex decision making problems into smaller sub problems where there are always 
only three possible results to choose from. Decision making by the Bernoulli-principle is done 
in two steps: 1) on the foundation of a hypothetical decision problem whereby the utility 
function is determined and 2) the alternative whereby the maximum return on utility is 
chosen. If more than one alternative provides the maximum return then any one of the 
alternatives can be randomly chosen.57 
A further rational decision making approach is the game theory. The game theory is a 
mathematical method that provides a framework to describe, analyze and predict behavior in 
social situations of conflict, cooperation, and coordination. One of the more well-known 
classical games of the game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma.58 In past research game 
theorists took very extreme positions from highly mathematical analyses which presumed that 
people at one extreme are not smart enough to satisfy everyday decisions and at the other 
extreme they use adaptive and evolutionary approaches. By now research tries to chart the 
middle course between an over-rational equilibrium analyses and under-rational adaptive 
analyses by using the so called behavioral game theory. It aims to describe actual behavior, 
mostly within designed laboratory experiments, in order to determine empirically how 
individuals make choices under conditions of uncertainty and strategic interaction.59 In 
traditional game theory behavior in the game is entirely determined by its structure. The 
structure incorporates the players, the decisions, the information, the outcome of the 
decisions. One of the essential difficulties of the game theory is that the consequences of a 
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player are mostly dependent on decisions of others which the player cannot observe and must 
predict. Therefore most games bear uncertainty about each other’s strategies.60 Besides the 
normative theories, which focus on rational decision making of individuals, there is also the 
social choice theory. The social choice theory attempts to analyze group decisions as precisely 
as possible. Social choice theory therefore seeks to analyze collective decision making 
problems. In this case a social choice problem is any decision making problem faced by a 
group of individuals where every group member is willing to state at least ordinal preferences 
over outcomes. The challenge of such social decisions is to somehow combine the individual 
preference by ordering them in a way (social preference ordering) that their preference 
ordering reflects the preferences of all members of the group.61  
b) Descriptive models of decision making 
In turn, normative decision making theories aim to give advice on how judgments and 
decisions should be made. The descriptive decision making theories try to describe how, in 
reality, decisions are made or how people really think and explain why a person made a 
certain decision in a specific way. The aim of descriptive decision making theory is to find a 
meaningful hypotheses about individual or group behavior to predict or control behavioral 
orientated decisions in specific decision making situations.62 Rational decision making 
approaches, like the Bernoulli-principle (maximizing the utility), are from a prescriptive view 
not to be criticized if given axioms are accepted from the decision maker.63 But as human 
beings, for certain reasons (e.g. limited cognitive capabilities to perceive and process 
information in a logical/rational consistent way), do not behave and act in a totally rational 
way (according to the homo oeconomicus) the rational models do not match the reality of 
decision making of human beings.64 Eisenführ et al. describe four main effects more in detail 
as to why there is a “gap” between the rational and the intuitive decision making, which can 
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occur at different stages of the decision making process.65 First, the bias of forecasting 
probability means that decision makers often have a hard time in determining the 
circumstances of the problem and the probability of occurrence of this problem. Second, the 
“Ellsberg-Paradox”, means that no matter what the origin of the probability is (e.g. expert vs. 
non expert information), it is not valued in the same way. Third, the reference point effect, by 
traditional means of the utility (normative) theory just evaluates the value at the end (final 
state) whereas from a descriptive point of view the decision maker mostly evaluates the win 
or the losses from a reference point looking at the changes in wealth or welfare. And fourth, 
the security effect indicates a phenomenon in which decision makers tend to realize a 
difference between two probabilities, the transition between almost secure and secure. Besides 
those four effect’s Eisenführ et al. see 25 more effects (e.g. sunk cost, framing, anchoring, 
adjustment, etc.) as to why there is a gap between the normative and the descriptive decision 
making models.66  
To bridge the gap between rational models and human behavior in decision making 
Kahneman & Tversky have developed the “Prospect Theory”.67 The Prospect Theory is one 
of the most well-known descriptive decision making theories.68 Within the Prospect Theory of 
Kahneman & Tversky the decision making process is divided into two phases: 1) the editing-
phase and 2) the evaluation-phase.69 The editing-phase mainly presents the prospects in a 
simpler form. In the second, the evaluation-phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the 
prospect of the highest value is chosen. The editing-phase consists of a preliminary analysis 
of the offered prospects where several operations are applied. They transform the outcomes 
and probabilities associated with the offered prospects. Major operations can be described as 
follows: 1) Coding, where the reference point is defined to evaluate gains and losses. 2) 
Combination, where prospects can be simplified sometimes by combining the probabilities. 3) 
Segregation, in which riskless components are segregated from risky components. 4) 
Cancellation, where components that are shared by the offered prospects are discarded. 5) 
Simplification, which refers to the simplification of prospects by rounding probabilities or 
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outcomes and 6) Detection of dominance, where offered prospects are scanned to detect 
dominant alternatives which are rejected without further evaluation.70 In the evaluation-phase 
it is assumed that the decision maker evaluates each of the prospects which were edited and 
chooses the prospect with the highest value. The overall value of the edited prospect is 
expressed in terms of two scales, π and υ. The first scale (π) associates with each probability p 
a decision weight π (p). The second scale (υ) assigns to each outcome x a number υ (x) which 
reflects the subjective value of the outcome.71 An essential feature of the Prospect Theory is 
that the carriers of value are rather changes in wealth of welfare than final states. In this case 
for Kahneman & Tversky the value should be treated as a function in two arguments: 1) The 
asset position that serves as a reference point and 2) the magnitude of change from the 
reference point. They propose that the value function (Figure 3) is defined on deviations from 
the reference point, meaning generally concave for gains and convex for losses and steeper for 
losses than for gains.72 
 
Figure 3: A hypothetical value function 
Source: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279 
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c) Utilization of decision theory elements for the present research 
By now rational choice theorists admit that normative theories fail to describe actual behavior 
in decision making. The foundations of rational choice theories have been under attack from 
experimental findings of decision researchers. They have shown that the descriptive form of 
decision making is consistent with the principles of cognitive psychology but inconsistent 
with rationality as commonly construed. By now it seems obvious that for various reasons the 
normative decision making theory accounts only poorly for actual behavior. Therefore there is 
a need to better understand the actual decision making behavior.73 This is where descriptive 
decision making theories and models try to explain how, in reality, decisions are made or how 
people really behave in certain decision making situations. Building on this foundation the 
present research work aims to provide inside information about the impact of personality 
predetermination and behavioral approaches on the efficiency outcomes of decision making in 
different structured problem tasks. 
1.1.2. Development from rationality to bounded rationality in decision making 
From a historical point of view decision making theory differentiates decision making 
behavior between “closed” and “open” models.74 Closed models can be characterized as 
closed systems where there is no consideration on how the environment might influence the 
decision making process. In closed model decisions premises are taken for granted and 
therefore are treated as independent variables. In contradiction, the open models consider 
interactions between the system and the environment. Therefore decision premises in open 
models are treated as dependent variables.75 The closed model which represents the classic or 
neoclassic view is a typical rational choice model of economic decision making where the 
preference of the decision maker is on the maximization of net benefits or utilities by 
choosing the alternative that returns the highest level of benefits.76 Kirsch describes this 
rational model as the classical case of the “homo oeconomicus” where individuals with 
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rational behavior use their given resources to maximize their returns.77 Neuert refers to this 
notion as the “economic man model”.78 The economic man has a complete system of 
alternatives which allows him to choose among these alternatives. Also, he always has 
complete awareness of these alternatives and has no limits to complexity of the calculation, so 
that he can determine which alternative is best. Objective rationality would imply that first, all 
behavior alternatives prior to the decision have been viewed in a panoramic fashion, second, 
that all consequences that would follow the decision on each choice have been considered and 
third, that one alternative is picked out of a whole set of alternatives with a system of values 
as criterion.79 Taking, at least, these implications into account shows that the model of 
rational behavior falls short.80 For Simon decision makers are not infallible rational-analytical 
machines. Their behavior of objective rationality falls short in at least three ways: 1) 
Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that follow 
on each choice. 2) Since these consequences are in the future, imagination must supply the 
lack of experience. 3) Rationality requires a choice among all the possible alternative forms of 
behavior. In actual behavior, just a very few of these possible alternatives ever come to 
mind.81 This view is also supported by March. In reality, at the time of the decision making 
process not all alternatives are known and not all consequences are considered.82 March even 
believes that relevant available information is often not used, goals are inconsistent and 
incomplete and decision rules used by the decision maker often differ from decision making 
theory. Rather than looking for the “best possible” (maximizing) action, they search for the 
“good enough” (satisficing). Beyond many observations of decision making behavior, for 
March there seems to be a theoretical reason why human beings find the satisficing behavior a 
more compelling notion: from a cognitive perspective a complex world gets more simplified 
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for individuals when they are able to divide the world into two parts of “good enough” and 
“not good enough” instead of having to worry about an infinite number of alternatives.83  
Recognizing this was the reason for transmuting the closed model of the “homo 
oeconomicus” into the open model of the “administrator” which we can recognize in everyday 
life of bounded reality.84 The administrator is characterized by a satisficing rather than 
maximizing approach looking for the good enough solution by choosing alternatives without 
examining all possible solutions. Doing this, the administrator ignores interrelations and 
complexity that enables him to make decisions with relatively simple rules of thumb.85 For 
March the development of the idea of limited rationality was also due to the fact that 
individuals and groups tend to simplify decision making problems because they have 
difficulties in anticipating or considering all alternatives and all information.86 Here Kirsch 
sees similar restrictions like Simon and March as to why individuals tend to act like the 
administrator instead of the homo oeconomicus.87 For Kirsch, in the first place, individuals 
are more comfortable with smaller changes at the time since they are less risky and they can 
anticipate the consequences better than with larger changes. Second, because of restricted 
resources of information processing individuals tend to look for a limited amount of 
alternatives and just consider a limited amount of consequences within these alternatives. 
Third, individuals tend to solve problems not finally, but rather adapt them to new 
possibilities. This will make them feel better, especially when they have not considered all 
possibilities, since they will approach the problem again anyway. Lastly, individuals mostly 
encounter problems as they arise rather than taking a long term approach.  
Whereas in the past behavior was only considered as being rational when given targets were 
maximized (optimized), today the concept of rational behavior also seems to be appropriate 
when given targets are satisfied.88 Originally, rationality was only considered as individual 
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rationality. Decisions to satisfy role expectations or social standards were therefore, per se, 
not seen as rational. But decision making theory by now interprets rationality in the sense of 
social rationality. Therefore, when decisions are made to satisfy social standards or individual 
roles they are not in contradiction with rationality anymore. At the beginning of the decision 
making theory rationality was also interpreted as a substantial rationality. Decisions therefore 
were only considered as rational if targets were reached that were set by the observer. If the 
behavior could not be objectively evaluated and therefore was not in line with the targets 
given by the observing party, the decision was considered as not rational. By now rationality 
is interpreted as formal rationality where material content of targets or demand has no more 
influence if behavior is considered rational or not.89 A further consideration if behavior was 
rational relied on real given information which could be observed from the outside (objective 
rationality). But form the experience of today it is clear that individuals reflect objective 
reality only partially.90 Individuals rely only on subjective, simple models of the environment 
when making decisions.91 Therefore today human beings tend to consider behavior also as 
rational when it relies on information which can be experienced subjectively by an individual 
(subjective rationality). For individuals to behave rationally in an organization does not 
directly imply that they try to achieve the goals of the company. They could strive for 
rationality to achieve their own individual targets. So when speaking of individuals as 
behaving irrationally it could, in general, mean that their targets are not our targets or that 
they are acting on incomplete information or ignoring consequences of the future. Moreover, 
individuals and groups in organizations tend strive for their own targets and views of what the 
organization should be like. Therefore our view must include the human selfishness and 
motivation for power.92 
Jones believes that there is also no more doubt that the view of the classic or neoclassic model 
of economic decision making is empirically not sustainable anymore.93 The view of Jones is 
supported by Bronner as in reality the classical model does not appear, because from a 
behavioral point of view, human beings never pursue maximum or minimum goals as 
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assumed in the classical rational model.94 Because of the lack of cognitive capabilities, 
limited resources for the search of information and the cost of information, human beings tend 
to solve problems by looking for a satisfying solution rather than maximizing the returns. For 
Bronner the restriction of information goes along directly with the limited development of 
decision alternatives.95 Therefore the search for alternatives also concentrates on satisfying 
solutions. The so called simplification of reality is not an arbitrary or irrational process. 
Individuals try to find a search mode to be most economical by using the most promising 
alternative. They do this by using heuristic principles trying to separate important from less 
important details. These heuristic principles can be separated in at least two groups: First, into 
special heuristic principles which are based on certain experiences and therefore are only 
valid for these kinds of problems and second, into general heuristic principles which are 
independent from specific experience.96 For Fredrickson boundaries of rationality on the 
members of an organization are often imposed by the structure of the organization (e.g. 
centralized versus decentralized).97 For him the structure of the organization and the degree of 
complexity specifies how wide or narrow the boundaries of rationality are. For Neuert human 
behavior in decision making processes never shows a pattern of pure rationality, as rationality 
is limited to individual and/or collective constraints, like insufficient cognitive competences, 
psychological predispositions, feelings, emotions, etc.98 In particular human behavior can be 
considered as a combination of intuitive and rational behavior. Moreover, based on his 
empirical findings, Neuert comes to the conclusion that a mix of rational and intuitive 
behavioral patterns tend to generate a higher efficiency in decision making processes. 
To Eisenhardt & Zbaracki the discussion whether decision makers are rational or bounded 
rational is not controversial anymore.99 They come to the conclusion that existing cognitive 
limits restrict the rational model and the complexity of the problem often influences the shape 
of the decision path. To them a heuristic perspective is emerging where in contrast to a 
traditional rational view as a “monolithic concept” a more multidimensional approach is 
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suggested. In this case decision makers are rational in some ways but not in others. One 
example here is the study of Isenberg where he found that managers on the one hand made 
contingency plans, a rational strategy, but on the other hand acted quickly on incomplete 
information, a bounded rational strategy.100 For Gigerenzer & Selten bounded rationality can 
be described as step-by-step rules or procedures which function well in situations where there 
is limited research, knowledge or time available.101 Bounded rationality can be specified into 
three classes of processes: into simple search rules, where pieces of information are acquired 
or adjustments are made and this process is repeated until it is stopped, into simple stopping 
rules, where the search is terminated when, for example, the first object is chosen which 
satisfies the aspiration level, or into simple decision rules, where the search is stopped when 
having acquired a limited amount of information and a simple decision rule is applied, like 
choosing the object that has been favored by the most important reason. For Gigerenzer & 
Selten bounded rationality has the following characteristics: first, it is a collection of rules and 
heuristics rather than a general purpose decision making algorithm, second, these heuristics 
are fast, frugal and computationally cheap rather than consistent, coherent and general, third, 
these heuristics are adapted to the particular structures of the environments, both social and 
physical.102 Gigerenzer & Selten believe simple heuristics work, because they can exploit 
structures of information in the environment. This rationality is a form of ecological 
rationality rather than one of consistency and coherence. A further reason for simple 
heuristics to work is the robustness of their simple strategies compared with models which 
have large numbers of parameters. Last, real world situations often involve multiple 
competing goals which have no common denominator and include serious problems for 
optimization but can be handled by models of bounded rationality. Roth comes to the 
conclusion that there are rational considerations but that there are no rational decisions.103 He 
argues that the limited capacity of the human brain makes it impossible to solve complex 
problems by calculations. Even if it is possible to calculate larger parts of problems, there are 
always parts which have to be estimated or assumptions which have to be made. A further fact 
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is how human beings make decisions in real life. Due to knowledge and time limitations 
human beings tend to rely on decision making heuristics like the rule of thumb, which can be 
very effective. They therefore accept risks and suboptimal results either because of 
convenience or to come to an end. The biggest flaw for Roth in rational decision making 
theory is the fact that rationality in decision making by human beings plays just a minor role. 
The studies of Dijksterhuis et al. show Roth that rationality in the case of conscious cognition 
only plays a role for problems with lower complexity.104 For Roth decisions are always 
emotional, no matter how long rational considerations were considered. Rational arguments 
for him always affect decisions through emotions.  
1.1.3. Intuition in decision making 
The term intuition is defined as “immediate understanding, knowing something instinctively, 
identifying a pattern without thinking”.105 Psychology and management intuition have been 
associated with many terms and definitions. Such include: primary mode of perception which 
operates subconsciously, analyses frozen into habit, gut feelings, a problem solving process 
reached nearly effortless without conscious awareness involving little or no conscious 
deliberation, a form of reasoning with the ability to recognize patterns from experience in 
lightning speed, affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and 
holistic associations.106 For Volz & von Cramon, intuition is “knowing something without 
knowing how you know it”.107 Ju et al. see intuition within the decision making process as a 
combination of the decision maker’s knowledge, experience and emotions.108 For Sadler-
Smith intuition is rapid, a judgment, affect-laden, involuntary, holistic, ubiquitous, non-
conscious and both powerful and perilous.109 Pretz & Totz view intuition as “a product of the 
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tacit system and highlight three distinct aspects of the nature of intuition: affective, heuristic, 
and holistic”.110 Hodgkinson et al. view intuition as a complex set of inter-related cognitive, 
affective and somatic processes in which there is apparently no rational thought, no deliberate 
process and it can be difficult to articulate.111 To them the outcome can be experienced as a 
holistic hunch or gut feeling.  
For Kahneman & Tversky intuition can be understood in three senses. 1) a judgment without 
the use of analytic methods or deliberate calculation and it can be reached by an informal and 
unstructured mode of reasoning, 2) a formal rule of fact of nature if it is compatible with our 
lay model of the world and 3) a rule or procedure seems to be part of our repertoire of 
intuitions when we apply it or follow the procedure in our normal conduct.112 
For Roth there are rational considerations but there are no clear rational decisions.113 
Decisions to him are always emotional no matter how much rationality is stacked on the 
emotions. In this sense for him decision making always includes emotions and therefore is 
either affective emotional without consideration, what he calls “gut feelings”, or is a 
combination of rationality and affective emotions. But for Roth gut feelings are not the same 
as intuition. For him intuition is implicit knowledge being derived from the preconscious.114  
Intuition is mostly viewed under a philosophical or psychological perspective. Greek 
philosophy, especially the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, distinguished between the ordinary 
inferential kind of thought, so called discursive thought, and a kind of non-inferential, non-
discursive or intuitive thought. Under the philosophical approach in diverse Greek schools 
intuition was seen as spiritual insight whereby intuition mostly relies on the perception of the 
superior state of mind or divine principles.115 From a historical point of view in psychology 
intuition is mostly viewed as some sort of unconscious, biased and automatic processing 
which is inferior to controlled analyses. Psychologists in the past had the tendency to ignore 
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intuition.116 Carl Gustav Jung was one of the first ones in psychology to address intuition in a 
more elaborate way.117 For Westcott there are not many references to intuition in 
psychological literature. For him the only grand theory which has been presented in 
psychology is probably the one by Jung.118 Jung described intuition as a kind of perception 
which does not exactly go through the senses but goes via the unconscious.119 He sees 
intuition as a basic psychological function that mediates perceptions in an unconscious way. 
In intuition contents present themselves as whole and complete without being able to explain 
or discover how this content came into existence.  
Chester Barnard was among the first in management literature to briefly distinguish the 
rational and intuitive process: 
“By “logical processes” I mean conscious thinking which could be expressed in words, or 
other symbols, that is, reasoning. By “non-logical process” I mean those not capable of being 
expressed in words or reasoning, which are only made known by a judgment, decision or 
action. This may be because the processes are unconscious, or because they are so complex 
and so rapid, often approaching the instantaneous, that they could not be analyzed by the 
person within whose brain they take place. The sources of these non-logical processes lie in 
physiological conditions or factors or in the physical and social environment, mostly 
impressed upon us unconsciously or without conscious effort on our part. They also consist of 
a mass of facts, patterns, concepts, techniques, abstractions, and generally what we call formal 
knowledge or beliefs, which are impressed upon our minds more or less by conscious effort 
and study”. 120 
Even though there are several varieties of intuition to Allport it seems they always hold 
knowledge in one way or the other. For him the simplest form of intuition is “direct 
perception” whereby less is added by experience since structures are clear and the solution 
and the choice seem obvious. Next is “innate knowledge and identity” which requires 
operative activity between the external environment and innate ideas. According to Allport 
there are patterns in the human mind which are confirmed by the activity of senses. A further 
concept of intuition is “immediate knowledge” whereas intuition rises from a sympathetic 
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attitude toward outside reality; you feel it is right.121 When interviewing 60 experienced 
professionals holding significant positions in major organizations Burke & Miller’s findings 
revealed that 56 percent understood intuitive decisions to be based on previous experiences, 
together with emotional inputs, which are in line with the statement of Barnard.122 For Burke 
& Miller intuition is a cognitive conclusion which is based on the decision maker’s previous 
experience and emotional inputs.123 Agor, Harper and Matzler et al. also see the ability to use 
intuition as a particular domain which is acquired through experience and learning and relies 
upon a process of pattern recognition.124 Volz & von Cramon conceive intuition as a process 
where the coherence of patterns, meanings or structures are perceived in an affective valence 
or “gut feeling” based on previous experience.125 
For Isenberg executives use intuition in five distinctive ways: first, for sensing intuitively 
when a problem exists, second, to rely on well learned behavior patterns rapidly, third, 
synthesize isolated bits of data and experience into an integrated picture, fourth, intuition as a 
check (a belt and suspenders approach) and fifth, to bypass in-depth analysis and move 
rapidly to come up with a plausible solution. For Isenberg intuition therefore is not the 
opposite of rationality, nor the random process of guessing. For him intuition is based on 
experience in analysis and problem solving.126 
Khatri & Alvin Ng see intuition not as an irrational process. For them intuition is a complex 
phenomenon that draws from our store of knowledge in our subconscious and has it’s roots in 
our past experience. Further it is based on the deep understanding of the situation.127 
Gigerenzer believes that intuition, or what he calls “gut feelings”, has its own rationale. 
Rationale in this sense consists of two elements: simple rules of thumb or heuristics and these 
two elements taking advantage of the evolved capacities of the brain.128 Like van Riel et al. 
with the active sense and common sense style, Gigerenzer understands the nature of intuition 
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in two ways: first, one assumes that intuition solves complex problems with complex 
strategies and second, one assumes that simplicity relies on the evolved brain.129 For 
Hammond et al. these heuristics are not foolproof. They see various kinds of “traps” when 
using these heuristics as shortcuts in decision making.130 For Klein the expert’s intuitive 
ability derives from cues which rapidly match with more commonly occurring patterns 
leading then to action steps in ways that lead to effective problem solving or decision making. 
Klein calls this routine the recognition primed decision (RPD) model which combines two 
processes: first, how decision maker’s size up the situation to recognize which course of 
action makes sense and second, evaluate the course of action by imaging it. This two-part 
process of pattern matching and mental simulation is to Klein the explanation why human 
beings can make good decisions without generating and comparing a list of options. To Klein 
coming to a good decision means the necessity of having good mental models of how things 
work.131 To Allinson & Hayes intuition is a cognitive style or trait.132 Hogarth reviews it as a 
cognitive strategy.133 For Hodgkinson et al. intuition can be conceptualized as one element of 
practical intelligence.134 For Sarmany-Schuller intuition is also a cognitive style which is 
associated with immediate assessment and the adoption of a global perspective based on 
feelings.135 
In the latest research intuition has been viewed as one part of a two part information 
processing system: system 1 and system 2.136 System 1 is believed to be the evolutionary and 
older one and the one that involves the automatic and relatively effortless processing and 
learning of information without conscious attention. It is described as automatic, tacit and 
natural associative. The second system is called System 2 and is determined by being rule 
based, extensional, intentional and deliberate. System 2 enables individuals to learn 
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deliberately, to develop ideas and engage in analyses in an attentive manner.137 According to 
the cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a dual process model developed by Epstein and 
his colleagues, the rational system operates analytic, verbal and relatively affect-free at a 
conscious level, Epstein and his colleagues believe that these two systems are two parallel 
interactive modes of information processing which are served by separate cognitive systems. 
The experimental system is believed to be older and operates automatically, primarily non-
verbal in nature and is emotionally driven at a preconscious level.138 Recent studies by 
Liebermann et al. using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have also identified 
two processing systems within social cognition.139 One of the processes being intuitive 
(reflexive) refers to ‘the X-system’ and the other one the analytic (reflective) refers to ‘the C-
system’. The older evolutionary system, the X-system, is based on parallel processing, is fast 
in operation, slow in learning and spontaneous. In contrast the C-system is based on serial 
processing, is slow in operation, fast in learning and intentional.140 Kahnemann believes that 
human beings always first address System 1 because it is fast, less effortful and less work. 
Human beings involve themselves or switch to the slower and more effortful rational system, 
System 2, when the first approach to System 1 fails or does not bring the expected results.141 
Although management writers use terms as “business instinct” and “intuitive insight” as a 
synonym for intuition it is important to recognize that intuition is neither the same as instinct 
nor is it equivalent to insight.142 Intuition and insight are related in such a way that they both 
rely upon non-conscious mental processes.143 Intuition seems to be an affect laden judgment 
whereas insights are clear-cut solutions. Sadler-Smith believes that insight consists of a 
creative problem solving process with several stages like, preparation, incubation, intimation 
illumination and verification where at the end the solution pops up as insight in a “Eureka” 
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moment.144 He sees insight as a process of “prepared mind” drawing, consciously or non-
consciously, conclusions on problem relevant information. Instincts merely remain to be 
hardwired, autonomous reflex actions.145 
1.2. Personal disposition in decision making 
a) Personality and behavior 
Personality can be derived out of two theories: First, the theory of disposition where human 
beings have characteristics which are stable over a certain amount of time and which enable 
them to show a certain behavior in certain situations. In this sense personality can be 
understood as the sum of characteristics which differentiate human beings from each other. 
But personality is not an incoherent set of characteristics, rather a hierarchy of characteristics. 
This hierarchy links different characteristics in a structure which then describes the structure 
of personality. This disposition hierarchy arises from inheritance or learning. Second, 
personality can be derived out of the theory about how human beings process information 
(e.g. cognitive, motivational and emotional). Both theories seem to be available to us and we 
rely intuitively on the theory which seems more appropriate to us at a given time.146 For 
Kirsch personality describes values, motives, attitudes and habits which characterize human 
beings. He sees personality as all the information an individual has learned or stored over 
time, no matter if it ever was retrieved at a certain moment in time or not.147 Roth sees 
personality as a combination of different characteristic types resulting from emotions, 
temperament, intellect and how human beings act, communicate and behave.148 For Roth 
there are four factors which shape personality. The first factor is the genetic pre disposition. 
The second is the development of the brain and especially dysplasia in the front part of the 
brain or in the hippocampus. The genetic pre disposition and the development of the brain 
roughly shape 50 percent of the personality. The third factor is prenatal or postnatal affective-
emotional experiences which roughly count for 30 percent of the personality. The fourth 
factor shapes the personality by socializing with friends, relatives, teachers and colleagues 
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during later childhood and teenage years. Roth sees personality as an outlasting pattern which 
is partly genetic and partly developed during the first few years in life.149 For Roth there is no 
more doubt that the former dispute, about disposition and environment, concerning the 
development of the personality is solved. For him personality results from the 
interdependency of the four mentioned factors.150 Allport understands personality as a 
dynamic organization within an individual’s psychophysical system that determines the 
unique adjustments to their environment. In this sense the psychophysical system represents 
habits, general attitudes and dispositions. The uniqueness indicates the individuality of every 
adjustment of every person in time, place and quality. With the adjustment to his environment 
Allport refers to functional as well as to evolutionary aspects of the environment. Therefore 
adjustment to the environment can include behavioral, geographical as well as evolutionary 
aspects. For him parts of the personality are innate but he clearly stresses the fact that 
personality is influenced by environmental surroundings and the need to adjust to them.151 
Gigerenzer sees it as a “fundamental attribution error” to explain intuitive behavior only 
“internally” without analyzing the environment or the context. For him personality and 
attitude rarely predict behavior well. Intuition that he calls gut feelings are not fixed character 
traits, preferences or attitudes. Therefore to explain intuitive behavior he proposes an adaptive 
approach where it is necessary to have people interact with their environment to use or 
develop their intuitive behavior.152 
b) Cognitive styles 
Cognitive styles in the literature are described as individual preferences in perceiving and 
processing information or as an individual difference how people perceive, think, solve 
problems and relate to each other.153 Often personality and cognitive styles are used 
interchangeably but cognitive style scholars have a different view about to which extent 
cognitive styles are related to personality. In this sense personality is seen as a combination of 
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stable characteristics that give people their own individuality. They consider personality and 
cognitive styles as two independent but related constructs which together affect behavior.154 
The work of Jung was among the first ones that differentiated people in distinctive types on 
how they perceive and how they process information, indicating that those types share distinct 
personality characteristics.155 Jung differentiated people into four mental functions and two 
attitudes, allowing him to describe different types of people. Jung differentiated the four 
mental functions into sensing and intuitive types related to their preference on how they 
perceive information and into thinking and feeling types related to their preference on how 
they make judgments. For him intuitive types prefer to acquire information by imagining new 
possibilities and sensing patterns via the unconscious.156 Intuitive types favor generalities and 
have a preference to focus on the big picture, see patterns in information and are future 
orientated.157 Sensing types, in contrast, prefer to notice concrete factual details with their five 
senses. They depend on objects and only concrete, sensuously perceived objects attract their 
attention and are fully accepted into their consciousness.158 Individuals with a preference for 
Sensing therefore focus on what is occurring at the present and what can be observed with the 
physical senses.159 Thinking types come to a decision by linking up ideas through logical 
connections and use objective information in a logical problem solving process. They tend to 
rely on the principles of cause and effect and to be objective and impersonal when making a 
decision. Feeling types, in contrast, come to a decision by weighting relative values and 
merits of the issues. They tend to rely on an understanding of personal and group values and 
to be more subjective than thinking types.160 Since the decision of Feeling types are generally 
based more on personal and group values, these decisions are frequently viewed as more 
subjective than decisions of Thinking types.161 Jung described the two attitudes as 
introversion and extraversion. For him introverted types are orientated primarily toward the 
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inner world and they tend to focus their energy on concepts, ideas and internal experience.162 
Introverts are more inclined to show slower reactions to events. Extraverted types in contrast 
are orientated mainly toward the outer world; they tend to focus their energy on people and 
objects.163 Extraverts have the tendency to react quickly. For Jung there are only four ways of 
solving problems according to the four mental functions. Human beings can only perceive a 
problem by using a sensing or intuition function. When they realize that they have a problem 
there are only two ways to solve the problem, for instance when they choose between 
alternatives, which is by using the thinking or feeling function. All people prefer one of those 
four functions and it is called the “dominant” or “superior function. The opposite of the 
dominant function is the inferior function. All human beings have one function which is 
applied the most, the dominant function and an auxiliary function which provides a balance to 
the first or dominant function. When the dominant function and the auxiliary function are 
revealed, the decision making style for an individual is determined.164 For Hough & ogilvie 
the decision style is a subset of the cognitive style, which refers primarily to how individuals 
gather and evaluate information for decision making.165 
The more “romantic” view is that formal business planning processes (the sequential-logical 
process) rely on the left brain hemisphere, whereas the less formal intuitive and creative 
aspects of management are accomplished by the right hemisphere and cannot be derived from 
psychological research.166 This view is also supported by neuroscience research as the 
activation of certain areas of the brain can be measured by using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging while working on intuitive tasks. But those areas are not necessarily 
located in the right hemisphere of the brain.167 For Bowers et al. intuition is accessible to 
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everyone but it just differs in speed and accuracy.168 Reber et al. see little or no individual 
differences in implicit learning and hence intuition. Therefore they suggest that it should not 
be related to personality theory as it was done by Jung.169 In contrast the results of the study 
of Woolhouse & Bayne indicate that there are individual differences for sensing and intuitive 
types on how to use strategy and on the performance of implicit learning tasks. For them 
types with a preference for intuition are more successful in using unconscious information and 
types with a preference for sensing tend to prefer information in a concrete format. They 
clearly support the findings of Westcott and Bowers et al. that there are individual differences 
in the use of intuition and these differences can be related to a measure of personality.170 
Westcott found in his study that extreme groups, using his measures, had “distinguishing and 
coherent patterns of personality”.171 Woolhouse & Bayne see the difference in the level of use 
of intuition (more or less) in the nature of people exiting associations between words and 
concepts.172 The main findings in the study of Shiloh et al. support the evidence that an 
intuitive or rational approch in decision making can be related to personality types/cognitive 
styles. Within their study they show that participants with a rational thinking style were more 
related to normative judgements and participants with intuitive thinking style were more 
related to heurisitc judgements.173 
According to the Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory, human beings operate on two 
fundamental information processing systems. The experiential system, which operates mainly 
on an unconscious level relates to experiences which have been built up in the past. The 
experiential system can be characterized as automatic, rapid, effortless, associative and 
holistic.174 Although the experiential system is a cognitive system, it derives beliefs from 
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emotional experiences.175 Epstein describes the experiential system as an automatic, 
preconscious experiential conceptual system. This system regulates everyday behavior which 
is of necessity and emotionally driven by a dynamic unconscious system”.176 In contrast the 
rational system operates predominantly at the conscious level in an analytical, effortful, 
affect-free and relatively slow manner while demanding high cognitive resources.177 The 
rational system is more process oriented, logical-reason orientated and requires justification 
via logic and evidence. The rational system seems to be more suitable when analytic 
approaches are needed or considerations for long time consequences are at stake.178 Because 
the rational and the experiential system are independent from each other, people believe that 
they can think or decide completely rational. But as the two systems can interact and 
influence each other every rational thought or decision is likely to be biased by the 
experiential system.179 In this sense the experiential system can influence the rational system 
also by being a resource of creativity and bringing up ideas which would not be available in a 
purely logical process of the rational system. Further the experiential system can also be a 
useful source of information as it is a learning system. But, in turn, the rational system can 
also influence the experiential system.180 It can reflect spontaneous and impulsive thoughts 
and override them by recognizing that they are inappropriate. The rational system can also 
provide understanding of the operating principles of the experiential system which in turn 
allows people to train, improve and develop their experiential system. In this case there is also 
an unintentional way in which the rational system can influence the experiential system by 
repetitions of thoughts and behavior. Such repetitions become habitualized and therefore shift 
control from the rational to the experiential system.181 Alter et al. support the view that people 
make different decisions based on personality whether they adopt a rational systematic 
processing manner or if they rely on intuitive, heuristic processing. From their empirical study 
they provide evidence that when people experience difficulty or disfluency this leads them to 
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adopt a more rational approach in information processing. The participants in the study who 
experienced difficulty or disfluency while processing information believed that the tasks were 
more difficult and therefore engaged in a more analytical processing style than the 
participants who did not. To them people who usually tend to rely on heuristic processing turn 
to more systematic information processing when experiencing difficulty or disfluency. This is 
a clue that the problem or decision may ask for more elaborate thought and simple or intuitive 
response may be wrong.182 Dijksterhuis et al. found in their studies that participants facing 
simple decision making situations performed well when making conscious, deliberate 
thoughts where as participants facing complex decision making situations performed better 
when making unconscious, intuitive thoughts. The study also showed that post choice 
satisfaction was greater in a simple decision making situation when decision makers had taken 
deliberate, rational approaches. For complex decisions the decision makers experienced 
greater post choice satisfaction when they took unconscious approaches.183  
As different levels of cognitive activities have been observed (e.g. how managers in practice 
use the two information systems), this led to the conclusion that cognitive continuums on a 
single dimension do not allow independent variations on the intensity of use and the relative 
use of each system.184 Therefore van Riel et al. proposed four basic decision styles reflecting 
a cognitive style mix (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Cognitive style matrix 
Source: Van Riel et al., 2006, p. 11 
The four decision styles can be described as following: The rational style is characterized by 
the predominant use of the rational system. It reflects rational analysis with a deliberate and 
logical approach, process and evidence orientated. The common sense style is a mix of 
effortless analytical thinking in combination with experiential cognition. Heuristics, short cuts 
or routine decision making can be seen as practical examples for this style. The common 
sense style is often characterized by high degree of efficiency and effectiveness and is mostly 
used in situations with relatively limited complexity and substance where there is no in depth 
justification required. The intuitive style, for the most part, exclusively and intensely uses the 
experiential style for information processing. The fourth style is active sense making and is a 
combination of effortful rational thinking and intuitive insights of the experiential information 
processing system. As decision makers apply much effort to this style, it seems to be 
genuinely synthetic or creative in nature and therefore has the potential to be the source of 
creativity.185 For Stanovich & West individual differences vary with the cognitive ability and 
thinking disposition. They claim that related to the cognitive ability there are different levels 
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of analyses and differences on how efficient individuals process at an algorithmic level.186 
The study of Kickul et al. revealed that participants showed higher self-efficacy when specific 
stages in a new venture creation process occurred, fitting most closely to their preferred 
cognitive style.187 
1.3. Ambiguity of problem structures in decision making 
In a more general sense a problem can be seen as something unknown in a situation where a 
person is looking to fulfill a need or to accomplish a goal. Problems are characterized by a 
problem domain which consists of content to define the problem elements, a problem type 
describing the combination of concepts and procedures on how to address the problem and 
how to solve it. A problem solving process which depends mostly upon the problem solver’s 
understanding of the representation of the problem type must include the understanding of the 
problem and goal state (cf. experts versus novices). Finally a solution is necessary which 
represents the goal of the problem solver.188 
A problem within a decision making process can be characterized by: first, what priority the 
problem for an individual or an organization has, meaning also what consequences may result 
on how the decision making process is performed; second, on how complex the information 
situation may be. At one extreme the information is “fully” available in a structured- and 
manageable form, adequate, sufficient and can be easily included in the decision making 
process. And at the other extreme the information is vague, maybe extremely scattered, hard 
to retrieve, inadequate, insufficient, overwhelming and therefore difficult to include in the 
decision making process; third, on how ambiguous the problem may be. Ambiguity in this 
sense describes to which degree a problem structure is well-defined or ill-defined or lacks 
clarity.189  
For Shapiro & Spence the approach of the decision making process (intuitive versus rational) 
also depends on the nature of the task (e.g. structured or unstructured). For them tasks having 
a more structured nature like accounts receivable, order entering and inventory control are 
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conducive to analytical reasoning because the they have typically well-accepted decision 
rules. Other tasks with less structured problems like mergers and acquisition decisions, new 
product planning and corporate strategy formulation are typical for the use of intuition.190 For 
Fields it is also evident and observable that individuals in the R&D department have a higher 
level of use of “unpatterned methods” and action modes than individuals in the IT department. 
Fields links this to the fact that R&D works in advance of current technologies and therefore 
has a strong need for future orientated, creative and innovative new products and processes, 
i.e. intuitive behaviors. IT on the other hand works within a well-defined frame work and 
therefore displays rather rational behavior.191 Van Riel et al. support the view that the 
decision tasks varies with the structure of the decision. They also concluded that well 
structured problems call for a rather rational approach as decision makers can make rational 
calculations. In turn for them ill-structured problems are not for rational decision making as 
they are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about the actual and the desired 
situation and therefore don’t have a base for rational calculations.192 A further major 
condition for the nature of the task can be the complexity of the decision making context. 
Problem complexity can overstrain the physical constitution of our brain and therefore 
rational decision making can experience great difficulty when dealing with complex 
problems. Conscious thoughts, in this case, suffer from low capacity making it less suitable 
for very complex problems.193  
Dane & Pratt see the problem characteristics as one of two factors influencing intuitive 
effectiveness. They postulate that the more increasingly unstructured the problems get the 
more effective intuitive judgment becomes vs. rational analysis.194 For Dane & Pratt ill-
structured problems are conducive to the intuitive decision making process due to the absence 
of well accepted decision making rules.195 In a three level model of cognitive processing 
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Kitchener has proposed a possibility to identify three distinct types of problem solving skills. 
At the first level well-defined problems can be solved by using inferential rules and strategies. 
At the second level skills such as metacognition can be used to select and monitor skills from 
level one whereas ill-defined problems require skills which allow monitoring the epistemic 
nature of problems.196 For Schraw et al. there are no epistemic assumptions needed to solve 
well-defined problems because they lead to certain, guaranteed solutions. For ill-defined 
problems this is not the case; they cannot be solved without epistemic assumptions as they 
have no certain, guaranteed solutions. Well-structured problems rarely show in between-
domain transfer while ill-structured problems frequently do so. As epidemic assumptions 
differ among individuals, they reach different solutions when solving ill-defined problems as 
they hold different beliefes about their knowledge. Due to the fact that epistemic assumptions 
are needed for ill-defined problems, in contrast to well-defined problems, for both types of 
problems different cognitive processes are required.197  
For Smith there are various existing conceptualizations of problem structures. At first there is 
the clarity of the problem’s goal state. If the goal is not adequately specified this can produce 
a weakness in the structure and therefore can result in an ill-structured problem. Further the 
problem structure can be conceptualized by how well it is formulated explicitly and 
quantitatively and how it then can be solved with well-known techniques. In this sense the 
structure of the problem can be determined on the degree of clarity, which the decision maker 
gets from his task. Next the problem structure can also be conceptualized by the process. In 
this case a problem is ill-structured when there is no effective solution procedure to solve the 
problem.198 In the case of a well-structured problem, the problem may still be difficult but 
there is a clear procedure on how to solve it. Finally the structure of the problem is linked to 
the knowledge of the problem solver. A problem can be well-structured if the problem solver 
is familiar with the knowledge needed to solve the problem or in contrast the problem can be 
ill-structured if the problem solver doesn’t have adequate knowledge of the problem. In this 
case, regardless of the initial description of the structure, in the end effect it is the behavior of 
the problem solver making the ascriptions to the structure of the problem.199 Within a group, 
problem solving environments for Chizhik et al., well-structured tasks can be seen as 
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activities which have clear specified problems and that there is most likely only one possible 
solution to the problem. In contrast ill-structured tasks are characterized by having multiple 
possible solutions which can be subjectively evaluated as good or poor. Well-structured tasks 
make it easier for members of a group to separate correct from incorrect solutions and 
therefore to address the correct abilities to find that solution. If there seems to be only one 
correct solution in the well-structured task status, hierarchies appear to be maintained and 
there seems to be no need for discussions. Higher status members of the group make their 
suggestions in a kind of top down process restricting lower status members making additional 
suggestions as the task environment is not conducive. This situation has the risk of limiting 
opportunities in the task solving process. In contrast, ill-structured tasks seem to improve the 
perception of lower status group members allowing them to make suggestions even if done 
after the suggestions of higher status group members are made.200 For Chizhik et al. ill-
structured tasks encourage the participation of all group members to access the relevant skills, 
abilities and need for the task completion and therefore provide the lower status members 
with a greater chance to perform. In well-structured tasks the group seems to work more task 
orientated and maintains the hierarchical structure.201 
Joanssen clusters problems into three kinds: puzzle problems, well-structured problems and 
ill-structured problems. For him puzzle problems are well-structured, have a single correct 
answer and all elements which are required for the solution are known. Solving these kinds of 
problems requires using logical, algorithmic processes where the problem solver can 
consistently compare the current state of the problem with the goal state. Well-structured 
problems for him require the use of a limited number of concepts, rules and principles, a well-
defined initial state, a known goal state and a set of constrained logical operators. In contrast, 
ill-structured problems are typically in a specific context whereby one or more aspects are not 
well specified. The problem description is not clear or well enough defined and the 
information to solve the problem is not within the problem statement.202 For Joanssen the 
main purpose in distinguishing between well- and ill-structured problems results in common 
assumption that skills for solving well-structured problems have limited relevance and 
transferability for solving ill-structured problems.203 Hausschild et al. determine that there are 
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three kinds of decisions: 1) Intra-departmental day-to-day decisions, 2) decisions of medium 
complexity and 3) innovative decisions. 204  
1) Well-structured problems 
For Voss more generally a problem seems well-structured when it can be described by the 
following features:  
“1) The goal is well-defined, and generally the solution is agreed upon by the members of the 
respective community. 2) Constraints are usually stated in the problem statement or are 
readily apparent. 3) Operators are frequently mathematical, logic based, or in the case of some 
games, objects moves. 4) The problem lends itself to computer simulation, because the 
number of states, the constraints and the operators are readily within computer simulation 
capabilities”.205 
It seems for Simon that it is impossible to set up a formal definition of a well-structured 
problem. He instead advocates establishing a list of characteristics whereby problems must be 
satisfied in order to be categorized as a well-structured problem. For him well-structured 
problems should comply with some or all of the following requirements: 1. criterions are 
defined for testing any proposed solution, 2. the initial problem state goal can be represented 
in at least one problem space, 3. for the transition from given to attainable states, legal moves 
(attainable state changes) can be represented in a problem space, 4. the problem solver can 
acquire knowledge about the problem represented in a problem space, 5. if the problem 
involves the external world, definition of state changes need to reflect with complete accuracy 
the laws of nature that govern the external world and 6. the basic processes postulated should 
only require practical amounts of search and computation of information.206 For Simon it 
seems striking that parts of a process or a sub problem can be well-structured when the overall 
process or problem is ill-structured.207 For Kirsch in well-defined problem situations a 
stimulus is recognized by the individual which triggers an execution program or at least an 
algorithm which can support the decision making process. If this execution program can be 
directly associated with a situation, this leads to a routine decision. When the execution 
program cannot be directly associated with a situation but with the help of an algorithm the 
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situation can be clarified. For Kirsch this leads to an adaptive decision. When individuals face 
well-defined problem situations they are spared from conflict and uncertainty.208  
For Lee & Cho in a well-structured problem the problem situation is clear and methods to 
solve the problem are known or present, the problem is already given in a standardized 
procedure and there is an appropriate algorithm which ensures the correct answer. For them 
within a well-structured problem there is little room for problem finding as the solutions seem 
obvious and easy to find.209 Kitchener sees this in a similar way. For her well-defined 
problem situations are absolutely correct and knowable. Well-defined problems have two 
constraints, first there is only one correct situation which can be determined with total 
certainty and second the procedure to reach the solution is clear.210 When reflecting on well-
structured problems from an educational background, Joanssen has a similar conclusion. For 
him well-structured problems can by described by the following attributes: all elements of a 
problem are present; the problem solver understands it as a well-structured problem and has 
possible solutions; it involves a limited amount of concepts and rules which appear regularly 
and are organized in a predictive and prescriptive arrangement with constrained parameters; it 
includes correct, convergent answers; has knowable and comprehensible solutions and has a 
preferred and prescribed solution process.211 For Joanssen the problem solving process for 
well-structured problems can be described by a three step process (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Problem solving process for well-structured problem 
Source: Joanssen, 1997, p. 70 
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The first step of the problem solving process is devoted to the representation of the problem 
which means understanding the task of the problem including the problem statement and the 
goal. The problem representation is constructed by the individual and does not emerge from 
the context of the problem solving task. Therefore representing the problem should link it to 
the existing knowledge of the problem solver. The next step is the search for solutions. Most 
strategies to support the search for solutions require considerable skill from the problem 
solver.212 For Joanssen most novices are novices because they lack heuristic strategies and 
problem schemas to search for the problem solution. The third and final step is trying to 
implement the solution. If the solution works the problem is solved, if the solution fails the 
problem solver should return to the problem representation or the search for solutions and 
adjust the process to receive another answer.213 Shin supports this view. For her, to solve 
well-structured problems individuals tend to follow four solving processes: first, by finding 
out what exactly the problem is, second, by finding the appropriate information in the 
individual’s memory or by applying a domain-specific or general searching strategy on how 
to solve the problem, third, by selecting the best solution while anticipating the logical 
consequences of each, and fourth, by implementing the solution and evaluating it to see if it 
solves the problem. Domain-specific knowledge and structural knowledge play an important 
role but it is not enough to solve well-structured problems. It has to be meaningfully 
organized or integrated to solve the problem.214 For Shin well-structured problems can be 
characterized by having single correct, convergent answers which allow the decision maker to 
reach a satisfactory and final solution as with mathematics-related problems. For her well-
structured problems can be solved with various search techniques like recall analogical 
problems, means-ends analysis, decomposing and simplifying the finding of sub-goals and 
generating or testing.215  
2) Mid-structured problems 
Mid-structured problems situation in decision making are described mostly quite vaguely 
within the literature. So terms which are used more frequently are mid-point or “something” 
in-between well- and ill-structured. Lee & Cho are one of the very few authors to describe the 
mid-structured (moderate) problem situation more in detail. They see the problem finding as 
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essential because methods and solutions are not often directly provided. In “moderate” 
structured problems - in the author’s terms mid-structured problems - the overall goals of the 
decision making processes may still be evident but information, findings and data are 
implicitly embedded in the problem. Therefore they must be found and formulated by the 
individual decision maker himself.216 For mid-structured problem situations it seems that: 1) 
they have a defined initial state, 2) goals are known, but information, findings and data might 
be implicitly embedded in the problem and must be formulated and found by the individual, 
3) they require the use of a limited number of concepts, rules and principles and 4) the 
knowledge of skills on how to solve well-structured problems is needed and must be 
discovered by the decision maker himself. For mid-structured problem situations, in addition 
to well-structured problem situations where the problem solutions process is given by a 
known tool, template, method, concept, procedure, rule or algorithm which is used to solve 
the problem, an overall problem solution process is missing and has to be established. In this 
case where as for a well-structured problem situation by definition there is a clear approach 
and a single correct answer, for mid-structured problem situations there could be different 
possible problem solution processes or concepts with similar but varying approaches and 
answers. These varying results still can be evaluated objectively by common conventions in 
contrast to ill-structured problem solutions where no objective solution is possible and results 
respectively answers are evaluated e.g. by an expert solution. 
Based on those theoretical findings from the existing literature, the author refers to mid-
structured decision making problems and tasks by the following criteria and conditions: 
• The problem task is part of strategic management decision making 
• The goal(s) of the problem solution procedure is/are relatively clearly defined and can 
be measured by indicators e.g. profitability, solvency, growth, sales, costs, etc. 
• However the problem environment is dealing with uncertain circumstances and can 
only be measured by subjective probability expectations  
• The decision making alternatives are subject to those uncertain probability scenarios  
• Whereas for the intended goal fulfillment, well-defined algorithms can be applied (e.g. 
investment appraisals, contribution margin computation, time series extrapolation 
methods, etc.), the uncertain environmental circumstances can only be presumed based 
on the problem solver’s creativity and intuition 
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• Thus, the measurement of the mid-structured decision making problem lies clearly in-
between the precisely defined well-structured problem situation and the non-defined 
ill-structured problem situation. 
3) Ill-structured problems 
In comparison to well- and mid-structured problems ill-structured problems are less tangible. 
Voss describes ill-structured problems with the following features: 1) the goal is vaguely 
determined and to get more transparency about the whole situation more analysis and 
refinement is usually required, 2) the constraints of the problem are not part of the problem 
description, 3) in contrast to well-structured problem solutions, ill-structured problems, for the 
most part, cannot be claimed as right or wrong, valid or invalid, they rather can be regarded in 
terms of plausible or acceptable, 4) when a solution is stated it is rather verbal and when a 
solution is presented it is mostly rhetorical in nature, 5) often solutions for ill-structured 
problems are not final in the sense, that having a problem solving result, a plan is put in place 
to find out if the solution really works in reality, based on the implementation and evaluation, 
6) when information is very complex, in the sense of size and structure, and it is therefore 
hard to retrieve for any kind of simulation.217 For Simon a problem is ill-structured, when the 
problem structure lacks definition in some respect. A problem is considered ill-structured 
when it is not a well-structured problem.218 For Bradley many ill-structured problems have no 
single objectively correct solution. Therefore he believes that professionals with extensive 
domain knowledge and task specific experiences use some kind of schema or script driven 
approach to solve ill-structured problems. For him these schemas or scripts are retrieved from 
a base of domain knowledge which has been developed through extensive domain experience. 
In contrast to professionals with well-developed schemas and scripts, the professionals with 
limited domain experience are not able to access this schema driven reasoning process to 
solve ill-structured problem as they have a less developed base of domain knowledge and 
therefore have not enough experience to fully develop these kinds of schemas.219 For ill-
structured problems Lee & Cho see the problem finding as essential because methods and 
solutions are often not directly provided. Problem finding in ill-structured problems is even 
more demanding than in mid-structured problems since there is a minimum on given 
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information or basic data and therefore individuals have to use their own resources to solve 
the problem.220 Lee & Cho also see a relation between knowledge (declarative and 
procedural) and problem finding as it is difficult to conceive a problem without being able to 
draw on existing knowledge.221  
Kitchener sees ill-defined problems as problems which have conflicting assumptions, 
evidence and opinions which may lead to different solutions. Ill-defined problems may have 
different solutions or no solutions at all or there is no guarantee that a procedure is found to 
reach the solution.222 For Kirsch there are generally two main reasons why a problem 
situation is ill-defined. First, there is no execution program or algorithm available which 
allows the individual to complete a routine where the selection of an evoked alternative out of 
a multitude of alternatives can be realized in an acceptable time frame. Second, the definition 
of the problem is vague or uncompleted. For Kirsch these kinds of situations call for 
innovative decisions.223 By Fernandes & Simon complex and ill-structured problems are 
characterized by the following features: intransparency in the sense, that only a few variables 
are available or, in contrast, a larger number are available where relevant ones have to be 
picked, multiple targets interfere with each other, complex relation between patterns and 
variables and time delayed effects in the sense that action may not show immediate 
response.224 
For Joanssen an ill-structured problem solving process can be generally described as a framed 
experiment where the problem solvers engage in a reflective conversation with the subjects of 
the problem situation. The problem solvers must frame the problem and recognize the 
divergent perspectives. Furthermore, they need to collect evidence to support or reject the 
different proposals and finally establish their own understanding of the situation.225 Joanssen 
describes the ill-structured problem solving process with a seven step model. In the first step 
the problem solver articulates the problem space among the competing options and examines 
from which context the problem has emerged. Important is here for Joanssen the domain 
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knowledge, as experts possess more developed problem schemas and procedures. In the next 
step alternatives, opinions, positions and perspectives of stakeholders need to be identified 
and clarified. As the ill-structured problem is not a single problem space, the problem solver 
needs to construct a multiple approach by identifying alternative views or perspectives on the 
problem. With the third step possible problem solutions are generated. Because there are 
multiple representations there might be multiple problem solutions. Step four assesses the 
viability of the alternative solutions. This is done by constructing arguments and articulating 
personal beliefs. For the fifth step the problem space and the solution options are monitored. 
Joanssen states that within an ill-structured problem, it is necessary to engage in a meta-
cognitive process where the problem solvers monitor the epistemic nature of the problem. In 
the sixth step the problem solver implements and monitors the solution. As the ill-structured 
problems do not have one correct solution, the effectiveness can only be determined by its 
performance. Finally the last step is devoted to the adaption of the solution. As few ill-
structured problems are solved in a single attempt, the problem solving process most likely 
becomes an iterative process.226  
For Shin the dynamic process of solving ill-structured problems includes the following steps 
(Figure 6): first, the problem needs to be recognized and then it needs to be decided if there is 
a problem. Next, it is necessary to find out what exactly the problem is by constructing the 
problem space including defining the problem. The third step is the representation of the 
problem, which is established by searching and selecting information in order to develop an 
argumentation. The fourth step is the solution process which involves generating and 
selecting possible solutions. The next step is a decision on the best solution by the problem 
solver’s perception of the problem and supporting the justification of problem solution by 
monitoring and evaluating the solution process.227 
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Figure 6: Problem solving process for ill-structured problems 
Source: Shin, 1998, p. 22 
A part of the problem solving process of ill-structured problems requires structural knowledge 
in order to rapidly access meaningful information and principles when domain specific 
knowledge is necessary for problem solving. Structural knowledge, in this case, can be 
described as knowledge on how concepts are interrelated with a special kind of domain. 
Knowledge structures can be seen as an organized network of information stored in the long 
term memory used for solving domain problems.228 
In summing up, the author can point out the following: In well-structured problem situations, 
the relevant cause-effect relations are completely open and known. In mid-structured problem 
situations, there is general knowledge about the relevant cause-effect relations, but it is 
subject to probabilistic outcomes concerning the problem solving alternatives, partly based on 
subjective expectations. In ill-structured-problem situations, finally, the overall goal maybe 
know and given but there is hardly any knowledge about underlying cause-effect relations. 
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF 
RESEARCH FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE EFFICIENCY 
OUTCOMES IN MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING229 
Since decision making behavior has been in the focus of business management, both from a 
scientific and a professional standpoint, there seems to be a dispute on whether rational or 
intuitive decision making leads to better outcomes. As the literature review shows, by now 
scholars agree that effective organizations do not have the luxury of choosing between 
intuitive and rational decision making.230 Especially within his ground breaking work in 
bounded rationality, Simon has shown that there are no truly rational decisions, since human 
beings in real life do not behave “totally” rational.231 Decisions in reality seem to lie in a 
continuum where at one extreme there is true rationality and at the other extreme there is true 
intuition. Depending on the input of various factors like personality, problem characteristics 
(e.g. ambiguity), the decision making context and decision characteristics, the decision 
making behavior is somewhere in between these poles.232  
Therefore it seems important to better understand how personality and the ambiguity of 
problems interact with each other and therefore influence the decision making process. The 
personality predetermination which partly shapes behavioral patterns (like intuitive versus 
rational decision making approaches) and the ambiguity of a problem seem to have a 
significant impact on the outcome of the decision making process. This is why this research 
work focuses on the impact of personality types and the ambiguity of problems on the 
efficiency of decision making.233 This by no means denies the fact that the other factors e.g. 
as in the model of Sinclair & Ashkanasy have an impact on the decision making efficiency.234 
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Based on the findings of the literature review in further research it should be addressed how 
personality predetermination (cognitive styles) or resulting behavioral patterns (intuitive 
versus rational) lead in the decision making process to higher socioeconomic efficiency 
within certain problem categories (cf. well-structured problems versus ill-structured 
problems). Therefore a starting point for the further research is the following setup:  
Individuals with a preference for rational thinking use information in a more concrete format 
and are more related to normative judgment.235 As for well-structured problems, by definition, 
the goal is well defined, it has a single answer, all elements for the solution are known, are 
logically based and problem solving requires rules like algorithmic process definition.236 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that individuals with a preference for rational thinking 
should be more efficient when deciding on well-structured problems since the characteristics 
of well-structured problems match their “thinking routines”. In contrast, individuals who have 
a preference for an intuitive thinking style are more successful in using unconscious 
information and are more related to heuristic judgments and to ill-structured problems where, 
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by definition, goals are defined, vague or not at all defined, the problem description is not 
clear, they have no single or correct solution, problems are in a special context and there is no 
execution program to solve the problem in a routine.237 Therefore it can be hypothesized that 
individuals with a preference for intuitive thinking should be more efficient in ill-structured 
rather than well-structured problems as their “thinking routine” matches the characteristics of 
ill-structured problems.  
Following the advice of Wossidlo and the results of Neuert that well-structured problems 
versus ill-structured problems may not provide enough accuracy, it is apparently necessary to 
include at least a mid-point with a “mid-structured” problem situation. So in addition to the 
well-structured and ill-structured problem situation it should also be determined which 
individual behavior leads to the most efficient outcomes in a “mid-structured” problem 
situation.238 To overcome the criticism as to whether types measured by personality tests are 
consistent across contexts and therefore reflect behavioral aspects, it is highly recommended 
to conduct an empirical experiment to observe individual behavior in “realistic” problem 
situations.239 This is also recommended by Popper’s “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”, 
where scientific research is not just comprised by the formulation of cause-effect hypotheses, 
but also of the attempt to empirically substantiate and/or falsify the respective assumption.240 
Therefore, an empirical study should be conducted to falsify or support the hypotheses under 
“real conditions”. 
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2.1. Efficiency measurement in the decision making process 
a) The concept of efficiency in the decision making process 
Organizations are founded and operated to fulfill certain purposes and aims. The organization 
and respectively their members are interested in satisfying the purposes and aims of the 
organization so that in an indirect manner their own requirements are satisfied. In the case of 
decision making within the organization Gzuk believes the purpose or aim is to reach high 
quality within the decision making process.241 For Gzuk, quality in this sense can be 
substantiated as activity to reach a purpose or aim.242 He refers to activity in this context also 
as efficiency. Gzuk sees the main purpose in managerial decision making in its connected 
economical efficiency.243 
For Joost efficiency is defined as a relative measurement which puts outcomes (results) and 
input in to relationship.244 Barnard describes a personal or organizational action as effective if 
a specific desired end is attained or a certain aim is reached. This action can also be 
considered as efficient if it satisfies motives of that aim. In the case that a certain aim is not 
reached but the motives are still satisfied the action may not be effective but still efficient and 
vice-versa. For Barnard, efficiency most likely relates to the satisfaction of motives of 
individuals in an organization and effectiveness relates to the achievement of certain aims of 
the organization.245 For Gzuk efficiency in general is how well a dedicated target is reached 
with a minimum of resources (output versus input). Gzuk understands, in this sense, the 
output as tangible or intangible results and the input as the deployment of mental or tangible 
resources. For him efficient decisions are characterized by fulfilling the aim of the target with 
a comparatively low amount of resources (input).246 Simon describes efficiency more 
generally as the ratio between input and output. For commercial organizations, which are 
generally guided by profits, the criterion of efficiency is the yield of the greatest net income. 
The simplicity is related to the fact that money provides a common understanding for the 
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measurement of efficiency in terms of output and income. But this concept needs to be 
expanded for specific activities in commercial organizations (e.g. personnel department) or 
for non-commercial organizations where factors are involved which cannot be directly 
measured in monetary terms.247 For Simon, to make an efficient decision it is necessary to 
have empirical knowledge of the expected results that are associated with different alternative 
possibilities.248 Neuert supports this view. He believes that efficiency can be characterized as 
an expression of performance rate, output-input relation and quality. He explicitly 
differentiates the term effectiveness from efficiency. For him effectiveness characterizes 
whether a measure is, in general, suitable to achieve a certain goal. In this case efficiency can 
be seen as the quality level of the results within the decision making process.249 In the context 
of decisions Gzuk sees efficiency as the degree on which a purpose is reached containing two 
additional conditions: first, the purpose is reached with a minimum use of resources 
(economical input) and the result of the decision ensures a problem solution which lasts a 
longer period of time.250 It seems not to be enough to measure the efficiency of a decision by 
itself rather than the outcome of mental or tangible activity.251 Efficiency within the 
organization can also be reviewed by different approaches. Within the target approach, 
organizations have explicit targets and efficiency can be defined by the degree of target 
achievement. The systems approach considers beside the targets also the structures and 
processes of the system-environment relationship. Efficiency, in this case, evolves from a 
concrete and uni dimensional to an abstract and multidimensional construct. The 
organizational member approach considers the interests of the external stakeholders. An 
organization in this sense is efficient when the expectances of these members of the 
organization are satisfied or fulfilled. Closely related to the organizational member’s approach 
is the interest approach. The interest approach assumes that evaluating the same object will 
lead to different efficiency evaluations due to different evaluating persons and their individual 
value and preference structure as well as to their different interests. The management audit 
approach is a more application orientated approach. Within the management audit approach 
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the organizational efficiency is determined by evaluating the organization by analyzing 
certain parts of the enterprise in periodical intervals with relevant questions and by variance 
analysis (budget-actual) of the key indicators.252 
b) Dimensions of management decision making efficiency 
Decision making outcomes in business management can be characterized by different 
dimensions of efficiency. Neuert describes as one dimension the material efficiency where 
measurement is realistic input and output in commercial activities, which can be measured 
with objective criteria like earnings, profitability, growth and independence.253 Bronner refers 
to this part of efficiency as the economic efficiency.254 A further dimension is personal 
efficiency. For Neuert in contrast to the material efficiency, the personal efficiency has rather 
subjective results in the decision making processes. As subjective results he understands 
expected team results, identification with team work, self-reflection of group behavior and the 
individual role within the group. In summary he characterizes personal efficiency as the 
subjective evaluation of the decision makers concerning the results of their decision making 
process as well as the self-reflection on their behavior during the decision making process.255 
Bronner supports this view. For him it is also not possible to measure the personal efficiency 
on an objective base. He advocates measuring it via the personal activity of the decision 
maker within a decision making group and the satisfaction of other group members with his 
activity in addition to the estimation of the overall achievement of the decision making 
group.256 For Bronner, within the decision making process, time or time pressure is usually an 
influencing factor. He believes there is also a dimension of temporal efficiency. Temporal 
efficiency again is an objective criterion because it can be measured by time. For Bronner 
time, in this sense, can be a direct measurement (e.g when trying to reduce lead time in a 
process) or an indirect measurement (e.g. measuring not quantifiable deployment of persons 
or material in rather complex mental processes).257 
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For Gzuk, to define the concept of efficiency it is necessary to have a purpose or aim, a 
realized output or result and an input or the use of resources.258 For Gzuk, to achieve 
efficiency in the decision making process there are two conditions which need to be fulfilled: 
first, a decision must realize the most efficient ratio between output and input and second, a 
decision must bring results which ensure that the aimed objectives are achieved.259  
To operationalize the measurement of efficiency in the decision making process Gzuk 
advocates establishing a multi-dimensional indicator model (Figure 7).260 This multi-
dimensional indicator model contains four efficiency dimensions: The target-output relation, 
the input-output relation, the target-input relation and the provision for the realization of the 
decision. Within those efficiency dimensions indicators need to be established to enable the 
operationalization of the model which then allows the measurement of the total efficiency of a 
decision.261 To achieve acceptable security on the measurement of efficiency, Gzuk advocates 
that for each dimension there should be more than one indicator.262 
 
Figure 7: Multi-dimensional indicator model for the efficiency measurement 
Source: Gzuk, 1975, p. 57 
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To measure total efficiency in terms of the formal efficiency, material efficiency and 
individual efficiency, Neuert has modified the multi-dimensional model of Gzuk. In Neuert’s 
multi-dimensional model there are three dimensions for formal efficiency, material efficiency 
and individual efficiency. Each dimension can have from one to several efficiency criteria. A 
criterion for formal efficiency could, for example, be the comparison between a targeted 
situation and the actual situation. A criterion for material efficiency could be profit and a 
criterion for individual efficiency could be satisfaction. To measure those criteria in various 
dimensions adequate indicators have to be defined.263 
Grabatin, reviewing the efficiency from an organizational perspective, splits total efficiency 
into different efficiency dimensions. For him, the dimensions are the “general” economic 
efficiency, the efficiency of the internal system, which includes indicators to evaluate 
organizational processes and the necessary constraints for the realization of the organizational 
efficiency. For Grabatin, typical criteria for general economic efficiency are turnover, profit, 
market share, etc. For the necessary constraints he picks criteria like flexibility, growth, 
communication, etc. Grabatin splits internal system efficiency dimension again into various 
dimensions, like the efficiency of the organizational structure, the efficiency of the task 
fulfillment and socioeconomic efficiency factors. For the socioeconomic efficiency, Grabatin 
introduces efficiency criteria like individual satisfaction, motivation, etc.264 
According to Nutt, decision makers report that rapid actions are a key factor for them. In this 
case he sees the duration of the decision making process as a good indicator for measuring 
efficiency. On the other hand, efficiency also depends on the quality of the decision which 
also needs to be taken into account. In this sense the duration is measured by the elapsed time 
from the point of recognition until the time when the decision is adopted or abandoned. To 
Nutt objective indicators to value the quality of the decision are preferred. But as they are 
mostly difficult to collect and they need to be converted into common metrics and those 
conversions again can be argumentative and hard to describe, he advocates measures by 
informants who subjectively estimate the values. Therefore the quality of the decision is rated 
by an anchored rating scale using five anchors. A rating of 5 (outstanding) is to be given to a 
decisive contribution which provides an exceptional quality. A rating of 1 (poor) is to be 
given to a decision which had no impact or merit. The rating of 4 is termed good, the rating of 
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3 is adequate and the rating 2 is disappointing.265 To avoid the fact that decision makers can 
make self-serving estimates on rating the quality of the decision, Nutt advocates that only two 
secondary informants value the quality of the decision. These two informants value the 
quality of the decision independently along the rating scale and without discussion. To 
enhance the precision of rating the quality and to move the subjective estimates to a rather 
true value, Nutt introduces the estimate-discuss-estimate (EDE) procedure. He therefore 
computes the initial results and then has them discussed by the informants. When the 
individual results are far off, the informants need to explain this with compulsory arguments, 
which are then weighted. Taking the average out of the second rating with weighted 
arguments seems, for Nutt, to raise the rating toward a true value.266  
2.2. Measuring decision making style and behavior 
Individual differences continue to be one of the main explanatory variables in the field of 
judgment and decision making.267 The broad term of individual difference covers areas from 
decision making styles to cognitive ability to personality. Therefore the measurement of 
individual difference can be divided into seven categories: decision making measures, risk 
attitude measures, personality inventories, personality construct measures, and miscellaneous 
measures.268 A representative set of measures for the study of individual differences in 
judgment and decision making according to the seven categories have been collected and 
displayed by Appelt et al. in the online database “Decision Making Individual Differences 
Inventory” (http://www.dmidi.net).269 Most of these measures differ in their theoretical 
underpinning and their psychometric properties: therefore it seems questionable if the use of 
such a wide range of measurements benefits the research of judgment and decision making as 
the results may lack comparability.270 To allow for a better cross comparison between 
different studies Appelt et al. recommend using existing measures without modification, 
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where appropriate.271 Some of the most well-known and mostly used measures for the 
cognitive style or intuitive/rational behavior include the Cognitive Style Index, the Agor 
Intuitive Management Test, the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator.272  
The Cognitive Style Index (CSI) was designed by Allinson & Hayes to assess individual 
preferences on information processing. It distinguishes in two different cognitive styles: an 
intuitive style which emphasizes feelings, open endness and global perspective and second, an 
analytical style which emphasizes reasoning, detail and structure. With a relatively small 
amount of items (38 items with 3-point ratings) the CSI is convenient when being 
administered within large scale organizations.273 For Allinson & Hayes, the results of the 
substantial study with almost 1000 subjects indicate that the distribution of the scores support 
the theoretical expectations, show very good reliability in terms of internal consistency and 
temporal stability and clear evidence of a proper construct and concurrent validity.274 
To test the use of intuition in management decision making, Agor started in 1981 testing 
executives from a wide range of organizations with the Agor Intuitive Management Test 
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(AIM).275 The AIM is a self-report instrument including two parts. The first part reflects the 
ability to use intuition and consists of twelve questions which were taken from the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Depending on the answer of the instrument, the first part gives 
an indication of the preferred cognitive style (intuitive or rational). The second part of the 
AIM test consists of ten questions and measures and the actual use of intuition.276  
with the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) Epstein introduced a measurement to assess 
the preference for rational versus intuitive thinking on the basis of the Cognitive-Experiential 
Self Theory (CEST).277 The REI distinguishes between two cognitive styles: a rational style 
which is measured by items being adapted from “Need for Cognition” (NFC) scale and an 
experiential style which is measured by the “Faith in Intuition” scale.278 Theses scales are 
again divided into subscales of ability and favorability. The ability subscale reflects the 
individual’s belief in his ability in using rational or experiential thinking. The favorability 
subscale reflects the preference of engaging in this kind of information processing.279  
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is one of the widely used measures of intuitive 
types.280 The MBTI is a self-reported personality construct which is based on the Jungian 
theory.281 The MBTI identifies basic preferences on four dichotomies (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: The four dichotomies of the MBTI 
Source: Briggs Myers et al., 2003, p. 6 
These basic preferences describe different ways of how people perceive information (Sensing-
Intuition dichotomy) and different ways of making judgments (Thinking-Feeling dichotomy) 
in combination with different attitudes (the Extraversion-Introversion and Judging-Perceiving 
dichotomy). The Sensing/Intuition (S-N) scale taps the individual preference between the two 
opposite ways of perceiving information. The Thinking/Feeling (T-F) scale is designed to tap 
the individual preference between two contrasting ways (logic versus reliance on emotions) of 
making judgments.282 In this sense the Sensing/Intuition scale may reflect the holistic nature 
of intuition and the Thinking/Feeling scale may reflect the affective nature of intuition.283 The 
Extraversion/Introversion (E-I) scale is designed to reflect a person’s preference for either the 
outer world focusing their energy on people and objects or the inner world focusing the 
energy on concepts, ideas and internal experience. The Judging/Perceiving (J-P) scale is 
designed to reflect a person’s preference using a Judging process and therefore using either 
Thinking or Feeling when dealing with the outer world or using a Perceiving process and 
therefore using Sensing or Intuition when dealing with the outer world. The MBTI identifies 
16 different personality types (Figure 9) which result from the interactions between the four 
dichotomies.284 But the combination of those four letters of a “type” is more than a 
combination of single descriptions of attitudes and mental functions. The combination of 
those four letters also includes a so called “type dynamics”, meaning that each four-letter type 
stands for a complex set of dynamic relationships among the attitudes and the functions. 
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Within the four-letter type each human being has one function which is applied the most, the 
dominant function. Furthermore a secondary function, an auxiliary function provides balance 
to the first or dominant function (Figure 9). The function that is the opposite of the dominant 
function is typically the least developed or inferior function and is also referred to as the 
fourth function. The opposite function to the auxiliary function is the tertiary function and is 
also referred to as the third function.285 Determining the dominant function and the auxiliary 
function allows revealing the decision making style of an individual.286 
 
Figure 9: Priorities and directions of functions of the 16 types of the MBTI 
Source: Briggs Myers et al., 2003, p. 31 
Hodgkinson et al. criticize the CSI and the latest version of the REI because they show factors 
which are not within their underlying theory. For them the critique of the CSI has three 
significant respects: first, they see the empirical tests of its factor structure to be inconsistent 
with its declared theoretical basis. Second, it seems that it is not in line with the state-of-the-
art dual-process formulation and third, a semantic analysis shows that it has little relation to 
intuitive domain.287 For Hodgkinson et al. the REI appears to have item content problems 
with the experientially subscale as it conflates style or trait with strategy.288 For Langan-Fox 
& Shirley, when taking a closer inspection of the Sensing-Intuition scale of the MBTI, none 
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of the items assess affective or behavioral aspects of intuition.289 When examining the nature 
of intuition by measuring with the MBTI and REI Pretz & Totz, findings suggest that both 
instruments measure affective, heuristic and holistic characteristics of intuition.290 Woolhouse 
& Bayne see the MBTI as a reliable and valid instrument to measure personality as many 
studies have been published and especially because the MBTI shows a strong relationship 
with four out of five scales in the big five model of personality measured by the NEO-PI.291  
One serious problem seems to be whether the types, as measured by personality tests, are 
consistent across contexts and therefore reflect behavioral aspects. Therefore and because 
Hodgkinson et al. see an over-reliance on psychometrically self-report instrument measures 
for intuitive style, they advocate more direct approaches designed to force rational and 
intuitive behavior.292 For Hodgkinson et al. the use of self-report measures in conjunction 
with empirical experiments potentially provides a powerful setting for determining intuitive 
behavior.293 
2.3. Construction of a theoretical model for the empirical testing of the impact of 
personality types on management decision making 
2.3.1. Specification of the problem structure and construction of the hypotheses 
According to the literature, intuitive or rational approches in decision making can be related to 
personality/cognitive styles.294 Further findings support the evidence that participants with a 
rational thinking style operate predominantly at the conscious level in an analytical, effortful, 
affect-free and relatively slow manner while demanding high cognitive resources and are 
more related to normative judgements. The rational system is more process orientated, 
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logical-reason orientated and requires justification via logic and evidence. The rational system 
seems to be more suitable when analytic approaches are needed or considerations for long 
time consequences are at stake. In contrast, participants with an intuitive thinking style 
operate mainly on an unconscious level which relates to experiences which have been built up 
in the past. This intuitive system can be characterized as automatic, rapid, effortless, 
associative and holistic. The intuitive system is more related to heurisitc judgements.295 When 
taking these implicatons into account it seems that individuals facing simple decision making 
situations perform well when taking rather conscious, deliberate thoughts whereas participant 
facing complex decision making situations perform better when taking unconscious, intuitive 
thoughts. There seems to be a clear link between the cognitive style and the structure of the 
problem. The more increasingly unstructured the problems get the more effective intuitive 
judgment becomes versus rational analysis. Ill-structured problems are therefore conducive to 
the intuitive decision making process as to the absence of well accepted decision making rules 
and vice versa.296 This is also shown within an empirical study conducted by Dijksterhuis et 
al. This empirical study shows that conscious thinkers reported a greater post choice 
satisfaction when shopping for simple products and less satisfaction when shopping for more 
complex products. In contrast, unconscious thinkers reported a greater post choice satisfaction 
when shopping for more complex products and less satisfaction when shopping for simple 
products.297  
To have clear specifications for the further development of this work when referring to 
cognitive styles, the four mental functions (Sensing/Intuition and Thinking/Feeling) defined 
by Jung shall be taken into account.298 For the problem the three categories (well-structured, 
mid-structured and ill-structured) with the following specification will build the main 
foundation for this work. 
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In this sense ill-structured problems can be specified by the following elements: 
• Goals are defined vaguely or not at all  
• The problem description is not clear or well enough defined 
• Has no single objectively correct solution 
• Information to solve the problem is not within the problem statement 
• The problems are in a special context whereby one or more aspects is/are not specified 
• Between-domain transfer capabilities are needed 
• There is no execution program or algorithm available to solve the problem in a routine 
• Solutions may not be final, rather a plan is put in place to find out if the solution works 
in reality based on the implementation and evaluation. Problem solving in this case 
becomes an iterative process 
For mid-structured problems the following definitions are adopted: 
• The problem task is part of strategic management decision making 
• The goal(s) of the problem solution procedure are relatively clearly defined and can be 
measured by indicators e.g. profitability, solvency, growth, sales, costs, etc. 
• The problem environment is dealing with uncertain circumstances and can only be 
measured by subjective probability expectations  
• The decision making alternatives are subject to those uncertain probability scenarios  
• Whereas for the intended goals fulfillments well-defined algorithms can be applied (i. 
p. investment appraisals, contribution margin computation, time series extrapolation 
methods, etc.), the uncertain environmental circumstances can only be presumed based 
on the problem solver’s creativity and intuition. 
• The measurement of the mid-structured decision making problem lies clearly in-
between the precisely defined well-structured problem situation and the non-defined 
ill-structured problem situation 
And well-structured problems can be specified by the following elements: 
• Have well defined initial state and well defined goals 
• Have a single correct answer 
• All elements which are required for the solution are known 
• Problem solving requires using rules and strategies like logical, algorithmic processes 
which ensure a correct answer 
• The current state of the problem can be consistently compared with the goal state 
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Taking the theoretical background into consideration that intuitive behavior can be 
characterized as automatic, rapid, effortless, associative and holistic, using heuristics to solve 
problems leads to the conclusion that intuitive behavior seems to be more appropriate and 
therefore more efficient when solving ill-structured problems as those problems by definition 
call for these kinds of abilities. In contrast as rational behavior can be characterized as process 
orientated, logical-reason orientated and requires justification via logic, using analytic 
approaches to solve problems leads to the conclusion that rational behavior seems to be more 
appropriate and therefore more efficient when solving well-structured problems. 
Based on this conclusion the basic hypothesis is formulated.  
HB: Personality predetermination has an impact on decision making efficiency, varying 
along different decision making structures 
Further sub hypotheses are stated in the introduction. 
2.3.2. The causal relationship of personality types and decision making outcomes 
The aim of this causal analysis is to show, how different types of personality, their resulting 
behavioral approaches (intuitive versus rational conduct) and different problem structures 
impact the outcomes of decision making in business management. At the end this should 
generate results, which allow in the future for provinding more clarity on how different types 
of personality and therefore different behavioral approaches are more efficient in solving 
different kinds of structured problems (e.g. well-structure, mid-structured and ill-structured 
problems). This could allow addressing the “right” type of personality to the “right” type of 
problem in order to achieve the most efficient decision making process.  
A causal model in this sense demonstrates a measurement model which shows the 
relationship of the latent exogenous variable to the latent endogenous variable. It describes 
with a structural model the theoretical complex and how the independent variable (here the 
personality predetermination) impacts the independent variable (here the efficiency outcomes 
of decision making in business management). As efficiency in this sense is measured as 
socio-psychological and economic efficiency, the latent endogenous measurement variables 
are also measured by the socio-psychological efficiency (e.g. satisfaction, etc.) and the 
economic efficiency (e.g. duration, costs or target-actual comparison). The structure of the 
problem (well-structured, mid-structured and ill-structured) impacts the dependent variables 
so that the independent variable is characterized as an intervening variable and in this way is 
integrated in the structural model. 
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Based on the theoretical background and on the hypotheses from the previous chapter, a path 
analyses is used to select the relevant causal factors and to establish the relationships between 
the independent and dependent variables, allowing then the setup of a causal model (Figure 
10). The latent exogenous measurement variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 provide information about 
the nature of the independent variable X (personality predetermination). The independent 
structural variable X influences the intervening variables Zw…Zi and the dependent Yw…Yi 
variables. These dependent variables (Yw…Yi) again are operationalized and measured by the 
latent endogenous variables yw1 … yi3. 
 
Figure 10: Causal analytical model for the relationship of personality types, behavioral 
approaches and socioeconomic efficiency in decision making 
Source: Author 
Legend of the causal model:  
X = Independent structural variable (Personality predetermination) 
Y = Dependent structural variable (Socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making 
process) 
Yw…Yi = Socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making process depending on the 
problem structure (well-structured, mid-structured, ill-structured) 
Zw…Zi = Intervening structural variable (structure of the problem)  
x1…x4 = Latent exogenous measurement variables (personality predetermination) 
yw1…yi3 = Latent endogenous measurement variables (socioeconomic efficiency) 
γ1 = Correlation degree between the latent exogenous and latent endogenous variable  
λ1…λu3 = Correlation degree between the structural and measure variable 
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2.3.3. The determination variable: measurement of the independent variable 
As this study aims to determine when intuitive versus rational decision making is more 
efficient in different structured problems, from an epistemic background it is necessary to 
operationalize the independent variable, the personality predetermination, in a way that 
intuitive and rational decision making styles can be identified. According to the literature, 
various instruments measure personality/cognitive style. Some of the most frequently used 
instruments include the Cognitive Style Index - the CSI, the Agor Intuitive Management Test 
- the AIM, the Rational-Experiential Inventory - the REI and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
– the MBTI.299 Further above, within the theoretical background, it was already laid out in a 
more detailed manner, that all these instruments underlay some critics. The author decided to 
choose the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator for the determination of personality and 
measurement of the cognitive style. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is mainly based on the 
theory of Jung.300 The decision toward the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was made 
by the author due to the following reasons: 
• The psychological types which are represented by the MBTI are conceptually related 
to information gathering and information evaluation aspects of the decision making 
process301 
• The CSI and the latest version of the REI show factors which are not within their 
underlying theory302 
• The first half of the AIM instrument is based on the items of the MBTI303 
• Langan-Fox & Shirley criticize the fact that the MBTI does not assess affective or 
behavioral aspects. But this is a problem Hodgkinson et al. see with most of the 
psychometrically self-reporting instruments. Therefore they advocate conducting, in 
                                                 
299  Cf. Agor, W. H. (1986). How Top Executives Use Their Intuition to Make Important Decisions. In: Business 
Horizons 29, pp. 49–53; Agor, W. H. (1989). Intuition in organizations. Leading and managing productively. 
Newbury Park, USA: Sage; Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI 
manual. A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, 
USA: CPP, Inc.; Pacini, R.; Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information 
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. In: Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 76 (6), pp. 972–987. 
300  Jung, C. G. (1921/1971). Psychological Types. London, Great Britain: Routlege. 
301  Hough, J. R.; ogilvie, d. (2005). An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes*. In: 
Journal Management Studies 42 (2), p. 422. 
302  Hodgkinson, G. P.; Langan-Fox, J.; Sadler-Smith, E. (2008). Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct in 
the behavioral sciences. In: British Journal of Psychology 99, pp. 17-18. 
303  Agor, W. H. (1994). Intuitives Management: Die richtige Entscheidung zur richtigen Zeit. 2. Aufl. Bremen, 
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addition, a laboratory or a field experiment to assess behavioral aspects to overcome 
this critical point304 
• The MBTI has proven to be a valid and reliable instrument as many studies have been 
published and especially because the MBTI shows a strong correlation with four out of 
five scales of the big five model of personality measured by the NEO-PI305 
• The analysis of more than 32.000 respondents of the MBTI showed reliability 
coefficients, measured by the Cronbachs’s alpha, averaging: E-I=0.79, S-N=0.84, T-
F=0.74 and J-P=0.82306 
• The MBTI is one of the most widely used and understood instruments in measuring 
personality types/cognitive styles within organizations and it allows direct transfer 
from research to practice307 
• And to allow a better cross comparison between different studies, Appelt et al. 
recommend using existing and well used measures without modification, where 
appropriate308 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator measures four dichotomies to assess the personality 
predetermination. To reflect a person’s preference/attitude for either the outer world, focusing 
their energy on people and objects or the inner world, focusing the energy on concepts, ideas 
and internal experience, the Extraversion-Introversion (E-I) scale is used. Extraverted types 
are mostly interested in what happens around them, outside of their own person. Introverted 
types, on the other hand, are attracted to the inside of their own person. They care and focus 
mainly on things and details about their own person. The Sensing-Intuition (S-N) scale taps 
the individual preference between the two opposite ways of perceiving information (concrete 
factual details through the five senses versus patterns through the unconscious). Sensing types 
                                                 
304  Cf. Hodgkinson, G. P.; Langan-Fox, J.; Sadler-Smith, E. (2008). Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct 
in the behavioral sciences. In: British Journal of Psychology 99, p. 19; Langan-Fox, J.; Shirley, D. A. (2003). 
The nature and measurement of intuition: cognitive and behavioral interests, personality, and experiences. In: 
Creativity Research Journal 15, p. 210. 
305  Cf. Furnham, A.; Moutafi, J.; Crump, J. (2003). The relationship between the revised NEO-Personality 
Inventory and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. In: Social Behavior and Personality 31 (6), p. 582; McCrae, 
R. R.; Costa, P. T. (1989). Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator From the Perspective of the Five-
Factor Model of Personality. In: Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 57, pp. 17–37; Briggs Myers, I.; 
McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the development and use 
of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., p. 178. 
306  Capraro, R. M.; Capraro, M. M. (2002). Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Score Reliability Across: Studies a 
Meta-Analytic Reliability Generalization Study. In: Educational and Psychological Measurement 62 (4), p. 
594. 
307  Hough, J. R.; ogilvie, d. (2005). An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes*. In: 
Journal Management Studies 42 (2), p. 422. 
308  Appelt, K. C.; Milch, K. F.; Handgraaf, M. J. J.; Weber, E. U. (2011). The Decision Making Individual 
Differences Inventory and guidelines for the study of individual differences in judgment and decision making 
research. In: Judgment and Decision Making 6 (3), p. 256. 
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solves problems with logical rules, requiring therefore, information about reality and are very 
thorough when developing problem solutions, which mostly takes time. The Intuitive types, in 
contrast, do not see things the way they are rather they see them the way they should be. The 
Intuitive types tend to “live” in the past or in the future. The Thinking-Feeling (T-F) scale is 
designed to tap the individual problem solving process by reflecting on the preference of 
individuals to use two contrasting means (logic versus reliance on emotions) to make 
judgments. For Thinking types actions rely on intellectual motives and situations are captured 
by logical reasoning. Problems are solved via known rules and by using classification and 
numbering. Thinking types tend to act impersonally. The Feeling types, in contrast, agree or 
disagree on appearing issues on the basis of individual value propositions, which are closely 
connected to their intrinsic motivation. The Judging-Perceiving (J-P) scale is designed to 
reflect a person’s preference/attitude using the Judging process and therefore using either 
Thinking or Feeling when dealing with the outer world or using a Perceiving process and 
therefore using Sensing or Intuition when dealing with the outer world. From a theoretical 
point of view, within the two mental functions, the Sensing-Intuition (S-N) scale measures the 
holistic nature of intuition and the Thinking-Feeling (T-F) scale measures the affective nature 
of intuition.309 As already reviewed within the theoretical background, the MBTI identifies 16 
different personality types which result from the interactions between the four dichotomies.310 
Within the four-letter type each human being has one function which is applied the most, the 
dominant function and a second function, the auxiliary function, which provides balance to 
the first or dominant function. The function opposite the dominant function is the inferior 
function and is typically the least developed. It is also referred to as the fourth function. The 
opposite function to the auxiliary function is the tertiary function, also referred to as the third 
function.311 Determining the dominant function and the auxiliary function allows revealing 
the decision making style of an individual.312 In this sense dual processing research sees the 
Sensing/Thinking types as the most analytical and the Intuition/Feeling types as the most 
intuitive.313 Further, White et al. believe that extroverts can control new situations better than 
introverts, due to the fact that they have the ability to handle problems in an assertive and 
                                                 
309  Pretz, J. E.; Totz, K. S. (2007). Measuring individual differences in affective, heuristic, and holistic intuition. 
In: Personality and Individual Differences 43, p. 1250. 
310  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., pp. 3-6. 
311  Ibid.., pp. 29-31. 
312  Andersen, J. A. (2000). Intuition in managers. Are intuitive managers more effective? In: Journal of 
Managerial Psychology 15 (1), pp. 49-50. 
313  Hough, J. R.; ogilvie, d. (2005). An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes. In: 
Journal Management Studies 42 (2), pp. 426-427. 
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cooperative way.314 It also seems that people with a more intuitive cognitive style are found to 
be more extraverted.315 Therefore the four dichotomies in combination with a dominant 
preference for Sensing or Intuition (Figure 11) and an auxiliary preference for Thinking or 
Feeling provides the possibility to grade rational and intuitive behavior into the following 
classes: 
Rational behavior 1st degree 
 ISTJ: Introvert with a dominant preference for Sensing and with auxiliary preference 
for Thinking 
Rational behavior 2nd degree 
 ESTP: Extravert with a dominant preference for Sensing and with auxiliary preference 
for Thinking 
Rational behavior 3rd degree 
 ISFJ: Introvert with a dominant preference for Sensing and with auxiliary preference 
for Feeling 
Rational behavior 4th degree 
 ESFP: Extravert with a dominant preference for Sensing and with auxiliary preference 
for Feeling 
Intuitive behavior 1st degree 
 ENFP: Extravert with a dominant preference for Intuition and with auxiliary 
preference for Feeling 
Intuitive behavior 2nd degree 
 INFJ: Introvert with a dominant preference for Intuition and with auxiliary preference 
for Feeling 
Intuitive behavior 3rd degree 
 ENTP: Extravert with a dominant preference for Intuition and with auxiliary 
preference for Thinking 
Intuitive behavior 4th degree 
 INTJ Introvert with a dominant preference for Intuition and with auxiliary preference 
for Thinking 
Figure 11: MBTI personality types with Sensing or Intuition as the dominant function 
and Thinking or Feeling as auxiliary function 
Source: Cf. Hirsh & Hirsh, 2007, p. 5; Neuert, 1987, p. 230 
                                                 
314  White, C. J.; Varadarajan, R. P.; Dacin, P. A. (2003). Market Situation Interpretation and Response: The Role 
of Cognitive Style, Organizational Culture, and Information Use. In: Journal of Marketing Research 67,  
p. 66. 
315  Cools, E. (2008). Cognitive Styles and Management Behaviour. Theory, Measurement, Application. 
Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, p. 37. 
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Following these eight types which have either Sensing or Intuition as their dominant functions 
are eight more, which have Thinking or Feeling as their dominant functions (Figure 12) and 
either Sensing or Intuition as their auxiliary function:  
Rational behavior 5th degree 
 ISTP: Introvert with a dominant preference for Thinking and with auxiliary 
preference for Sensing 
Rational behavior 6th degree 
 ESTJ: Extravert with a dominant preference for Thinking and with auxiliary 
preference for Sensing 
Rational behavior 7th degree 
 INTP: Introvert with a dominant preference for Thinking and with auxiliary 
preference for Intuition 
Rational behavior 8th degree 
 ENTJ: Extravert with a dominant preference for Thinking and with auxiliary 
preference for Intuition 
Intuitive behavior 5th degree 
 ENFJ: Extravert with a dominant preference for Feeling and with auxiliary preference 
for Intuition 
Intuitive behavior 6th degree 
 INFP: Introvert with a dominant preference for Feeling and with auxiliary preference 
for Intuition 
Intuitive behavior 7th degree 
 ESFJ: Extravert with a dominant preference for Feeling and with auxiliary preference 
for Sensing 
Intuitive behavior 8th degree 
 ISFP: Introvert with a dominant preference for Feeling and with auxiliary preference 
for Sensing 
Figure 12: MBTI personality types with Thinking or Feeling as the dominant function 
and Sensing or Intuition as auxiliary function 
Source: Cf. Hirsh & Hirsh, 2007, p. 5; Neuert, 1987, p. 230 
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Hirsh & Hirsh also describe this as the dominants lens (Figure 13) of the type table.  
 
Figure 13: MBTI personality types grouped into their dominant functions 
Source: Hirsh & Hirsh, 2007, p. 5 
Whereas with the personality predetermination (X), the independent variable was determined 
and operationalized with the four dichotomies of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. In the next 
step within the model structure the intervening structural variable and dependent variable 
have to be operationalized.  
2.3.4. The effect variables: measurement of the dependent variable and the intervening 
variables 
The intervening variable (Z), the problem structure, is operationalized by defining three 
different kinds of structures within the ill-structured problem (ISP), the mid-structured 
problem (MSP) and the well-structured problem (WSP). The three different problem 
structures (ISP, MSP and WSP) are characterized according to the definitions formulated 
within the theoretical background (cf. chapter 2.3.1). 
The determination of the socioeconomic efficiency can be done by various constructs.316 
Especially the choice of the efficiency dimensions is always related to the judgment of the 
                                                 
316  Cf. Grabatin, G. (1981). Effizienz von Organisationen. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter (Mensch und 
Organisation, 8), pp. 39-62; Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum 
Zusammenhang zwischen Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 
108-124; Nutt, P. C. (2008). Investigating the Success of Decision Making Processes. In: Journal of 
Management Studies 45 (2), pp. 425–455. 
79 
observer. Introducing a multi-dimensional indicator model (Figure 14) allows the author to 
split and measure of the socioeconomic efficiency in various dimensions.317 This allows the 
measurement of single efficiency dimension and then determining the total efficiency. Each 
dimension can have from one to several efficiency criteria. 
 
Figure 14: Multi-dimensional indicator model for the efficiency measurement 
Source: Neuert, 1987, p. 114 
To operationalize the dependent variables the author has decided to split the socioeconomic 
efficiency into a three dimensions: formal efficiency, material efficiency and individual 
efficiency.318 
By definition the decision making process can be understood as a target orientated process 
(target-output relationship) where from a current/actual state the aim is to reach a future/target 
state. In this sense the decision making with its various sub processes can be seen as a formal 
instrument for solving problems by making choices when selecting between alternatives.319 
The comparison between those alternatives can be described as formal efficiency. The level of 
formal efficiency can be determined by comparing the aimed target or the desired situation 
with the current situation. In this sense a higher coincidence between the targeted and the 
                                                 
317  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 114. 
318  Ibid. 
319  Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr (Empirische 
Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), p. 24. 
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current state/situation indicates a higher efficiency and in turn a lower coincidence between 
the targeted and the current situation indicates a lower efficiency.  
Material efficiency in decision making relates to the economic results and can be understood 
as an input-output relationship of a corporation which are measured by criteria like profit, 
growth, rate of return, etc. Management science has created a series of key indicator to 
display material efficiency in decision making. Mostly these are measures which indicate 
economical activities as input-output relationships with performance indicators like 
profitability, cost and returns or cost and benefits. Formal and material efficiency deal rather 
with the “hard facts” and reflect more the economical and therefore the objective detectable 
and reproducible side of decision making.  
Personal/individual efficiency reflects more the socio-psychological and subjective part in 
decision making and therefore deals with results which can be considered as “soft facts” and 
are related to the emotions, feelings, acceptance and satisfaction of individuals. From a more 
general point of view the author sees individual efficiency here as the subjective expectance 
of the decision maker when comparing factual results and former planned results after the 
decision making processes. Individual efficiency is more characterized by the decision makers 
hope to fulfill the expectations. Individual efficiency in this sense can also be described as the 
satisfaction of the decision maker concerning the achieved results.320  
With the classification of the three efficiency dimensions (formal, material and individual 
efficiency) the author has tried to select relevant concepts to measure various dimensions of 
efficiency in the management decision making process. Efficiency dimensions are suitable to 
measure special aspects of the decision making process under a certain view but still need to 
be combined to result in a comprehensive efficiency concept, total efficiency. There are 
various concepts on how to combine different efficiency dimensions to satisfy the efficiency 
concept and to achieve total socioeconomic efficiency.321 Grabatin advocates with an 
“efficiency analysis of the organization” an approach to determine the efficiency of 
organizations in general. In this case he defines an n-dimensional area which is limited by 
negotiated tolerance (target) limits. As satisfying solutions are in the focus instead of optimal 
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solutions, the tolerance or target limits frame a valid solution space which then can be defined 
as the area of the efficient organization.322 Neuert criticizes this approach, as tolerance (target) 
limits always need to be known, which does not seem to be the case in reality. Grabatin’s 
concept also does not provide the possibility of weighting efficiency dimensions 
differently.323 In his approach, Gzuk defines an algorithm for the construction of a total 
efficiency index, whereby the total efficiency of a decision is measured by the positive 
discrepancy of the worst possible efficiency profile.324 As in this approach, the possibility to 
weigh different dimensions of efficiency is up to the user. This concept also does not seem to 
be suitable for the present work. Therefore the author has decided to rely on the 
“amalgamation” concept of Neuert.325 
2.4. The research design for the empirical study measuring the impact of personality 
types on the efficiency outcomes of management decisions 
To test the hypotheses the author has decided to introduce a laboratory experiment, as no 
other method seems more appropriate for producing data/answers in such a controlled 
manner. Popper has already highlighted the fact that one of the main issues within an 
experiment is to eliminate all disturbing factors.326 This is especially valid for laboratory 
experiments. The laboratory experiment, as already explained, seems to provide, in the 
author’s case, a good possibility for the observer to gain insight into the arrangement and the 
execution of the experiment. The intersubjective checkability and traceability of the 
laboratory experiment can be rated higher than that of a field experiment which may include 
all kinds of disturbing side effects.327 Document analyses or a set of interviews also provide a 
possibility for gathering data on an empirical base but the author believes that there is a large 
risk of receiving subjectively biased answers from the participants. They rather report what 
they would like to be instead of what they are. A further methodical basic requirement for 
empirical testing is to allow for repeating the experiment again under reproducible 
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circumstances. This is also fulfilled to a greater degree with a laboratory experiment than with 
any other purpose like method, because of the controlled environment in which the 
experiment takes place.328 The laboratory experiment is therefore characterized by a high 
degree of reliability. A further aspect of the laboratory experiment is that experimental 
situations can be constructed in a variable way so that cause and effect relationships can be 
clearly isolated and tested. This allows attributing or denying an effect clearly to a cause.329 In 
this way it can be determined if decision making efficiency outcomes within different 
structured problem situations change when personality/cognitive styles change.  
According to the causal model (cf. chapter 2.3.2) the author has developed the following 
structure (Figure 15) for the empirical experiment: 
 
Figure 15: Structure of the empirical experiment 
Source: Author 
To identify the personality predetermination of each participant within the study, which also 
reflects the behavioral aspects of the hypotheses, in the first step of the experiment a 
personality self-assessment instrument is introduced. Therefore participants are asked to 
complete a self scorable personality assessment. In the next step, within the laboratory 
experiment, participants receive the first out of three tasks (cf. Appendix I) with a dedicated 
structure (well-, mid- and ill-structured problem) and are asked to solve the task according to 
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the description of the problem statement. This allows the author to collect data/information 
about economic efficiency (formal and material efficiency) in every one of the three problem 
structures with participants having either a rational or an intuitive decision making style. The 
data for individual efficiency are collected by a questionnaire (cf. Appendix II).  
a) Measurement of the personality predetermination/cognitive style 
As already explained above, more in detail, the author has decided to use the Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator (MBTI), the German version of the form “M”, to assess personality 
predetermination. It is a self-scoring pencil and paper test which contains 88 items to assess 
the four dichotomies. The results of the MBTI allow for the identification of the types for 
testing of the hypotheses and to verify or falsify them to determine if there is an impact of the 
personality predetermination (rational versus intuitive style) on the socioeconomic efficiency 
in management decision making. 
b) Measurement of the material, the formal and the individual efficiency 
As this experiment aims to provide information about the impact of personality 
predetermination on efficiency in management decision making it seems obvious that the 
problem tasks are related to business management issues. Problem tasks requiring smaller 
decisions from everyday life don’t seem to be appropriate here.330 Therefore specific kinds of 
tasks (cf. Appendix I) are selected for the three kind of problem situations (well-, mid- and ill-
structured). According to the causal model (cf. chapter 2.3.2) time (also as an indirect 
indicator of costs) is the measurement variable to track the material efficiency dimension. So 
time consumption fulfills the task of providing information about material efficiency.  
Formal efficiency is tracked by comparing the results of problem solutions of the participants 
to the “optimal results”. As well-structured tasks, by definition, are tasks which can be solved 
quantitatively by a mathematical algorithm, the indicator for an optimal result for a well-
structured problem task is a correct figure done by a calculation. For ill-structured tasks 
where, by definition, the problem constellation cannot be calculated by a mathematical 
algorithm and might not have an objective result, the optimal result is determined by the 
judgment of experts. For mid-structured problem tasks which are characterized by having a 
part within the problem structure which can be determined by a calculation and another part 
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which might have no objective solution, the optimal result is a combination of both, a 
calculation of a figure and the judgment of experts. 
The author has chosen a questionnaire as a data gathering method for individual efficiency, as 
in this case personal attitudes (like satisfaction, self-reflection, etc.) which are hard or almost 
impossible to track by observing participants in an empirical experiment. The questionnaire 
mainly contains questions about the personal satisfaction of the participants on solving the 
problem tasks, how systematic they rate their approach in solving the task and how they rate 
their own cognitive style. Friedrichs, in this case, advocates validity, reliability and 
comparability reasons, for using standardized questionnaires or existing questionnaires which 
can be adapted if needed.331 Therefore the basic foundation of the questionnaire is based on a 
previous research project done by Neuert, whereby he evaluated the dependency of planning 
behavior and planning success. In this evaluation Neuert conducted a survey to collect 
information on individual efficiency of the planning process on the basis of a questionnaire he 
developed.332 Therefore individual efficiency is tracked with a standardized and structured 
questionnaire (cf. Appendix II). The questionnaire makes direct reference to the impact of 
personality on personal decision making efficiency within different structured problem 
categories.  
The disadvantage of a questionnaire having an uncontrolled survey can be mostly dispelled 
when using a standardized questionnaire and when during the answering of the questions the 
investigator is present.333 Standardized questionnaires are structured and do not only fix 
content and sequence of the questions but also provide exact wording and a clear 
understandable scale for the answers. Structureness, in this sense, is represented by the fact, 
that single questions can be accurately used to generate answers for the hypotheses. The 
questionnaire, in the author’s case, is fully standardized, meaning that there are only “closed” 
and no open questions. Closed questions are pre formulated questions with measurement 
scales. For this case empirical science has developed a vast amount of appropriate scales 
which have proven to be plausible, valid and, reliable in long term studies.334 When 
developing the questionnaire the author used the “Likert-scale”. The Likert scale intends to 
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measure the attitude of persons concerning a specific object or situation. All items are 
formulated in a strict positive or negative manner. The idea of the Likert-scale is the fact that 
the more strongly the test subject refuses a statement, the further his attitude differs from the 
formulation of the statement.335 
Exemplarily the Likert-scale in the questionnaire was formulated as following: 
Question: How satisfied were you today with your problem solution process? 
       
Answer:       
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied 
2.4.1. Validity, reliability and representativity of the chosen empirical methods 
a) Validity and reliability 
For validity in the first step it is necessary to address appropriate indicators to the variables 
which allow for measuring the characteristics as they are understood. This has already been 
laid out more in detail in the chapters 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 on how (with which indicators) the 
author is going to measure the independent and dependent variable allowing an 
intersubjective reconsideration. The author is aware that the components of decision making 
behavior like, cognition, reflexion, target orientation, etc. underlay subjective norms. For the 
declaration of reliability in measurement, science in empirical research has developed the so 
called reliability coefficient. It’s results, coming in general, from the quotient from error 
variance of the measurement and total variance of the complete data set of a research 
problem.336 
The participants for the empirical experiment were selected among managers and students 
from business management faculties. The managers337 were full time practitioners in the field 
of business administration and are also attending a part time doctoral study program in global 
management. The students were included as participants in the study to ensure comparability 
with previous empirical experiments, as many of former research have been conducted with 
students. The question if students behave in a management decision making situation as “real” 
decision makers and therefore produce valid results was already highlighted by various 
                                                 
335  Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
336  Cf. Friedrichs, J. (1990). Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung. 14. Aufl. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,  
p. 102; Neuert, J. O. (2009). Sozio-ökonomische Analyse der "Integrierten Mediation" als 
Konfliktregelungskonzept. Realtheorie, Modelkonstrukt und empirische Befunde. Kufstein (Unpublished 
Project Study), p. 199. 
337  The managers included in the study hold among others positions like CEO, COO, Senior Manager, Managing 
Director, Business Unit Leader, Department Leader, Director, etc. 
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studies but will also again be addressed in this study.338 These studies revealed that in 
laboratory experiments the decisions of students and professionals working in the business 
management field produced similar results.339 Witte & Hausschildt, in this case, argue that 
simplifications are justified if it is assured that students do not behave differently than 
professionals in relationship to the variables which are under examination.340 In the author’s 
case, according to Witte & Hausschildt, this is assured by choosing for the well-structured 
problem tasks (cf. Appendix I) a task which has a business management background (e.g. an 
investment decision). As this kind of a task is also a part of the student’s basic education in 
the field business management and also a typical task for professionals in the field of business 
management, students and managers should therefore provide similar results. There seems to 
be a limited risk in receiving different results between the student participants and the 
participating managers as for the ill-structured task, a task was chosen (cf. Appendix I) which 
is new to students and to professionals.  
Due to the operationalization of the indicators, the measurements of the variables, from a 
scientific point of view, are state of the art and therefore the author believes this allows a valid 
measurement of the variables. The following points highlight from a validity and reliability 
perspective, why a laboratory experiment is preferred to other options: 
• The situation and the main influencing factors can be better controlled and therefore 
allow for a more accurate and valid recording of the components of the independent 
and dependent variables. 
• The comparatively low complexity of the laboratory experiment allow for a high 
assurance of measurement since there are a lot less disturbing effects, which arise in a 
field experiment due to a large amount of empirical impressions. 
• A reproducibility of certain tasks or situations is, without a doubt, in a laboratory 
experiment easier than in a field experiment as well as in an interview situation or a 
document analyses. 
                                                 
338  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 165-167; Witte, E.; 
Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
(13), p. 184. 
339  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 165-167; Witte, E.; 
Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr 
(13), pp. 181-184. 
340  Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: 
Mohr (13), p. 182. 
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• The risk of a distorted description of elements of the independent and dependent 
variables is rather low, due to the presence of an observer in the laboratory 
experiment. In contrast, a document analyses or an interview has the risk that due to 
“psychological smoothing” of the participants, the reality is distorted.341 
b) Representativity 
The representativeness of empirical experiments asks for isomorphism or at least 
homomorphism of the research situation (here of the personal structure and the task situation) 
and compares this to reality. This means, that tasks which are conducted in a laboratory 
experiment should show high similarity to tasks in reality and people conducting the task 
should have the same engagement as in reality.342 When talking about representativeness 
researchers in general are mainly confronted with two difficulties: 
• A higher degree of abstraction enables a high controllability of all impacting factors of 
the empirical experiment. The chance of an accurate assessment of the cause and 
effect relationship is quite high. But if the degree of abstraction is too high and 
therefore there is a high distance to reality, this increases the risk that results cannot be 
applied to reality. 
• At the other end, a smaller degree of abstraction, which therefore enables a relatively 
close distance to reality, increases the risk, that influencing factors cannot be 
controlled and assessed due to the high complexity of the situation. The chance of the 
assessment of an accurate cause and effect relationship is rather low. But in contrast 
the possibility of “realistic” behavior of individuals increases because of the realistic 
approach.343 
As the results of experiments often have no “real” consequences for the participants, it can be 
questioned if the participants show the same effort within a laboratory experiment as within 
real life situations. The research design seems to be well constructed if it is possible to 
stabilize the “Ego-Involvement” during the whole time of the experiment.344 Pre-tests for a 
                                                 
341  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 165. 
342  Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: 
Mohr (13), p. 181. 
343  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 155. 
344  Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: 
Mohr (13), p. 181. 
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similar study showed that a remark to the participants that the experiment is of pedagogical 
relevance, was sufficient enough to eliminate “playful behavior”.345 
When reviewing the structures of the task and the measurement of efficiency under the 
perspective of representativeness, the author comes to following conclusion: 
• By assigning an investment decision to the laboratory experiment for the well-
structured problem task, the author addressed a task which is a common task in any 
kind of business and therefore reflects or represents reality. The ill-structured task, 
which is mainly about prioritizing items, to the author’s understanding, is also a task 
which can be found in strategic parts of business management quite often and 
therefore also reflects or represents reality quite well. As the mid-structured problem 
task is most likely a combination of a well- and ill-structured problem situation, the 
author believes that this task also reflects or represents the reality quite well. The 
selection of the mid-structured problem situation is an intermediate between the well- 
and ill-structured problem situations. 
• For the measurement of economic efficiency the author has dedicated the 
measurement of time consumption to material efficiency and the target-actual 
comparison to formal efficiency. As time consumption is also used in the field as a 
measurement of material efficiency and the target-actual comparison as measurement 
for the formal efficiency, the author believes this demonstrates representativeness. To 
our understanding individual efficiency, even in a field experiment, would also have to 
be measured with a questionnaire, as personal attitudes (like satisfaction, self-
reflection, etc.) are difficult or almost impossible to track by observing participants in 
an empirical experiment. Therefore, to the author’s understanding individual 
efficiency measurement via a questionnaire provides a very accurate 
representativeness. 
Due to the explanations above, the author believes that the setup of the empirical experiment 
as laboratory experiment seems to provide acceptable validity, reliability and 
representativeness. 
 
 
                                                 
345  Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: 
Mohr (13), p. 181. 
89 
2.4.2. Planning and organization of the empirical experiment 
In the previous chapter the setup of the empirical experiment was laid out and was discussed 
more in detail on how the experiment will be preceded and why it was preceded in the 
proposed construct. In next step the organization of the empirical experiment will be 
discussed more in detail. Prearrangements, course of action and scheduling will be reviewed. 
a) Structure of the participants 
The author has decided to choose the participants for the empirical experiment among 
managers (practitioners) and students from business management faculties to ensure 
comparability with previous empirical experiments as many of them were conducted with 
students. Several studies have already highlighted the fact that in laboratory experiment 
decisions of students and professionals working in the business management field produced 
similar results.346 The author is aware that there is a risk that students could behave differently 
from practitioners, especially when tasks used in the experiment are not related to business 
management field. As the problem tasks for the laboratory experiment are business 
management related cases (cf. Appendix I) this should justify also the use of students and not 
only managers for the empirical experiment.347  
b) Organization of the laboratory experiment 
To be able to handle the laboratory experiment in a proper way there were several sessions 
with a limited amount of participants. Each session included up to a maximum of 35 
participants. In the first step the participants were asked to fill with pencil and paper the 
personality instrument (MBTI). The participants were advised that there is no time limit on 
answering the questions in the instrument. After all the participants had finished the 
personality instrument (MBTI) they receive the first (well-structured) of three problem 
structured tasks (well-, mid- and ill-structured) for completion. After finishing each problem 
task, they were asked to fill out the questionnaire to evaluate individual efficiency for every 
task. To ensure, that the participants record their time on the problem task, they only received 
one task at a time and had to return the finished task before they could go on. In this case the 
supervisor/author was able to check if the time was documented. The author was aware, that 
                                                 
346  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 330; Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. 
(1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr (13), p. 184. 
347  Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. (1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: 
Mohr (13), p. 184. 
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sessions with up to 35 participants are quite large, but to eliminate the risk that participants 
are biased by information of former groups, it seemed reasonable to work with groups of this 
size. Nevertheless, the participant were instructed not to forward any information from the 
experiment, therefore eliminating any risk of influencing other participants. For reasons of 
validity, reliability and representativeness the participants were instructed to do the following 
before starting the experiment: 
• After the instructions, the participants received the first problem solving task (cf. 
Appendix I) and they were asked to complete it as required by the written problem 
statement. 
• They could take as much time as they like: time is not a limit. But they still should 
document the time when they begin and when they finish the task. 
• After finishing the task, they should immediately return the task to the instructor and 
pick up the questionnaire (cf. Appendix II) and complete it. There was also no time 
limit on the questionnaire. 
• After they finished the questionnaire they were handed the next task and received the 
next questionnaire after they had turned in the completed task. 
• This was the same procedure for the third and last task. 
• As the experiment is of high pedagogical relevance, the participants were asked to 
behave as they would in a work environment. 
• Until the four groups had finished the laboratory experiments, the participants were 
asked not communicate with other groups about the tasks they had to conducted, so 
that the other groups are not influenced in any way. 
Each of the sessions was budgeted with about four hours in total for completing the MBTI, 
the three problem solving tasks and the questionnaire.  
2.5. The operationalization of the variables 
After the hypothetical constructs (hypotheses) were described on a theoretical basis by the 
construction of the theoretical causal model and the layout of the research design for the 
laboratory experiment was completed. The next step was to complete the scientific evaluation. 
It is necessary to operationalize the research variables. This was done by formulating a 
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measurement model for the latent exogenous and endogenous variables.348 The quality of the 
results to falsify or support the hypotheses is strongly influenced by the measurement 
indicators. The better the empirical definitions or indictors match the theoretical definitions 
the more valid the results will be. This is also described as construct validity.349 
a) The latent exogenous (independent) variables 
Following the chapter 2.3.3, the independent variable, the personality predetermination, has 
been constructed on a theoretical analytical basis and indicators have been derived. In the next 
step, the empirical testing of causal theory, the exact description of the measurement of the 
variables will be addressed. 
In the main hypotheses it is assumed that the personality predetermination has an impact on 
the socioeconomic efficiency of management decision making. Therefore the H0 is 
formulated: 
• Intuitive behavior in the decision making process leads to higher socioeconomic 
efficiency within certain problem categories. 
In this case the personality predetermination (intuitive/rational behavior) is operationalized by 
a self-scoring personality profile, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which measures 
four dichotomies (Figure 16) to assess personality predetermination. 
 
Figure 16: The four dichotomies of the MBTI 
Source: Briggs Myers et al., 2003, p. 6 
                                                 
348  Weiber, R.; Mühlhaus, D. (2010). Strukturgleichungsmodellierung. Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung 
in die Kausalanalyse mit Hilfe von AMOS, SmartPLS und SPSS. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer (Springer-
Lehrbuch), pp. 85-86. 
349  Friedrichs, J. (1990). Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung. 14. Aufl. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, p. 
102. 
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The Extraversion/Introversion (E-I) scale is used to tap a person’s preference focusing their 
attitude/energy either on the outer world, on people and objects (E) or on concepts, ideas and 
internal experience (I). The Sensing/Intuition (S-N) scale taps the individual preference 
between two opposite ways of perceiving information, concrete factual details through the 
five senses using logical rules (S) versus seeing patterns through the unconscious using gut 
feelings (N). The Thinking/Feeling (T-F) scale taps the individual problem solving process by 
reflecting the preference of individuals between two contrasting ways: logic (T) versus 
reliance on emotions (F) when making judgments. The Judging/Perceiving (J-P) scale is 
designed to reflect a person’s preference/attitude using a Judging process and therefore using 
either Thinking or Feeling (J) when dealing with the outer world or using a Perceiving 
process and therefore Sensing or Intuition (P) when dealing with the outer world. 
These four dichotomies of the MBTI identify 16 different personality types. Within the 16 
different personality types every type has one out of the four mental functions (S-N and T-F) 
which is preferred the most, the dominant function. The second function, the auxiliary 
function, provides balance to the first or dominant function. The function opposite the 
dominant function is the inferior function and is typically the least developed. It is also 
referred to as the fourth function. The opposite function to the auxiliary function is the tertiary 
function, also referred to as the third function.350 
As the dual processing research sees the Sensing/Thinking types as the most analytical and 
the Intuition/Feeling types as the most intuitive, the four dichotomies in combination with a 
dominant preference for Sensing or Intuition and an auxiliary preference for Thinking or 
Feeling provides for the possibility to grade rational and intuitive behavior in different 
ranks.351  
b) The latent endogenous (dependent and intervening) variables 
In this context the socioeconomic efficiency represents the dependent variable. As already 
discussed in a more elaborate way in chapter (2.3.4) the determination of the socioeconomic 
efficiency can be done by various constructs. To operationalize the dependent variables, the 
socioeconomic efficiency, the economic part of efficiency, in this context, will be determined 
                                                 
350  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., pp. 29-31. 
351  Hough, J. R.; ogilvie, d. (2005). An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes. In: 
Journal Management Studies 42 (2), pp. 426-427. 
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and measured by material and formal efficiency and the socio-psychological part of efficiency 
will be determined and measured by individual efficiency. 
1) Operationalization and measurement of the economic efficiency 
Material efficiency in decision making relates to economic results and can be understood as 
an input-output relationship which is measured by criteria like profit, growth, rate of return, 
etc. Management science has created a series of key indicators to display material efficiency 
in decision making. Mostly these are measures which indicate economical activities as input-
output relationships with performance indicators like profitability, cost and returns or cost and 
benefits.352 So in this context the time, as an indirect measure for costs, will serve as a 
measurement indicator for the latent endogenous variable. Within the experimental study, the 
participants will be instructed to record the time they have used for the completion of the 
different tasks. So the duration of time the participants need for each task fulfillment, will 
provide an indication on the material efficiency in the decision making process.  
Since time as a measurement indictor does not give any indication on the quality of the 
decision making process, but is a main criteria of efficiency, the measurement of formal 
efficiency will give an indication on the quality of the decision making process.353 In this 
context formal efficiency will be tracked by comparing the results of problem solutions from 
the participants to the “optimal results”. Since well-structured tasks by definition (cf. chapter 
2.3.1) are tasks which can be solved quantitatively by a mathematical algorithm, the indicator 
for an optimal result for a well-structured problem task will be a correct figure achieved by a 
calculation. For the ill-structured tasks, where by definition (cf. chapter 2.3.1), the problem 
constellation cannot be calculated by a mathematical algorithm and might not have an 
objective result, the optimal result will be determined by the judgment of experts. For the 
mid-structured problem tasks, which are characterized (cf. chapter 2.3.1) by having a part 
within the problem structure which can be determined by a calculation and another part which 
might have no objective solution, the optimal result will be a combination of both a 
calculation of a figure and a judgment of experts. 
 
                                                 
352  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 119. 
353  Gzuk, R. (1975). Messung der Effizienz von Entscheidungen. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr (Empirische 
Theorie der Unternehmung, 5), p. 5. 
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2) Operationalization and measurement of the socio-psychological efficiency 
The socio-psychological efficiency is represented by individual efficiency and is the more 
subjective part within the decision making process dealing with results which can be 
considered as “soft facts” and are related to emotions, feelings, acceptance and satisfaction of 
individuals. The individual efficiency is more characterized by the decision makers hope to 
fulfill the expectation and in this sense can also be described as the satisfaction of the decision 
maker concerning the achieved results. As in this case it is rather difficult or almost 
impossible to track personal attitudes (like satisfaction, self-reflection, etc.) by observing 
participants in an empirical experiment a questionnaire (cf. Appendix II) is used which 
contains mainly questions about the personal satisfaction of the participants on solving the 
problem tasks, how systematic they rate their approach solving the task and how they rate 
their own cognitive style.354  
3) The total efficiency in the concept of the causal context 
In the end economic efficiency (material and formal efficiency) and socio-psychological 
efficiency (individual efficiency) with the various measurement indicators need to be brought 
together in a construct of total efficiency within the causal analytical context. This means 
seeing, how different kinds of personalities (personality predetermination) impact the 
efficiency of management decision making. 
As discussed in chapter 2.3.4 the total efficiency will be calculated by the amalgamation of 
material, formal and individual efficiency. For this case the author has decided to rely on the 
amalgamation concept of Neuert.355 Neuert has conducted a survey, taking a representative 
sample from the population, to evaluate the weighting of different efficiency dimensions as 
they are present in reality. The evaluation indicated that material efficiency represents 70% of 
the weight, formal efficiency 20% of the weight and individual efficiency 10% of the 
weight.356 Therefore the same level of weighting will be used for the calculation of the total 
efficiency within this study. 
                                                 
354  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, Appendix 3. 
355  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, Appendix 3, p. 125. 
356  Ibid., p. 268. 
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2.6. Evaluation of the material, the formal, the individual and the total efficiency 
In the previous chapters the concept of material, formal and individual efficiency are 
described in a more elaborate way and it is also shown how they can be measured. In the next 
step it will be shown how material, formal, individual efficiency and finally total efficiency 
can be evaluated from the results of the laboratory experiment. For illustration purposes the 
efficiency figures will be standardized to a scale from 0 to 1. 
a) Evaluation of the material efficiency 
For material efficiency (EM), the use of time as an indirect measure for costs, serves as 
indicator. In this case the time which is consumed to fulfill the different tasks is measured and 
evaluated. Meaning that using less time to achieve the tasks indicates a higher material 
efficiency. To have a common “direction” of the figures (the higher = the better), the time is 
inverted (1-time). To standardize material efficiency on the scale from 0 to 1, the time is 
divided by 60, turning the minutes into hours. To avoid negative figures for material 
efficiency, results which exceed 60 minutes will be excluded from the sample. 
𝐸𝑀 = 1 − �time60 � (1) 
b) Evaluation of the formal efficiency 
As described in chapter b) formal efficiency (EF) within the laboratory experiment will be 
tracked by comparing the results of the problem solution process of the participants with the 
“optimal results”. For the three kind of problem situations (well-, mid- and ill-structured) 
three different specific kinds of tasks (task I, task II and task III) were selected. Due to 
different structure (well-, mid- and ill-structured) they require different methods for the 
evaluation of the respective formal efficiency. 
1) Evaluation of the formal efficiency of task I 
Task I, the well-structured task, is about an investment decision making problem of choosing 
between three different production machines. As this the well-structured task can be solved 
quantitatively by a mathematical algorithm, the indicator for an optimal result will be a 
correct figure done by a calculation. Task I includes seven steps to complete the final result. 
Therefore the solution for task I is evaluated by seven different assessment criteria which are 
used to evaluate the quality of solving the problem. The distribution of the points on the 
different assessment criteria is shown in Figure 17. 
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Assessment criteria’s Pts. 
A1: Calculation method of the fixed costs 2 
A2: Result on the calculation method of the fixed costs 1 
A3: Calculation method of the variable costs 2 
A4: Results on the calculation method of the variable costs 1 
A5: Evaluation and selection of the most economic production machine 1 
A6: Calculation method of the critical production volume when to select which 
 machine 
2 
A7: Result on the calculation method of the critical production volume 1 
EF TI  Total result: 10 
Figure 17: Assessment criteria’s for the evaluation of task I 
Source: Author 
The candidates can achieve within task I between 0 and 10 points concerning on how close 
their calculation is to the “correct” calculation. To standardize formal efficiency of the task 1 
on a scale from 0 to 1 the results are divided by 10. Therefore the formal efficiency of task I 
(EF TI) is calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝐹 𝑇𝑇 = (𝐴1 + 𝐴2 + 𝐴3 + 𝐴4 + 𝐴5 + 𝐴6 + 𝐴7)10  (2) 
2) Evaluation of the formal efficiency of task II 
Task II, the mid-structured task, which can be characterized by having a part within the 
problem structure which can be determined by a calculation and another part which might 
have no objective solution and is addressed by a case study about a decision making process 
for a marketing strategy. Within this task the candidates, first have to rank the plausibility of 
the decisions taken by different managers (sales director, technical director, finance director, 
marketing director and human resources director) about the marketing strategy, second to 
rank which of the manager’s strategy the candidates prefer the most and third to setup a 
calculation on the financial impact of the strategy. Task II is also laid out on a 10 point scale. 
The first part is maximum credited with a maximum of 2.5 points, the second part with a 
maximum of 2.5 and the third part with a maximum of 5 points (cf. Figure 18). The first part 
of formal efficiency measures (Ef1), the evaluation of the quality of the ranking plausibility of 
the manager’s decisions and is done by comparing the results of the candidates to an expert’s 
solution. Meaning if the candidate is within the range of the expert’s solution the candidate is 
credited with points and if not the candidate doesn’t receive any points. As there are five 
managers and the maximum total is 2.5 points every correct answer is credited with 0.5 
97 
points. The second part of formal efficiency measures (Ef2), the evaluation of the candidate’s 
solution on the preference of the manager’s strategy and is done by subtracting the 
candidate’s solution from the expert’s solution. The maximum quality is achieving 0 points, 
meaning there is no difference to the expert’s solution or the minimum quality is achieving 12 
points, meaning the ranking was the maximum inverse to the expert’s solution. To have the 
same “direction” as task I, the higher the points the better the quality of the solution. The 
results of the task II (TII) of the candidates where subtracted from the minimum score (12 
points). To also stay within the 10 point scale as with task I, the second part of formal 
efficiency is further standardized to a 2.5 scale as follows: 
E𝑓2 = (12 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇) × 2,512  (3) 
The third part of formal efficiency measures (Ef3) is about calculating which one of two 
options of the marketing strategy is more favorable. Therefore the option 1 and option 2 are 
evaluated so that the final result is calculated. In the final result each of the two options is 
credited with one point. 
Adding up the first, the second and the third part of the measures results in the final formal 
efficiency (EFTII) of task II. To standardize formal efficiency again on a scale from 0 to 1 the 
sum of the partial formal efficiencies will be divided by ten, so that formal efficiency will also 
include values from 0 to 1. 
𝐸𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝑓1 + 𝐸𝑓2 + 𝐸𝑓310  (4) 
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No. Evaluation Details Exp. Pts. xxx325 xxx325 xxx023 xxx023 
1. Plausibility sales director 4-5 0,5 5 0,5  2 0,0 
2. Plausibility technical director 1-2 0,5 1 0,5  1 0,5 
3. Plausibility financial director 1-2 0,5 5 0,0  1 0,5 
4. Plausibility marketing director 4-5 0,5 5 0,5  4 0,5 
5. Plausibility human res. Director 2-3 0,5 1 0,0  2 0,5 
Ef1 Sub results:   2,5  1,5 
 
2,0 
6. Preference sales director 4   4 0 3 1 
7. Preference technical director 1   2 1 2 1 
8. Preference financial director 2   5 3 1 1 
9. Preference marketing director 5   3 2 5 0 
10. Preference human res. Director 3   1 2 4 1 
 
Standardizing (the higher= better): 
 
 4 
 
8 
Ef2 Sub results standard. on 2.5 pt. scale: 
 
 0,8 
 
1,7 
11. Option 1   1,66  0,0  0,8 
12. Option 2   1,66  0,0   0,8 
13.  Evaluation final result   1,66  0,0   0,0 
Ef3 Sub result: 
  
 0 
 
1,7 
EFTII Total result: 
  
 0,23 
 
0,54 
Figure 18: Example of the evaluation of task II 
Source: Author 
3) Evaluation of the formal efficiency of task III 
The Task III, the ill-structured task, where by definition the problem constellation cannot be 
calculated by a mathematical algorithm and might not have an objective result and where the 
optimal result will be determined by the judgment of experts represents a decision making 
situation in an imaginative urgency (crash on the moon). The task is to rank 15 items from 1-
15 (cf. Figure 19) on how “important” they are for a successful survival of the urgency. The 
calculation about the quality of the solution is done by calculation of the difference between 
the “expert’s” solution ranking of devices and the ranking of the candidate. The maximum 
quality is achieving 0 points, meaning there is no difference to the expert’s solution or the 
minimum quality of achieving 112 points, meaning the ranking was the maximum inverse to 
the expert’s solution. To have again a “common” direction as in the figures of task I and task 
II, the higher the points the better the quality of the solution. The results of the candidates are 
subtracted from the minimum score (112 points). Therefore the result of task III can be 
calculated as: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼 = 112 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (5) 
To also have a 0 to 1 point scale as in task I and task II the results of task III are also 
standardized: 
𝐸𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼  × 10112)10  (6) 
 
No. Items Exp.  xxx157 xxx157 xxx387 xxx387 
1. Box of matches 15 15 0 13 2 
2. Food concentrate 4 9 5 9 5 
3. 50 feet of nylon rope 6 6 0 11 5 
4. Parachute silk 8 10 2 15 7 
5. Portable heating unit 13 2 11 7 6 
6. Two .45 caliber pistols 11 11 0 12 1 
7. One case of dehydrated milk 12 8 4 14 2 
8. Two 100 lb. tanks of oxygen 1 1 0 1 0 
9. Stellar map 3 14 11 2 1 
10. Self-inflating life raft 9 12 3 10 1 
11. Magnetic compass 14 13 1 3 11 
12. 5 gallons of water 2 3 1 4 2 
13. Signal flares 10 5 5 8 2 
14. First aid kit, including injection needle 7 7 0 5 2 
15. Solar-powered FM receiver-transmitter 5 4 1 6 1 
TIII Min. = 112 pts. 
  
44 
 
48 
TIIIs Standardization (higher values = better results):  68  64 
EFTIII Total result standardized on a 0-1 pt. scale: 
  
0.61 
 
0,57 
Figure 19: Example of the evaluation of task III 
Source: Author 
c) Evaluation of the individual efficiency 
Every candidate is asked to fill out a standardized and structured questionnaire after 
completing the different tasks (task I, task II and task III). Different questions (cf. Appendix 
II) within the questionnaire are build up in a way that candidates who are more satisfied and 
can identify themselves more with the problem solution process will rate higher scores on a 
100 
five point Likert scale rather than those who are less satisfied and can less identify themselves 
with the problem solution process.357  
Example: 
How satisfied were you today with your problem solution process? 
       
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied 
       
Therefore the higher the candidates score on the five point Likert scale the higher their 
individual efficiency can be rated. The overall individual efficiency is then calculated by 
adding up the different figures from the Likert scales of the first six questions from the 
questionnaire and then dividing them by six to get the mean value. To standardize the 
individual efficiency for the amalgamation of total efficiency the sum of the partially 
individual efficiencies will be divided by five, so that individual efficiency will again include 
values between 0 and 1. 
EP = (𝑄1 + 𝑄2 + 𝑄3 +  𝑄4 + 𝑄5 + 𝑄6)(6 ×  5)  (7) 
d) Evaluation of the total efficiency 
Having evaluated and standardized the results of the material, the formal and the individual 
efficiencies, the total efficiency for every task is calculated by adding up the individual, the 
formal and the material efficiency. By the amalgamation concept of Neuert the material 
efficiency is weighted with 70%, the formal efficiency with 20% and the individual efficiency 
with 10%.358 Therefore the total efficiency is calculated by: 
𝐸𝑇 = E𝑀 × 0.7 + 𝐸𝐹 × 0.2 + 𝐸𝑃 × 0.1 (8) 
The total efficiency measure is calculated for each of the different problems (well-, mid- and 
ill-structured) individually. 
  
                                                 
357  Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, Anhang 3. 
358  Ibid., p. 125. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS, AND CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS, 
DERIVED FROM THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 359 
3.1. Explanation of the statistical analysis 
From a scientific point of view, research is not just comprised of the formulation of cause-
effect hypotheses. It also demands that these hypotheses are confronted with reality by 
establishing empirical tests to allow falsifying or tentatively substantiating these 
hypotheses.360 So in this case to satisfy scientific standards it is necessary to confront the 
hypotheses with reality (in the present case the empirically retrieved data of management 
decisions from candidates with different personalities). 
According to Prim and Tilmann the structure for generating and validating the author’s theory 
about the impact of personality on management decisions can be described as following: 
• The formulation of the hypotheses, e.g.: Intuitive behavior in decision making process 
leads to higher socioeconomic efficiency within ill structured problems than rational 
behavior 
• The setup of so called basic sentences from the empirical data collection (e.g. human 
beings with intuitive behavior are more efficient when solving ill-structured problem 
situations, etc.) 
• The confrontation of the hypotheses with the basic sentences (in our case the 
hypotheses are falsified or temporarily confirmed with the empirical data)361 
This means that any basic sentence which is contrary to the statements or any of hypotheses 
can refute those hypotheses. In turn every hypothesis which is supported by a basic sentence 
can be taken as tentatively substantiated.362 So for this case if statistical measures show a 
confirmation of the hypotheses it seems to be evident that human beings with a certain 
                                                 
359 Parts of this chapter have been published in: Hoeckel, C. (2012). The Impact of Personality Traits and 
Behavioral Patterns on the Outcomes of Business Management Decision Making – A Framework for an 
Empirical Study. In: New Challenges of Economic and Business Development Conference Proceedings, 
Riga, Latvia, pp. 259–269; Neuert, J.; Hoeckel, C. (2013). The Impact of Personality Traits and Problem 
Structures on Management Decision-Making Outcomes. In: Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing 9 
(3), pp. 382-393. 
360  Popper, K. R. (2005). Logik der Forschung. 11. Aufl. Hg. v. Herbert Keuth. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,  
pp. 16-17. 
361  Prim, R.; Tilmann, H. (1977). Grundlagen einer kritisch-rationalen Sozialwissenschaft. Studienbuch zur 
Wissenschaftstheorie. 3. Aufl. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, p. 82 ff. 
362  Neuert, J. O. (2009). Sozio-ökonomische Analyse der "Integrierten Mediation" als Konfliktregelungskonzept. 
Realtheorie, Modelkonstrukt und empirische Befunde. Kufstein (Unpublished Project Study), p. 278. 
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behavior (e.g. intuitive) are more efficient when solving tasks with a certain kind of structure 
(e.g. ill-structured). 
A scientific research design consists in the first step of a concept to gather empirical data in 
regards to the main research question and to falsify or tentatively substantiate the construct of 
the hypotheses. In the second step, following the collection of the data, an evaluation and 
interpretation of the data is carried out with statistical methods and procedures. Statistics in 
this sense can be understood as the scientific collection, preparation, illustration, analysis and 
interpretation of figures and data.363 Statistical methods are used to quantify mass data to 
allow describing, judging and drawing conclusions from them. 
In this context there is also a differentiation between descriptive and inferential statistics. 
Descriptive statistics are used when statistical analyses are mainly needed to record, 
summarize and present data. Descriptive statistics use e.g. tables, histograms and numerical 
characteristics like mean values, standard deviations and correlation coefficients to summarize 
and present data. Actually the interest of scientific research is not only to summarize and 
present data but also to draw the right conclusions from the results. And inferential statistics 
include in addition to the presentation of data conclusions and evaluations in a form of an 
interpretation of the results from the obtained data. Therefore inferential statistics mainly use 
two methods, first the method of estimation and second statistical tests to prove the 
hypotheses.364 In addition statistical procedures also represent uni-, bi- and multi-variant 
methods. If just on variable is part of the research, then uni-variant statistical methods (e.g. 
averaging, standard deviation, etc.) are required. When two variants are part of the research 
then bi-variant methods (e.g. correlation analysis) are of use. Having three and more variables 
require multi-variant statistical methods like multiple regression analyses or covariance based 
causal analyses.365 As most of the above mentioned statistical methods and procedures are 
complex and time consuming to calculate modern information and media technology has 
developed a vast amount of software products which are adequate to process large amounts of 
data and support a manifold of statistical analyses. One of the most popular software products 
for statistical analysis is the program SPSS (Statistical Package for Social the Sciences).366 
For the completion of the statistical analyzes of the present work the author has used the 
                                                 
363  Lorenz, R. J. (1996). Grundbegriffe der Biometrie. 4. Aufl. Stuttgart, Jena, Lübeck, Ulm: G. Fischer,  
pp. 16-19. 
364  Ibid. 
365  Ibid.,pp. 51 ff. 
366  Backhaus, K.; Erichson, B.; Plinke, W.; Weiber, R. (2011). Multivariate Analysemethoden. Eine 
anwendungsorientierte Einführung. 13. Aufl. Berlin, Germany: Springer. 
103 
current version of the SPSS. With the support of the SPSS package the author has managed to 
realize the descriptive and inferential statistics of this work. 
Based on the laboratory experiment treatments and the resulting data sets the following 
statistical procedures were conducted: 
• Computation of means and means distribution and relative frequencies of the overall 
efficiencies measures (incl. Chi-Square-Tests) in the various decision task structures 
(well-, mid- and ill-structured tasks) 
• Statistical correlation analyses on the basis of a structural equation model for the 
examination of complex correlations between various personality trait measures of the 
experimentees and the decision making efficiency measures in the various decision 
making task structures 
The functions and procedures of the statistical analyses will be described later in a more 
elaborate way when analyzing the empirical data of the laboratory experiment. 
3.2. Demographic data from the participants of the empirical study 
The overall sample size of the laboratory experiments included 111 participants (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Distribution of gender within the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
From these 111 participants 109 completed task 1, task 2 was completed by 98 participants 
and task 3 was completed by 106 participants. These completed data sets were included in the 
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statistical analyses. The experiments were carried out in four groups, whereby two groups 
were managers in the field of business administration, one group was comprised of master 
students (MIM) in the field of international management and one group was comprised of 
bachelor students (BIB) in the field of international business (Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21: Occupation of the participants of the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
From the 111 participants 46 (41 %) were females and 57 (57 %) were males. For 8 (7 %) 
participants there was no information on the gender available. Seventy two of the participants 
had birth dates between 1962 and 1991. The rest of the participants (39) did not provide any 
information on their year of birth during the experiment (Figure 22). The mean of the year of 
birth for the managers, the master and the bachelor students was 1982. 
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Figure 22: Distribution of age among the participants of the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
Figure 23 shows, not surprisingly, that the managers are on the average “older” than the 
master students (MIM) and they are again “older” than the bachelor students (BIB). The mean 
of the manager’s year of birth was 1977, the master student’s mean of the year of birth was 
1985 and the bachelor student’s mean of the year of birth was 1987.  
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Figure 23: Distribution of age and per occupation among the participants 
Source: Author 
The measurement of the personality predetermination by the MBTI revealed that 78 (70 %) 
participants are Extraverted and 33 (30 %) are Introverted on the Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) 
scale. On the Thinking-Feeling (T-F) scale, 87 (78 %) of the participants are Thinking types 
and 24 (22 %) are Feeling types. Sensing types are represented by 57 (51 %) participants and 
Intuition types are represented by 54 (49 %) participants on the Sensing-Intuition (S-N) scale. 
On the Judging-Perceiving (J-P) scale the Judging types are represented by 69 (62 %) and 
Perceiving types are represented by 42 (38 %) participants. The results show, that among the 
participants of the experiment the Judging, Extraverted and especially the Thinking types are 
more highly represented than the other types (Figure 24).  
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Figure 24: The MBTI preferences among the participants 
Source: Author 
Figure 25 shows the distribution of the personality types among the participants of the 
experiment. Besides the personality types, Figure 25 also shows how the different MBTI 
types are related to different behavioral styles according to their dominant function (cf. Figure 
13).367 From the 16 personality types of the MBTI the ENTJ, ESTJ and the ENTP represent 
48% of the participant’s types.  
                                                 
367  Hirsh, K; Hirsh, E. (2007). Introduction to Type and Decision Making. Mountain View, CA: CPP, Inc., p. 5. 
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Figure 25: Distribution of the MBTI personality type and the behavioral style among the 
participants 
Source: Author 
According to their dominant function (cf. Figure 13) the participants of the laboratory 
experiment where grouped into four kinds of behavioral styles (intuitive, mid intuitive, mid 
rational and rational). Figure 26 shows that 46 (41%) participants have a mid-rational style. 
The clear rational 27 (24 %) and intuitive 26 (23 %) participants of the study are about on the 
same level. The mid intuitive 12 (11 %) participants are somewhat “underrepresented”. 
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Figure 26: Participants of the laboratory experiment grouped by their behavioral style 
Source: Author 
The distribution of the personality types (predetermination) among the participants of the 
empirical experiment could lead to the insight that the data may not represent the general 
population as some personality types (Figure 25) or grouped personality types (Figure 26) are 
more highly represented than others. But according to the findings of Briggs Myers et al. 
certain personality types are more likely to select a certain kind of job or jobs with certain 
kinds of tasks.368 For ESTJ and ENTJ types it is quite common to be working in management 
jobs. The ESTJ and the ENTJ are both types which are overrepresented by working MBA 
students as compared with the national sample.369 In this case it seems quite “normal” and 
acceptable that personality types of the mid rational types are “overrepresented” in the test 
sample compared to the other personality types. 
 
 
                                                 
368  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., pp. 293-
295. 
369  Ibid., pp. 89-95. 
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3.3. Testing of the hypotheses concerning the impact of personality types on the 
efficiency outcomes of management decisions 
Based on the theoretical complex, the author assumes that intuitive behavior in the decision 
making process leads to higher socioeconomic efficiency within certain problem categories. 
This assumption is tested by taking the personality predetermination as the independent 
variable and evaluating the impact on the socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making 
process where as the dependent variable which is influenced by the structure of the problem 
as a intervening variable.  
3.3.1. Statement and findings within ill-structured problem situations 
In the proposed theory the author states that there is a cause and effect relationship between 
the intuitive and rational personality predetermination, an ill-structured problem situation and 
socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making process. Therefore the hypotheses H01 and 
H04 are addressed by the following statements: 
H01 Intuitive behavior in decision making process leads to higher efficiency within ill-
structured problems than rational behavior. 
H04 Rational behavior in decision making processes leads to lower efficiency within 
ill-structured problems than intuitive behavior 
The results from the empirical data of the participants solving ill-structured problem tasks can 
be interpreted according to the empirical data as follows: 
The mean value shows a slight difference between Extraverted (E) and Introverted (I) types 
and total efficiency outcomes when solving ill-structured problem tasks (Figure 27). 
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Figure 27: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
But when comparing Extraverted (E) and Introverted (I) types on material efficiency it can be 
seen that the Extraverted (E) types use generally less time to complete the tasks and therefore 
are more efficient than Introverted (I) types.  
 
Figure 28: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and material efficiency 
when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
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The Chi-Square-Test also shows a significant relationship between Extraverted (E) types and 
material (Figure 29) efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 29: Chi-Square-Test of Extraverted (E) types and material efficiency when 
solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Similar to the material efficiency, the Extraverts (E) also show on the average higher scores 
when completing ill-structured problem tasks and therefore are more efficient than Introverts 
(I). 
 
Figure 30: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and formal efficiency 
when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
The Chi-Square-Test again shows again a significant relationship between Extraverted (E) 
types and formal efficiency (Figure 31). 
E types -  material effciency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 23,554a 12 ,023
Likelihood-Ratio 16,341 12 ,176
Linear-by-Linear Association ,005 1 ,946
No. of Valid Cases 107
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Figure 31: Chi-Square-Test of Extraverted (E) types and formal efficiency when solving 
ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
In this case the Extraverted (E) types show a significant impact on the efficiency outcomes of 
material and formal efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks (Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32: Significance of Extraverted (E) types on the outcomes of material and formal 
efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
For the Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types the mean values for total efficiency outcomes show no 
great difference when solving ill-structured problem tasks (Figure 33). 
E types - formal efficiency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 40,065a 27 ,051
Likelihood-Ratio 27,196 27 ,453
Linear-by-Linear Association 11,174 1 ,001
No. of Valid Cases 106
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Figure 33: Mean values of Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
But when comparing more closely the outcomes of the personal efficiency when solving ill-
structured problem situations (Figure 34), it seems that Sensing (S) types achieve higher 
efficiencies. 
 
Figure 34: Mean values of Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types and personal efficiency when 
solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
115 
These results are also supported by a Chi-Square-Test which shows a highly significant 
relationship between the rational orientated Sensing (S) types and personal efficiency (Figure 
35). 
 
Figure 35: Chi-Square-Test of Sensing (S) types and personal efficiency when solving ill-
structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
In this case the Sensing (S) types, contradictive to the theory, show a significant relationship 
to the personal efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks (Figure 36). 
 
Figure 36: Significance of Sensing (S) types on the outcomes of personal efficiency when 
solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
For the mean values of the Thinking-Feeling (T-F) types and the outcomes of the total 
efficiency there is no obvious difference when solving ill-structured problem tasks. Thinking 
and Feeling types seem to achieve similar results (Figure 37). 
S types - personal effciency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 57,383a 17 ,000
Likelihood-Ratio 13,342 17 ,713
Linear-by-Linear Association 1,653 1 ,199
No. of Valid Cases 106
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Figure 37: Mean values of Thinking-Feeling (T-F) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
In the Judging-Perceiving (J-P) dichotomy there also seems to be no substantial difference in 
total efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks when comparing at the mean values 
(Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38: Mean values of Judging-Perceiving (J-P) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
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When comparing the mean values of decision making efficiency (Figure 39) of the four 
groups participating in the laboratory experiments, the results show no significant differences 
between the groups when solving ill-structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 39: Mean values decision making efficiency when solving ill-structured problem 
tasks of the groups participating in the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
The coefficient of variation of decision making efficiency (Figure 40) of the four groups 
participating in the laboratory experiments show a little more variation among the MIM group 
and the BIB group compared to the manager groups. 
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Figure 40: Coefficient of variation of the decision making efficiency when solving  
ill-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
When solving ill-structured problems there seems to be no substantial difference in efficiency 
outcomes between Thinking (T) and Feeling (F) types or for Judging (J) and Perceiving (P) 
types. Contradictive to the theory, Extraverted (E) and Sensing (S) types seem to achieve 
higher decision making efficiency outcomes when solving ill-structured problem tasks. The 
correlation analysis did not provide overall significant results between the personality 
predetermination and the efficiency outcomes when solving ill-structured problem situations. 
Though correlation analysis between the personality predetermination and the material 
efficiency shows a correlation coefficient of 0,192* with a r² of 0,037 (cf. Appendix III), in 
this case the variables “only” explain about 4% of the impact on the efficiency outcomes. 
3.3.2. Statement and findings within mid-structured problem situations 
In the proposed theory the author states that there is a cause and effect relationship between 
the complimentary personality predetermination, a mid-structured problem situation and 
socioeconomic efficiency of the decision making process. Therefore the hypothesis H02 is 
addressed by the following statement: 
H02 Complimentary intuitive and rational behavior in the decision making process 
leads to a higher efficiency in mid structured problems than sole intuitive or 
rational behavior. 
The results from the empirical data of the participants solving mid-structured problem tasks 
can be interpreted according to the empirical data as follows: 
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When comparing the mean values Extraverted (E) score slightly higher total efficiencies 
(Figure 41) in decision making outcomes than Introverts (I) types when solving mid-
structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 41: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
The higher total efficiency outcomes in decision making of Extraverted (E) types when 
solving mid-structured problem tasks are also supported by outcomes of material efficiency 
(Figure 42) and the level of significance (Figure 43) of material efficiency when solving mid-
structured problem tasks. 
 
120 
 
Figure 42: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and material efficiency 
when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 43: Chi-Square-Test of Extraverted (E) types and material efficiency when 
solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
In this case the Extraverted (E) types show a significant relationship with the outcomes of 
material efficiency when solving mid-structured problem tasks (Figure 44). 
 
Figure 44: Significance of Extraverted (E) types on the outcomes of material efficiency 
when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
E types - material efficiency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 55,730a 26 ,001
Likelihood-Ratio 26,841 26 ,418
Linear-by-Linear Association ,819 1 ,365
No. of Valid Cases 99
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Results of mean values (Figure 45) show a substantial difference between Sensing (S) and 
Intuitive (N) types in the outcomes of decision making efficiency when solving mid-
structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 45: Mean values of Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
These results are also supported when comparing the outcomes of material efficiency when 
solving mid-structured problem tasks as there seems to be a significant relationship (Figure 
46) to the Sensing (S) types. 
 
Figure 46: Chi-Square-Test of Sensing (S) types and material efficiency when solving 
mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
In this case the relationship between the Sensing (S) types and the outcomes of material 
efficiency when solving mid-structured problem situations seem to be significant (Figure 47). 
S types - material efficiency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 99,000a 26 ,000
Likelihood-Ratio 11,180 26 ,995
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,384 1 ,066
No. of Valid Cases 99
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Figure 47: Significance of Sensing (S) types on the outcomes of material efficiency when 
solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Between Thinking (T) and Feeling (F) types there seems to be no difference in the outcomes 
of decision making efficiency (Figure 48) when solving mid-structured problem situations 
and when looking at the mean values. These results are also supported by comparing the 
according correlations.  
 
Figure 48: Mean values of Thinking-Feeling (T-F) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Judging and perceiving types in the Judging-Perceiving (J-P) dichotomy seem to be quite 
equal (Figure 49). They both seem to be at the same efficiency outcomes level when solving 
mid-structured problem situations. These results are also supported by the correlation 
analysis, since there are also no significant correlations between either of these types (J-P) and 
the efficiency outcomes of decision making tasks. 
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Figure 49: Mean values of Judging-Perceiving (J-P) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving mid-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
The mean values of the decision making efficiency (Figure 50) of the four groups 
participating in the laboratory experiments show no significant differences when they are 
solving mid-structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 50: Mean values decision making efficiency when solving mid-structured 
problem tasks of the groups participating in the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
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The coefficient of variation in decision making efficiency (Figure 51) shows a higher 
variation for the MIM participants. The BIB participants are on a similar level with the 
managers. 
 
Figure 51: Coefficient of variation of the decision making efficiency when solving mid-
structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
When solving mid-structured problems there seems to be a difference in efficiency outcomes 
between Extraverts (E) and Introverts (I) and also between Sensing (S) and Intuitive (N) 
types. For the other types there are no significant differences in decision making efficiency 
outcomes when solving mid-structured problem tasks. 
3.3.3. Statement and findings within well-structured problem situations 
In the proposed theory the author states that there is a cause and effect relationship between 
the rational and intuitive personality predetermination, a well-structured problem situation and 
socioeconomic efficiency in the decision making process. Therefore the hypotheses H03 and 
H05 are addressed by the following statements: 
H03 Rational behavior in decision making processes leads to higher efficiency in well-
structured problems than intuitive behavior. 
H05 Intuitive behavior in decision making processes leads to lower efficiency in well-
structured problems than rational behavior 
The results from the empirical data of the participants solving well-structured problem tasks 
can be interpreted according to the empirical data as follows: 
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Extraverted (E) types seem to score higher outcomes in task evaluations when looking at the 
mean values (Figure 52) of total efficiency and when solving well-structure problem 
situations than as Introverted (I) types.  
 
Figure 52: Mean values of Extraverted-Introverted (E-I) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
These facts are also supported by the significance results when conducting the Chi-Square-
Test (Figure 53). Extraverted (E) types have a significant relationship to material efficiency 
when solving well-structured problem tasks.  
 
Figure 53: Chi-Square-Test of Extraverted (E) types and material efficiency when 
solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Taking the mean values and the Chi-Square-Test into consideration, it seems that Extraverted 
(E) types achieve higher outcomes when solving well-structured problem situations (Figure 
54). 
E types - material efficiency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Quadra 58,155a 32 ,003
Likelihood-Ratio 31,542 32 ,490
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,768 1 ,052
No. of Valid Cases 109
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Figure 54: Significance of Extraverted (E) types on the outcomes of material efficiency 
when solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
According to the mean values analysis the Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types show no obvious 
difference (Figure 55) in efficiency outcomes when solving well-structured problem tasks. 
 
Figure 55: Mean values of Sensing-Intuition (S-N) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Thinking (T) types seem to achieve higher efficiency outcomes, with their problem solution 
processes when solving well-structured problem situations than Feeling (F) types according to 
the mean values (Figure 56). From a correlation analysis point of view there are no significant 
results in seeing the same tendency. 
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Figure 56: Mean values of Thinking-Feeling (T-F) types and decision making efficiency 
when solving well-structure problem tasks 
Source: Author 
When solving well-structured tasks, the higher efficiency outcomes of Thinking (T) types are 
also supported by the significance of the Chi-Square-Test (Figure 57). 
 
Figure 57: Chi-Square-Test of Thinking (T) types and material efficiency when solving 
well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
Therefore there seems to be a significant relationship between Thinking (T) types and the 
outcomes of material efficiency when solving well-structured problem tasks (Figure 58).  
T types - material effciency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 47,199a 32 ,041
Likelihood-Ratio 25,160 32 ,800
Linear-by-Linear Association 5,009 1 ,025
No. of Valid Cases 109
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Figure 58: Significance of Thinking (T) types on the outcomes of material efficiency 
when solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
When comparing the mean values of Judging (J) and Perceiving (P) types the Judging (J) 
types score slightly higher in total efficiencies (Figure 59) in decision making outcomes, than 
Perceiving (P) types do when solving well-structure problem tasks. 
 
Figure 59: Mean values of Judging-Perceiving (J-P) types and decision making 
efficiency when solving well-structure problem tasks 
Source: Author 
But when comparing the outcomes of formal efficiency in solving well-structured problem 
situations (Figure 60) it seems that Judging (J) types are substantially more efficient. 
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Figure 60: Mean values of Judging-Perceiving (J-P) types and formal decision making 
efficiency when solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
This is also supported by the fact that Judging (J) types show a highly significant relationship 
to the outcomes of formal efficiency when solving well-structured problem tasks (Figure 62). 
 
Figure 61: Chi-Square-Test of Judging (J) types and formal efficiency when solving 
well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
So there seems to be a significant relationship between Judging (J) types and the outcomes of 
formal efficiency when solving well-structured problem situations (Figure 62). 
J types -formal effciency Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 24,627a 10 ,006
Likelihood-Ratio 23,020 10 ,011
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,374 1 ,066
No. of Valid Cases 109
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Figure 62: Significance of Judging (J) types on the outcomes of formal efficiency when 
solving well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
The mean values of the decision making efficiency (Figure 63) of the four groups 
participating in the laboratory experiments, show that the efficiency of the manager groups is 
slightly higher than that of the MIM and BIM groups when solving well-structured problem 
tasks. 
 
Figure 63: Mean values decision making efficiency when solving well-structured 
problem tasks of the groups participating in the laboratory experiments 
Source: Author 
The coefficient of variation in decision making efficiency for the MIM group (Figure 64) 
shows a higher variation than for the other groups. 
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Figure 64: Coefficient of variation of decision making efficiency when solving  
well-structured problem tasks 
Source: Author 
These results reflect the fact that Extraverted (E), Thinking (T) and Judging (J) types seem to 
be working more effectively (systematic) and are more comfortable when solving well-
structured problem situations. For the TJ (Thinking-Judging) types this would be in line with 
the underlying theory and also in line with Briggs Myers et al. They describe the TJ types as 
logical decision makers whose goal it is to impose a logical organizational structure to 
problems in order to solve them most efficiently.370 For the Sensing-Intuition (S-N) 
dichotomy the data do not seem to fit the theory, since for this dichotomy the theory claims 
that the Sensing types are rationally orientated and therefore should be more efficient when 
solving well-structured problem situations. This position cannot be supported by the empirical 
data. 
3.3.4. Comprehensive explanation and discussion of the experimental research findings 
The four groups participating in the laboratory experiment achieved similar decision making 
efficiencies within the various problem tasks. In this case previous findings from laboratory 
experiments seem to be confirmed, in that decisions of business management students and 
managers in the field of business management produced similar results.371 
                                                 
370  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., p. 52. 
371  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, p. 330; Witte, E.; Hauschildt, J. 
(1972). Das Informationsverhalten in Entscheidungsprozessen. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr (13), p. 184 
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When solving ill-structured problem tasks, the empirical data support the fact, that 
contradictive to the theory, there seems to be a significant relationship between the personal 
efficiency and Sensing types. So there seems to be evidence that rationally oriented types 
achieve higher efficiencies when solving ill-structured problem tasks than intuitive orientated 
types. As for the significant relation between the personal efficiency and the rationally 
orientated Sensing types, the hypothesis H01 and the hypothesis H04 in this case cannot be 
substantiated.  
For solving the mid-structured problem tasks, the empirical data on the bases of Chi-Square-
Tests provide a significant difference in efficiency measurement between the Sensing and the 
Intuition types but no difference between the Thinking and Feeling types. But as the 
hypothesis states that “complimentary” intuitive and rational behavior in the decision making 
process leads to higher efficiency in mid structured problems than sole intuitive or rational 
behavior, the data do not provide enough substantive results to support hypothesis H02. 
When solving well-structured problem tasks, the empirical data support the fact that Thinking 
and Judging types achieve higher efficiencies than Feeling and Perceiving types. Thinking 
and Judging types perceive themselves as working more systematically and are more 
comfortably when solving well-structured problem tasks than Feeling and Perceiving types. 
This is also in line with Briggs Myers et al. They describe the Thinking/Judging (TJ) types as 
logical decision makers whose goal it is to impose a logical organizational structure to 
problems in order to solve them most efficiently.372 According to the literature, the empirical 
data show that rationally orientated personality types (Thinking types) are overall more 
efficient when solving well-structured problem tasks than intuitive orientated types. So in this 
case the empirical data do provide substantive results to tentatively support the hypothesis H03 
and the hypothesis H05. 
The empirical results of the study of Woolhouse & Bayne support the hypothesis H03 and the 
hypothesis H05, whereby rational oriented personality types are more efficient when solving 
well-structured problem tasks. The results of their study indicate a clear difference in strategy 
and performance on implicit learning tasks between rational and intuitive oriented personality 
types. According to their study individuals with a rationally orientated personality type are 
                                                 
372  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., p. 52. 
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more efficient when applying concrete rules, which is one of the main characteristics of a 
well-structured problem task.373  
Overall, when comparing the mean distributions of the so called four mental functions, the 
NT (Intuition/Thinking) types (Figure 65) seem to achieve the highest decision making 
efficiencies when solving problem tasks.374 
 
Figure 65: Mean values of decision making efficiency measures among the four mental 
functions 
Source: Author 
The coefficient of variation of the sampling of the four mental functions of the MBTI (Figure 
66) also shows that the distribution of the data within the samples and the different structured 
tasks are quite consistent. 
                                                 
373  Woolhouse, L. S.; Bayne, R. (2000). Personality and the Use of Intuition: Individual Differences in Strategy 
and Performance on an Implicit Learning Task. In: European Journal of Personality 14, pp. 167-168. 
374  Briggs Myers, I.; McCaulley, M. H.; Qenk, N. L.; Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the 
development and use of the Myers-Briggs type indicator. 3. Aufl. Palo Alto CA, USA: CPP, Inc., p. 40. 
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Figure 66: The coefficient of variation of the sampling among the four mental functions 
Source: Author 
When conducting a study with 750 managers the empirical results of Hough & ogilvie also 
showed that managers with a preference for Intuition/Thinking (NT) had the highest quality in 
strategic decision making. In particular the research showed that NT-types make higher 
qualitative strategic decisions than NF, SF and ST-types (Figure 67).375  
 
Figure 67: Interaction of Judgment (TF) and Perception (SN) Predicting Decision 
Quality rationality 
Source: Hough & ogilvie, 2005, p. 493 
                                                 
375  Hough, J. R.; ogilvie, d. (2005). An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes. In: 
Journal Management Studies 42 (2), pp. 438–439. 
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In a further study with 200 managers in eight companies, Andersen had similar findings. His 
results showed when measuring the way the managers perceived problems and made their 
decisions, that types with a combination of Intuition (N) and Thinking (T) where 6.7 times 
more strongly, related to organizational effectiveness than with the other decision making 
styles. The covariance between effective and less effective managers being NT-types was 4, 
while the covariance for the “other” managers was 0.6.376  
Experimentees from the present study, with a complimentary intuitive and rational personality 
like the NTJ-types (Figure 68), seem to achieve higher overall efficiency measures in decision 
making than clear rational (cf. STJ or STP) or clear intuitive (cf. NFP or NFJ) types. 
 
Figure 68: Mean values of decision making efficiency among MBTI preferences 
Source: Author 
This becomes even more evident when looking at the four letter types. The ENTJ and INTP 
types seem to be among the types with the overall highest efficiency measures in decision 
making (Figure 69). In this case it seems evident that types with a “mixture” of rational and 
intuitive personality achieve the highest decision making efficiency. 
                                                 
376  Andersen, J. A. (2000). Intuition in managers. Are intuitive managers more effective? In: Journal of 
Managerial Psychology 15 (1), pp. 59–62. 
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Figure 69: Mean values of decision making efficiency among the 16 MBTI types 
Source: Author 
Neuert had similar empirical findings within his research, when he tried to discover a 
potential cause-effect-relationship between intuitive versus discursive decision making 
behavior and decision making efficiency. In his research he conducted a laboratory 
experiment, where the independent variable was measured on a scale from 1 (meaning “full” 
degree of intuition) to 8 (meaning “full” degree of discursion). The dependent variable, which 
was represented by the degree of rationality gained from the data set of experimental 
observation on a scale between 0 (meaning no rational decision making behavior at all) and 5 
(meaning “total” rational decision making behavior), revealed that as in the findings of the 
present work the highest decision making efficiency can be achieved by personality types 
which are in the middle of the spectrum between “complete intuition” and “complete 
discursion (Figure 70).377 
                                                 
377  Cf. Neuert, J. O. (1987). Planungsgrade. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Zusammenhang zwischen 
Planungsverhalten und Planungserfolg. Spardorf, Germany: Rene F. Wilfer, pp. 281-284; Neuert, J. O. 
(2010). The Impact of Intuitive and Discursive Behavioral Patterns on Decision Making Outcomes: Some 
Conjectures and Empirical Findings. In: WDSI Annual Conference Readings, Lake Tahoe, USA, pp. 4478–
4491. 
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Figure 70: Relationship between personality and decision making efficiency 
Source: Neuert, 1987, p. 283 
These results also indicate, that the highest degrees of decision making efficiency can be 
achieved by a “pertinent blend” of intuitive and rational personality types in general, and 
especially when it comes to complex strategic decision making issues. 
3.4. Impact of the research results on management decision making via an application 
orientated approach 
The literature (cf. chapter 1) establishes a common point of view that individuals which have 
a tendency for an intuitive thinking style are more successful in using unconscious 
information as well as heuristic judgments and therefore are more efficient when solving ill-
structured problems. In contrast, individuals with a tendency for rational thinking, who use 
information in a more concrete format and are more related to normative judgment, seem to 
be more efficient when solving well-structured problems. Therefore according to the 
literature, as already indicated within the hypotheses, intuitive behavior should lead to higher 
efficiency within ill-structured problem situations and rational behavior should lead to higher 
efficiency within well-structured problem situation in the decision making process. In this 
case it would be a rather “simple” approach for top managers to establish rules to assign the 
right “type” of people to the appropriate problem situation (rational orientated personality 
types for well-structured problem situations versus intuitive orientated personality types for 
ill-structured problems situation) or compose teams in a way that their personality structure 
matches the appropriate problem structure, in order to achieve overall the highest efficiency in 
the management decision making processes. But the results of this research, in general, did 
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not provide substantive results to tentatively support those hypotheses. Rather they indicated 
that the highest efficiency can be achieved by a “pertinent blend” of intuitive and rational 
personality. Therefore, managers need to better understand how to develop complimentary 
decision making teams comprised of a “perfect” mixture of intuitive and rational decision 
making types. Further it seems that managers need to recognize how to enhance their decision 
making efficiency within different kinds of problem situations (well-, mid- and ill-structured). 
To allow the development of a complimentary intuitive and rational decision making 
approach and the enhancement of decision making efficiency, the following three step 
application orientated approach was developed. This approach is ideally kicked off in a 
workshop with a group of managers, followed up by individual coaching and carried on by 
reflections of the individual managers to improve their decision making efficiency:  
 
• Step 1: Awareness of the personality type and training/improvement of the less 
developed behavioral patterns 
In this first step it is necessary that managers be introduced to the different styles of 
personality/behavior to understand how they differ and which impact different types of 
personality can have on management decision making. Ideally this is not only done by 
conducting a sole personality type assessment to deliver the type. Rather this is done by 
having a personality type assessment upfront and then conducting a workshop based on 
examples and case studies where different styles of behavior are carved out. It is crucial that 
managers experience and reflect the various differences among the personality types and the 
possible impacts on management decision making. This will enable managers to understand 
where they are on a continuum from totally rational to totally intuitive and also to recognize 
their type related communication style. This will put them into a position to understand what 
their dominant decision making style is and then to reflect continuously if they also activated 
their non-dominant decision making style in appropriate cases. Further it supports the 
managers when informing team members, subordinates or stakeholders about their decisions, 
taking into account the different type related perceiving modes of the addressed individuals. 
 
• Step 2: Understand the decision making requirements for managers 
In the second step it is crucial for managers to understand the decision making requirements 
of their daily job and how they can characterize them in terms of the problem situation (well-, 
mid-, ill-structured) to be able to solve them most efficiently. Therefore the managers should 
identify and list difficult situations from their daily business which require elaborate decision 
making processes. After that they need to understand the difference of well-, mid- and ill-
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structured problem situations (cf. chapter 2.3.1.). Next the identified and listed situations 
should be categorized into well-, mid- and ill-structured problems according to the criteria 
which have been established in chapter 2.3.1. This allows in a practical manner to address 
daily problem situations which require elaborate decision making approaches to the 
appropriate problem structure. 
 
• Step 3: Development of decision making approaches for differently structured 
problem situations  
After the categorization of the daily job situations into well-, mid- and ill-structured problem 
situations, in the final step, decision making approaches for the different problem structures 
have to be developed. As well-structured problems, by definition, have a well-defined initial 
state, well defined goals, a single correct answer and all elements for the solution are known, 
the task for the managers is to develop and gather tools, templates, checklists, methods and 
procedures which support the problem solution process for solving daily well-structured 
problem situations. That requires the development of sound knowledge of classical decision 
making heuristics such as investment appraisal, optimization algorithms, cost accounting 
tools, etc. As for mid-structured problem situations, by definition, the goals are known but 
information, findings, problem solutions and data might be implicitly embedded in the 
problem, the gathering of tools, templates, methods and procedures can be used but in 
addition an overall missing problem solution process has to be established. This can be done 
by using a creativity technique like brainstorming, scenario writing, application of decision 
matrices, etc. This would allow for developing and evaluating different possible problem 
solution processes for solving mid-structured decision problems. For ill-structured problem 
situations, where by definition, goals are vaguely or hardly defined, have no single objectively 
correct solution and no execution program or algorithm is known, rather than creating a clear 
problem solution process in a first step, managers need to establish a “competency attitude” to 
see or recognize patterns within the problem situation which they can track back to previous 
experience they had in similar situations. For this case a method which is developed for 
solving complex problems can be used to setup an approach for solving daily ill-structured 
problem situations. This method (i.p. “Look, See, Imagine, Show”) enables managers to 
visualize complex and ill-structured problems to better identify and recognize patterns within 
these problem situations and then work on concrete problem solutions.378 As a final step after 
                                                 
378  Roam, D. (2009). Unfolding the napkin. The hands-on method for solving complex problems with simple 
pictures. New York: Portfolio. 
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learning how to visualize complex problem situations it is crucial, that this know-how be 
“internalized” to build a competency attitude. Therefore it will be necessary for the managers 
to use and repeat this kind of method in a frequent mode in daily business so that it’s 
developed it into a habit. 
Surely this is only one possibility to transfer the results of this research study into an 
application orientated approach helping manages to improve their decision making efficiency, 
but it will be the foundation for leadership decision making training hosted by the author. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the intensive literature research and, in particular, on the results of the empirical 
investigation the scientific study leads to the following conclusions: 
1. Neither intuitive decision makers nor rational decision makers per se achieve 
outstanding decision making performance in differing decision making situations 
(well-, mid- and ill-structured) but mostly a “pertinent blend” of decision making 
characteristics leads to the relatively best decision making results. This empirically 
supported finding suggests that intuition and rationality, as well, significantly 
contribute to high decision making efficiency. Nonetheless, there are some decision 
making situations, where obviously more intuition based decision making or more 
rational decision making can be partially superior. This can be tentatively confirmed 
by the empirical results of this study, as Thinking (T) types achieve higher efficiencies 
than Feeling (F) types when solving well-structured problem situations. This is also 
supported by the fact that there is a significant correlation (χ2 = 0,041) between 
Thinking (T) types and material efficiency when solving well-structured problem 
tasks. The results also show that Judging (J) types achieve higher efficiencies than 
Perceiving (P) types when solving well-structured problem situations and that there is 
a significant correlation (χ2 = 0,060) between Judging (J) types and the formal 
efficiency when solving well-structured problem tasks. These findings are also line 
with the underlying theory of Briggs Myers et al., as they describe the TJ types as 
logical decision makers whose goal it is to impose logical organizational structure to 
problems to solve them most efficiently. 
2. Individuals who have a preference for an intuitive thinking seem to be more successful 
in using unconscious information and are more related to heuristic judgments as well 
as to ill-structured problems where, by definition, goals are defined vaguely or not at 
all. But contradictive to theory the rational orientated Sensing (S) types achieve higher 
decision making efficiencies than the Intuition (N) types when solving ill-structured 
problem situations. Further there is a significant correlation between the Sensing (S) 
types and personal efficiency when solving ill-structured problem situations. Therefore 
the findings from the literature review cannot be supported by the empirical results of 
this study. 
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3. For mid-structured problem situations it was assumed that individuals who have a 
preference for a complementary rational and intuitive thinking style are most efficient 
when solving mid-structured problem tasks. Here again the empirical results of the 
study do not provide significant evidence to support this assumption. However, the 
empirical results show, that personality types with a mix of intuition (N) and 
rationality (T) by the measurement of the MBTI show the highest efficiency outcomes 
in management decision making. These results are also in line with other empirical 
studies which have been conducted with managers. 
4. Overall there are no significant statistical correlations between the various degrees of 
intuition/rationality indicators and the decision making efficiency degrees in well-
structured, mid-structured and ill-structured decision making. This indicates that there 
is no “linear” function between rational/intuitive reasoning and decision making 
performance. Therefore it does not seems possible to “simply” establish rules for 
management decisions to use a more rational approach when facing well-structured 
problem situations and a more intuitive approach when facing ill-structured problem 
situations. 
5. The outcomes from the empirical experiment support the notion, that the highest 
decision making efficiency can be achieved by a “pertinent blend” of intuitive and 
rational personality types, which is also consistent with previous empirical studies. 
6. The empirical experiments, included managers (practitioners) and students from 
business management faculties as in many previous empirical experiments. Here again 
the findings from previous laboratory experiments seem to confirm that decisions of 
students and managers in the field of business management produced similar results as 
the four groups (two groups of managers and two groups of students) participating in 
the laboratory experiment. Also they achieved similar decision making efficiencies 
within the various problem tasks. This allows for the presumption that managers and 
business students alike can function as probands for experimental research studies. 
7. The overall general conclusion yields the fact that different personality types are not 
per se a dominant independent variable for decision making success, but corroborate 
the notion that various decision making types can nearly equally contribute to 
acceptable decision making efficiency in managerial problem solving. 
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SUGGESTIONS 
From the results of this scientific study the author suggests the following points: 
1. Whereas the literature until now proposed that rational oriented types seem to be more 
efficient when solving well-structured problems and vice versa intuitive orientated 
types are more efficient when solving ill-structured problems and therefore types 
could be allocated accordingly to the different problem situations. The results of the 
present study suggest that managers should also train their non-dominant decision 
making style to build up a complementary approach allowing them then to increase 
their decision making efficiency. Being able to address a complementary approach by 
mixing rational and intuitive approaches will not only increase the decision making 
efficiency of managers but also will enable them to consider how their subordinates 
and stakeholders perceive these decisions according to the difference of their 
personality type. A complementary approach therefore will support a type related 
communication resulting in a better understanding and therefore provide higher 
efficiency during the implementation of the decision making outcomes by team 
member, subordinates or stakeholders. 
2. Apart from the individual personality development, aiming to consider the impact of 
personality types on the decision making efficiency when solving problems within 
groups, managers can increase the decision making efficiency, by increasing the 
heterogeneity of their teams in terms of having individuals with different kinds of 
personality types. This means that team members are chosen according to the 
domination they have as a decision making style (intuitive vs. rational). This again 
would allow having a kind of complementary rational and intuitive approach to 
achieve higher decision making efficiency rather than an isolated rational or intuitive 
approach. 
3. For the operationalization on how to solve differently structured problems managers 
should identify the various decision making situations in their job environment and try 
to categorize them by well-, mid- and ill-structured problem situations (cf. chapter 
2.3.1). After that they should seek for adequate problem solutions, methods and 
procedures and practice them so that they become inherent. For well-structured 
problem situations this could mean using known algorithms, concepts, tools, templates 
and checklists which support the problem solution process. For mid-structured 
problem situations algorithms, concepts, tools and templates may first have to be 
developed in order to establish an overall, not knowing from the beginning, problem 
solution process. For ill-structured problem situations managers need to establish a 
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“competency attitude” to see and recognize patterns within problem situations which 
enable them to relate to previous experience they had in similar situations and to apply 
them then to a concrete problem solution process on a current problem. 
4. The author also recommends that the results of this study should be part of a 
leadership training or workshops within business organizations or professional 
academies, especially in the context of management decision making training. In this 
case the application oriented approach, outlined in chapter 3.4, could be a first starting 
point within workshops to implement and address the results of this study to increase 
the awareness of leaders and managers for this kind of topic in business organizations.  
5. As decision making and especially strategic decision making is one of the major 
management tasks, the results of this study should also be used for the education and 
training of future managers at Universities. Especially the impact of problem 
structures and individual behavior should be in the focus of this kind of education. 
Here also the application oriented approach, outlined in chapter 3.4, could be build up 
as a case study to support future managers to become better aware of the “mechanics” 
on how personality types impact the decision making efficiency.  
6. Last but not least, more research including various factors of personal disposition (e.g. 
personality, managerial experience, professional expertise, etc.) and the problem 
characteristics would be desirable to better understand how different factors influence 
the efficiency of the management decision making process and how personal behavior 
can be adjusted to improve this process, especially in an increasingly insecure and 
uncertain business environment. As in this case personal behavior is also related to 
situational circumstances, esp. in today’s dynamic business environment, there also 
seems to be a great need of further research in dynamic decision making structures and 
how they influence the efficiency of management decision making. Especially the 
development of more sophisticated tools on how to train people in dynamic situational 
decision making would be helpful.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Decision making tasks 
a) Well-structured decision making task 
Task 1 (English version) 
 
Registration number: _________    
Year of birth: _________    
Gender: □ female □ male   
Semester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Course of specialization: ____________________________________  
Time start: _______   
Time stop: _______   
 
Description379: 
For purchasing a new machine (option A, B or C) a decision shall be made based on a 
comparative cost method (investment calculation). The machine producing with the lowest 
cost per unit and therefore has the highest cost efficiency shall be selected.  
Task: 
Please determine which machine the most cost efficient option is? Please assume that the 
capacity of the machines will be fully utilized. 
Determine also for the two most cost efficient options until which critical production volume 
which option is more cost efficient? 
 
Total Costs  Machine A Machine B Machine C 
Purchasing price (EUR) 80.000 70.000 100.000 
Machine life (Years) 10 7 10 
Capacity (Units/Year) 10.000 7.000 12.000 
Fix costs (EUR/Year) 13.000 15.000 16.000 
Variable costs (EUR/Year) 32.000 18.760 29.760 
 
  
                                                 
379  Cf. Perridon, L, Steiner, M. (1997). Finanzwirtschaft der Unternehmung, 9. Aufl. München, Vahlen Verlag, 
pp. 43-44. 
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Aufgabe 1 (German version) 
 
Ihre Matrikelnummer: _________    
Ihr Jahrgang: _________    
Ihr Geschlecht: □ weiblich □ männlich   
Ihr aktuelles Fachsemester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Ihr Studienschwerpunkt: ____________________________________  
Uhrzeit Start: _______ Uhr   
Uhrzeit Ende: _______ Uhr   
 
Beschreibung380: 
Für die Anschaffung einer neuen Anlage (Variante A, B oder C) soll eine Entscheidung auf 
Basis einer Kostenvergleichsrechnung (Investitionsrechnung) getroffen werden. Es soll die 
Anlage beschafft werden, welche die geringsten Kosten pro Leistungseinheit (LE) 
erwirtschaftet bzw. damit die höchste Kosteneffizienz besitzt.  
Aufgabe: 
Bitte ermitteln Sie, welche Anlage die kostengünstigste Variante ist? Nehmen Sie an, dass die 
Kapazitäten der Anlagen jeweils voll genutzt werden. 
Beurteilen für die zwei kostengünstigsten Varianten auch, bis bzw. ab welcher kritischen 
Produktionsmenge welche Anlage kostengünstiger ist? 
 
Gesamtkosten  Anlage A Anlage B Anlage C 
Anschaffungswert (EUR) 80.000 70.000 100.000 
Nutzungsdauer (Jahre) 10 7 10 
Kapazität (LE/Jahr) 10.000 7.000 12.000 
Fixe Kosten (EUR/Jahr)) 13.000 15.000 16.000 
Variable Kosten (EUR/Jahr) 32.000 18.760 29.760 
 
  
                                                 
380  Cf. Perridon, L, Steiner, M. (1997). Finanzwirtschaft der Unternehmung, 9. Aufl. München, Vahlen Verlag, 
pp. 43-44. 
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b) Mid-structured decision making task 
Task 2 (English version) 
Registration number: _________    
Year of birth: _________    
Gender: □ female □ male   
Semester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Course of specialization: ____________________________________  
Time start: _______   
Time stop: _______   
 
Description: 
Pipers, which is a subsidiary of a large international food company, markets a range of meat 
products in Ruritania, one of the more backward European countries. The range contains four 
brand leaders, the longest-established and most profitable of which is the Pipers Premium 
Pasta. Premium Pasties owe their superior taste and texture to the use of Scottish beef steak 
and a unique cooking process devised by Sir Peter Piper, the founder of the firm. When Sir 
Peter sold his company to the present owners he was asked to stay on as Chairman of the 
Board. The day-to-day running of Pipers is now in the hands of a Canadian Managing 
Director in his thirties, while Sir Peter, who is twenty years his senior, devotes most of his 
time to an active and successful political career. 
The largest retailer in Ruritania is a firm called Metro Markets, which has increased its share 
of the total food market from 47% to 50% over the last five years. MM’s success is built on 
their buying power and the siting of their 700 retail outlets, one in every major town in 
Ruritania. MM demand that all their suppliers give them a price 2½% below their lowest list-
price. They also expect manufacturers of leading brands to supply an MM own-label product 
of almost comparable quality at a price 10% below the lowest list-price of the manufacturer’s 
brand. Pipers (like all their competitors), have given MM the extra 2½%, but Pipers have 
resolutely refused to supply a cheap own-label imitation of their Premium Pasty. In 
retaliation, MM have priced and shelved the product so that MM contribute less than 30% of 
its total sales volume. In addition, MM have refused to stock the last three new products 
Pipers have introduced until more than six months after they have proved themselves 
successful in other stores. 
One year ago a formidable new competitor for Pipers appeared in Ruritania, a subsidiary of 
CC (Meat Products) Inc. They have launched a premium product, the Rancho Steak Pie 
which is rated in consumer tests almost equal with Pipers Premium Pasty, despite being 
made from frozen South American beef. Rancho Steak Pies cost less to produce than 
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Premium Pasties, partly because of their cheaper raw materials, and partly because their new 
factory employs advanced manufacturing technology. The greater productivity of their plant 
compensates for the extra processes required by their lower-grade raw material. The result is 
that Rancho Steak Pies are sold to the consumer at prices 5% below Premium Pasties. 
This month MM approached Pipers stating that they plan to launch a new MM Premium 
Pasty in six months’ time. CC have already stated their willingness to manufacture the new 
product. MM says they wish to give the manufacturer of the brand leader one final chance 
before they accept CC’s offer. 
The Sales Director of Pipers believes they should take this opportunity since the sales volume 
of Premium Pasties is static and Pipers plan to launch several new lines in the next year. 
The Technical Director supports this view; he points out that a new automated manufacturing 
system for Premium Pasties would bring down the unit cost of production by more than the 
7½% difference in the price realised from Pipers and MM own-label pasties. 
The Finance Director confirms that the lower unit costs and extra profits on Premium Pasties 
sold to customers other than MM would enable the cost of the new automated plant to be 
recovered in 2½ years. 
The Marketing Director opposes the manufacture of MM own-label by Pipers, since this 
would inevitably take volume and market share from Pipers Premium Pasties. 
The Personnel Director points out that the installation of an automated manufacturing system 
in Pipers‘ factory would cause 400 process workers to become redundant. The unemployment 
level in Ruritania, the highest in Europe, has made the present government very sensitive on 
this issue, and redundancy payments would be considerable. 
Sir Peter opposes the manufacture of MM own-label. He has been actively lobbying the 
government to set up a Monopolies Commission to investigate the retail trade. He is also one 
of a group of MPs trying to introduce Fair Trading laws like those in force in the USA and the 
more advanced European countries: such laws would make MM’s demand illegal. 
Task: 
Next month the Managing Director is due to present Pipers annual and five-year plans to the 
Board of the international holding company. These plans must contain proposals for dealing 
with the present situation. Therefore please answer the following questions: 
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1. How plausible are the reasons of the different leaders from your point of view? Please 
evaluate the plausibility of the leaders in the following table:  
1 = very plausible to 5 = not plausible at all. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Sales Director      
Technical Director      
Finance Director      
Marketing Director      
Personnel Director      
 
2. Please bring the different reasons into order (from 1 to 5) according to your preference. 
1 = preferred the strongest to 5 = preferred the least 
Sales Director  
Technical Director  
Finance Director  
Marketing Director  
Personnel Director  
 
3. Please set up cost-benefit calculation for both strategic options, to show, which one of the 
options is to accept/decline. 
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Aufgabe 2 (German version) 
 
Ihre Matrikelnummer: _________    
Ihr Jahrgang: _________    
Ihr Geschlecht: □ weiblich □ männlich   
Ihr aktuelles Fachsemester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Ihr Studienschwerpunkt: ____________________________________  
Uhrzeit Start: _______ Uhr   
Uhrzeit Ende: _______ Uhr   
 
Beschreibung: 
Pipers, eine Tochterfirma eines internationalen Nahrungsmittelkonzerns, vermarktet eine 
Auswahl von Fleischprodukten in Ruritania, eines der rückständigeren europäischen Länder. 
Die Auswahl beinhaltet vier Markenführer. Die am längsten etablierte und profitabelste 
Marke ist die Pipers Premium Pastatasche. Premium Pastataschen verdanken ihren 
ausgezeichneten Geschmack und die Textur dem Einsatz von schottischem Rindfleisch und 
einer einmaligen Zubereitung, erfunden von Sir Peter Piper, dem Gründer der Firma. Als Sir 
Peter die Firma an den jetzigen Besitzer verkaufte, wurde er gefragt, ob er als 
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender im Unternehmen verweilen möchte. Das Tagesgeschäft wird nun 
durch einen kanadischen Geschäftsführer geführt, der Mitte dreißig ist, während Sir Peter, 
welcher bereits 20 Jahre in diesem Geschäft tätig ist, die meiste seiner Zeit für eine aktive und 
erfolgreiche Karriere in der Politik aufwendet. 
Der größte Einzelhändler in Ruritania ist eine Firma namens Metro Märkte, welche ihren 
Marktanteil die letzten fünf Jahre von 47% auf 50% gesteigert hat. MM’s Erfolg kommt von 
der Einkaufsstärke und dem Sitz der 700 Filialen, eine fast in jeder größeren Stadt von 
Ruritania. Die MM’s behaupten, dass ihnen alle Lieferanten Preise geben, welche 2,5% 
unterhalb der niedrigsten Preisliste liegen. Sie erwarten von den Markenherstellern auch, dass 
diese Produkte in vergleichbarer Qualität für die MM Eigenmarke hergestellt werden, bei 
denen die Preise 10% unterhalb der niedrigsten Preisliste der Markenprodukte der Hersteller 
liegen. Pipers hat (wie alle anderen Wettbewerber) MM die extra 2,5% gegeben, aber Pipers 
weigert sich vehement, ein Billigproduktimitat für ihr Premium Pastataschen zu liefern. Im 
Gegenzug hat MM das Produkt so platziert und ausgezeichnet, dass es weniger als 30% des 
Verkaufsvolumens beträgt. Weiter hat sich MM geweigert, drei weitere neue Produkte 
anzubieten, welche Pipers bereits seit mehr als sechs Monate erfolgreich in anderen Läden 
eingeführt hat.  
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Vor ca. einem Jahr ist ein neuer eindrucksvoller Wettbewerber in Ruritania aufgetaucht, eine 
Tochterfirma der CC (Fleischprodukte) AG. Sie haben ein Premium Produkt eingeführt, den 
Rancho Steak Pie, welcher bei Konsumententests genauso gut bewertet wurde, wie die 
Pipers Premium Pastataschen, unabhängig davon, dass der Rancho Steak Pie von 
gefrorenem südamerikanischen Rindfleisch hergestellt wird. Die Rancho Steak Pies kosten 
weniger, bedingt durch den Einsatz von günstigeren Rohmaterialien und weil die neue Fabrik 
modernere Herstelltechnologie einsetzt. Die höhere Produktivität der Werke kompensiert den 
Mehraufwand, welcher durch den Einsatz von geringer wertigem Rohmaterial entsteht. Das 
Ergebnis ist, dass die Rancho Steak Pies zu einem Preis verkauft werden, der 5% günstiger 
ist als bei den Premium Pastataschen.  
Diesen Monat ist MM auf Pipers zugegangen und hat ihnen mitgeteilt, dass sie innerhalb der 
nächsten sechs Monate planen eine neue MM Premium Pastatasche einzuführen. CC hat 
bereits signalisiert, dass sie gewillt sind das neue Produkt herzustellen. MM sagt, dass sie dem 
Hersteller der Premium Marke noch eine letzte Chance geben bevor sie das Angebot von CC 
annehmen. 
Der Verkaufsdirektor von Pipers glaubt, sie sollten die Chance wahrnehmen, da das 
Verkaufsvolumen der Premium Pastataschen stagniert und Pipers plant weitere neue 
Produktlinien einzuführen. 
Der technische Direktor unterstützt diese Sichtweise, er weist darauf hin, dass ein neues 
automatisiertes Herstellungsverfahren für die Premium Pastataschen die Stückkosten von 
Pipers im Gegensatz zu dem MM Eigenprodukt Pastataschen um 7,5% senken könnte. 
Der Finanzdirektor bestätigt, dass geringere Stückkosten und der dadurch entstandene 
Zusatzgewinn bei den Premium Pastataschen durch die anderen Kunden (außer MM), es 
ermöglicht, die Kosten der neuen automatisierten Fabrik innerhalb von 2,5 Jahren zu 
amortisieren. 
Der Marketingdirektor spricht sich gegen die Produktion der MM Eigenmarke durch Pipers 
aus, da diese unwillkürlich Marktanteile und Volumen von Pipers Premium Pastataschen 
Kosten kanibalisieren würde. 
Der Personaldirektor weist darauf hin, dass die Installation eines neuen automatisierten 
Herstellungsverfahrens in Pipers Fabrik etwa 400 Arbeitskräfte überflüssig machen würde. 
Die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit in Ruritania, eine der höchsten in Europa, hat die hiesige Regierung 
extrem sensibel für solche Situation gemacht und wodurch Freisetzungsprämien vorstellbar 
sind. 
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Sir Peter lehnt die Herstellung der MM Eigenmarke ab. Er betreibt aktive Lobbyarbeit, dass 
die Regierung eine Kartellbehörde einsetzt, um den Einzelhandel zu kontrollieren. Er ist auch 
in einer Gruppe von Parlamentsmitgliedern, die versuchen, „faire Handelsgesetze“ 
einzuführen wie z. B. in den USA oder in den mehr entwickelten Ländern in Europa. Diese 
würden die Anforderungen von MM illegal machen. 
Aufgabe: 
Nächsten Monat muss der Geschäftsführer den Jahres- bzw. den Fünfjahresplan dem 
Aufsichtsrat der internationalen Holding vorlegen. Der Plan muss Vorschläge enthalten, wie 
mit der derzeitigen Situation umgegangen werden soll. Beantworten Sie dazu die folgenden 
Fragen: 
1. Wie plausibel klingen Ihrer Meinung nach die Begründungen der einzelnen 
Führungskräfte? Bitte bewerten Sie diese in der folgenden Tabelle von  
1 = sehr plausibel bis 5 = überhaupt nicht plausibel. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Verkaufsdirektor      
Technische Direktor      
Finanzdirektor      
Marketingdirektor      
Personaldirektor      
 
2. Bitte bringen Sie die Sichtweisen in eine Reihenfolge (von 1 bis 5) gemäß Ihrer Präferenz. 
1 = am stärksten präferiert bis 5 = am wenigsten präferiert 
Verkaufsdirektor  
Technische Direktor  
Finanzdirektor  
Marketingdirektor  
Personaldirektor   
 
3. Bitte erstellen Sie eine Kosten-Erlös Kalkulation der beiden strategischen Optionen, um 
aufzuzeigen, welche der beiden Optionen ggf. abzulehnen/anzunehmen sind. 
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c) Ill-structured decision making task 
Task 2 (English version) 
Registration number: _________    
Year of birth: _________    
Gender: □ female □ male   
Semester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Course of specialization: ____________________________________  
Time start: _______   
Time stop: _______   
 
Beschreibung: 
You are a member of a space crew scheduled to rendezvous with a mother ship on the lighted 
surface of the moon. However, due to mechanical difficulties, your own ship was forced to 
land at a spot 200 km from the rendezvous point. During re-entry and landing, much of the 
equipment aboard was damaged and, since survival depends on reaching the mother ship, the 
most critical items available must be chosen for the 200 km trip. 15 items are listed as being 
intact and undamaged after landing.  
Task: 
Your task is to rank them in terms of their importance for your crew, to allow them to reach 
the rendezvous point. Place the number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the 
second most important, and so on through to number 15 for the least important. 
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Solution: 
Your ranking: Salvaged items:   
 Box of matches   
 Food concentrate   
 50 feet of nylon rope   
 Parachute silk   
 Portable heating unit   
 Two .45 caliber pistols   
 dehydrated milk   
 Two 100-pound tanks of oxygen   
 Stellar map   
 Self-inflating life raft   
 Magnetic compass   
 Five gallons of water   
 Signal flares   
 First aid kit containing injection 
needles 
  
 Solar powered FM receiver   
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Aufgabe 3 (German version) 
 
Ihre Matrikelnummer: _________    
Ihr Jahrgang: _________    
Ihr Geschlecht: □ weiblich □ männlich   
Ihr aktuelles Fachsemester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Ihr Studienschwerpunkt: ____________________________________  
Uhrzeit Start: _______ Uhr   
Uhrzeit Ende: _______ Uhr   
 
Beschreibung: 
Sie sind Mitglied einer Raumschiff-Crew. Ursprünglich war geplant, dass Sie mit einem 
Mutterschiff auf der beleuchteten Oberfläche des Mondes ein Rendezvous haben. Wie auch 
immer, wegen mechanischer Probleme musste Ihr Raumschiff an einem Punkt ca. 200 km 
entfernt von dem Rendezvous Punkt landen. Während des Wiedereintritts und der Landung 
wurde das meiste von Ihrer Ausrüstung an Bord beschädigt und da das Überleben vom 
Erreichen des Mutterschiffes abhängt, müssen die kritischsten Ausrüstungsgegenstände für 
den 200 km langen Trip ausgewählt werden. Unten sind 15 Gegenstände aufgelistet, welche 
nach der Landung noch intakt und unbeschädigt sind.  
 
Aufgabe: 
Ihre Aufgabe ist es nun, diese Gegenstände nach der Wichtigkeit für Ihre Crew zu ordnen, um 
es Ihnen zu ermöglichen den Rendezvouspunkt zu erreichen. Positionieren Sie den 
wichtigsten Gegenstand mit der Nummer 1, den zweitwichtigsten mit der Nummer 2 und so 
weiter bis zum am wenig wichtigsten Gegenstand mit der Nummer 15.  
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Lösung: 
Ihre 
Reihenfolge: 
Gegenstände:   
 Streichhölzer   
 Lebensmittelkonzentrat   
 Fünfzig Fuß Nylonseil   
 Fallschirmseide   
 Tragbares Heizgerät   
 Zwei Pistolen Kaliber .45   
 Trockenmilch   
 Zwei 100-Pfund-Tanks mit Sauerstoff   
 Mondatlas   
 Sich selbst aufblasendes 
Lebensrettungsfloß  
  
 Magnetischer Kompass   
 Fünf Gallonen Wasser   
 Signalleuchtkugeln   
 „Erste-Hilfe“-Koffer mit 
Injektionsnadeln 
  
 Sonnenenergie-UKW-Funkgerät    
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Appendix II: Questionnaire for the evaluation of the individual efficiency 
Questionnaire (English version) 
 
Registration number: _________    
Year of birth: _________    
Gender: □ female □ male   
Semester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Course of specialization: ____________________________________ 
Type of task: □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. How satisfied were you today with your problem solution process? 
       
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied 
 
2. How complex was the underlying problem for you? 
       
very complex 1 2 3 4 5 very easy 
 
3. How intense can you identify yourself with the discovered problem solution? 
       
very little 1 2 3 4 5 very much 
 
4. How do you evaluate your work concerning a target orientated information search? 
       
very disorientated 1 2 3 4 5 very target oriented 
 
5. How do you evaluate your work concerning a target orientated information search? 
       
very weak 1 2 3 4 5 very strong 
information search      information search 
 
6. How do you evaluate your work concerning a systematic approach? 
       
very unsystematic 1 2 3 4 5 very systematic 
 
7. . How do you evaluate your problem solving style,  
      rational (figures and facts-decider)             or              intuitive (stomach-decider))? 
       
very rational 1 2 3 4 5 very intuitive 
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Fragebogen (German version) 
 
Ihre Matrikelnummer: _________    
Ihr Jahrgang: _________    
Ihr Geschlecht: □ weiblich □ männlich   
Ihr aktuelles Fachsemester: □ 1     □ 2 □ 3     □ 4 □ 5     □ 6 □ 7     □ 8 
Ihr Studienschwerpunkt: ____________________________________ 
Aufgabentyp: □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 
 
 
Bitte beantworten Sie uns folgende Fragen: 
 
1. Wie zufrieden sind Sie heute mit Ihrem Problemlösungsprozess? 
       
sehr unzufrieden 1 2 3 4 5 sehr zufrieden 
 
2. Wie schwierig war das heutige Problem für Sie? 
       
sehr schwierig 1 2 3 4 5 sehr leicht 
 
3. Wie stark können Sie sich mit der getroffenen Problemlösung identifizieren? 
       
sehr gering 1 2 3 4 5 sehr stark 
 
4. Wie beurteilen Sie Ihre Arbeit hinsichtlich einer zielorientierten Problembearbeitung? 
       
Orientierungslos 1 2 3 4 5 sehr zielorientiert 
 
5. Wie beurteilen Sie Ihre Arbeit hinsichtlich einer zielorientierten  
    Informationsbeschaffung? 
       
sehr schwache  1 2 3 4 5 sehr starke 
Informationssuche      Informationssuche 
 
6. Wie beurteilen Sie Ihre Arbeit hinsichtlich des systematischen Vorgehens? 
       
sehr unsystematisch 1 2 3 4 5 sehr systematisch 
 
7. Wie beurteilen Sie Ihren Problemlösungsstil,  
      rational (Zahlen, Daten, Fakten-Entscheider) oder intuitive (Bauchentscheider)? 
       
sehr rational 1 2 3 4 5 sehr intuitiv 
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Appendix III: Empirical data 
Correlations of the MBTI preferences and the various problem tasks 
 
* p < 0.05    ** p < 0.01 
  
MBTI types 1-16 R²
formal efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,093 -
well-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,336
N 109
material efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,005 -
well-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,961
N 109
formal efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,031 -
mid-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,760
N 100
material efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,053 -
mid-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,600
N 99
formal efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,044 -
ill-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,652
N 106
material efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,192* ,037
ill-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,047
N 107
individual efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,186 ,035
well-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,053
N 109
total efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,068 -
well-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,483
N 109
individual efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,015 -
mid-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,887
N 98
total efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient ,006 -
mid-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,950
N 98
individual efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,027 -
ill-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,782
N 106
total efficiency Korrelationskoeffizient -,025 -
ill-structured Sig. (2-seitig) ,798
N 106
Correlations
PE2
Total2
PE3
Total3
Task 1 (0-10)
Time 1
Task 2 (0-10)
Time 2
Task 3 (0-10)
Time 3
PE1
Total1
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Mean values of ill-structured problem tasks 
 
  
E_I Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
E ,8171 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,0458 ,05610
I ,7783 ,002 ,73 ,84 ,0426 ,05476
Total ,8149 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,0464 ,05689
S_N Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
S ,8154 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04615 ,05660
N ,7900 ,005 ,74 ,84 ,07071 ,08951
Total ,8149 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04636 ,05689
T_F Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
T ,8174 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04603 ,05631
F ,7733 ,001 ,73 ,81 ,03141 ,04062
Total ,8149 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04636 ,05689
J_P Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
J ,8178 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04626 ,05657
P ,7957 ,002 ,73 ,87 ,04380 ,05505
Total ,8149 ,002 ,70 ,91 ,04636 ,05689
Ill-structured problem tasks
Ill-structured problem tasks
Ill-structured problem tasks
Ill-structured problem tasks
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Mean values of mid-structured problem tasks 
 
  
E_I Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
E ,6254 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07644 ,12222
I ,5720 ,001 ,55 ,61 ,02490 ,04353
Total ,6227 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07554 ,12132
S_N Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
S ,6240 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07470 ,11971
N ,4900 . ,49 ,49 .
Total ,6227 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07554 ,12132
T_F Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
T ,6233 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07710 ,12369
F ,6100 ,001 ,55 ,65 ,03808 ,06242
Total ,6227 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07554 ,12132
J_P Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
J ,6238 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07608 ,12197
P ,6154 ,006 ,49 ,72 ,07446 ,12099
Total ,6227 ,006 ,38 ,79 ,07554 ,12132
Mid-structured problem tasks
Mid-structured problem tasks
Mid-structured problem tasks
Mid-structured problem tasks
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Mean values of well-structured problem tasks 
 
 
E_I Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
E ,6359 ,015 ,27 ,86 ,12420 ,19532
I ,5314 ,024 ,36 ,76 ,15636 ,29422
Total ,6292 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12824 ,20383
S_N Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
S ,6281 ,017 ,27 ,86 ,12856 ,20466
N ,6850 ,018 ,59 ,78 ,13435 ,19613
Total ,6292 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12824 ,20383
T_F Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
T ,6360 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12632 ,19860
F ,5117 ,012 ,36 ,67 ,11053 ,21602
Total ,6292 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12824 ,20383
J_P Mean value Variance Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
J ,6332 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12620 ,19931
P ,6040 ,020 ,36 ,82 ,14242 ,23579
Total ,6292 ,016 ,27 ,86 ,12824 ,20383
Well-structured problem tasks
Well-structured problem tasks
Well-structured problem tasks
Well-structured problem tasks
